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Society’s increased dependency on networked technologies and infrastructures in nearly all sectors 
poses a new challenge to governments and other actors to ensure the sustainability and security 
of all things ‘cyber’. Cybersecurity is a particularly complex field, where multiple public and private 
actors must work together, often across state borders, not only to address current weaknesses, but 
also to anticipate and prevent or pre-empt a number of different kinds of threats. This report 
examines how public policy and regulatory measures are used to organise such processes in five 
countries: Canada, Estonia, Germany, the Netherlands and the UK. 
The contextual framework guiding this analysis first attempts to define cybersecurity, combining a 
grammatical understanding of the component parts ‘cyber’ and ‘security’, a hermeneutic 
understanding of related terms and a pragmatic understanding of how ‘cybersecurity’ is used in 
practice. Cybersecurity is defined as the proactive and reactive processes working toward the ideal 
of being free from threats to the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of the computers, networks, 
and information that form part of, and together constitute, cyberspace—the conceptual space that 
affords digitised and networked human and organisational activities. With this working definition of 
cybersecurity in place, the framework also identifies developments in the theoretical understanding 
of ‘governance’, first by looking at the shift from government to governance, then at the relationship 
between governance and regulation, and finally at more recent theories that recognize multiple 
forms and centres of governance, as well as the iterative and sometimes experimental nature of 
governance processes. Recent work on risk governance is also especially relevant to this particular 
case. Thus, ‘cybersecurity governance’ broadly refers to the approaches used by multiple 
stakeholders to identify, frame and coordinate cybersecurity.  
This study constitutes a ‘quick scan’ of relevant policy and initiatives using a comparative case-
oriented policy and stakeholder analysis. The five countries were selected on the basis of 
geographic diversity, different legal traditions, presence of a national cybersecurity strategy, a high 
ranking on the ICT Development Index and availability of sources. For each country an analysis 
was made of cybersecurity governance in three areas: botnet mitigation, protection of vital 
infrastructures and protection of identity infrastructures. The cases were selected to be diverse, 
and to cover the main aspects of cybersecurity (confidentiality, availability and integrity), different 
domains of government (law enforcement, national security, and service delivery), and different 
levels of private-actor involvement.  
The botnet case examines mitigation efforts with regard to machines infected by bots (pieces of 
advanced malicious software that install system backdoors that connect back to remote machines 
via common communication channels). Botnets have become complex, resilient infections, 
remaining under the radar of security tools such as firewalls and anti-viruses. All of the countries 
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included in this quick scan have a national Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT), which 
has a clear oversight mandate regarding the dissemination of threats on national territory. While 
the procedures followed by CERTs are to a large extent harmonised, the practical value of their 
operations in regard to botnets varies largely. Many CERTs distribute relevant information within 
circles of trust, but such information often remains undisclosed to a larger audience. Multi-
stakeholder mitigation efforts also seem to vary, while all countries have demonstrated participation 
in international cooperative efforts against botnets. There is a significant level of international 
cooperation in botnet mitigation, which is facilitated by the fact that all countries in our study have 
ratified the Cybercrime Convention. Legislation is thus a harmonizing element in this case. 
However, because the Convention acts as a minimum catalogue of offences and investigation 
powers, significant differences between countries’ law remain. An important point to be addressed 
is the fact that ISPs are currently quite limited in the types of action they can take. There are 
attempts to formalize an increased role for ISPs, but this is largely through ISPs taking the initiative 
to change their Terms of Use. 
Vital infrastructures are examined through the lens of the energy sector, as this sector has had a 
number of high-profile incidents related to (among others) technical malfunctioning and human 
error that demonstrate the importance of good cybersecurity governance. Although this narrows 
the focus with regard to vulnerabilities in and governance of vital infrastructures, the quick scan 
revealed that part of the problem across the board lies in the broad definition of what constitutes a 
country’s ‘vital’ infrastructures. The combination of numerous policy documents containing 
generally vague recommendations, with a large, and growing, number of actors that are somehow 
related to the governance of vital infrastructures, make the field hard to oversee for governance 
purposes. Further, this case highlights that economic factors play an important role, as the 
distribution of responsibilities among public and private parties, and the consequent strength or 
weakness of obligations of parties, partly depends on how resources are allocated and on parties’ 
willingness to invest in preventive measures that serve a combination of public and private 
interests. Even more importantly, the case illustrates the need for coordination in the governance 
of cybersecurity: the choice of new measures to take touches upon the general interest and 
therefore legitimises certain government involvement in stipulating the responsibilities of private 
actors. In the cases discussed here, two types of institutionalization can be discerned: 
institutionalization in the energy domain and institutionalization in the cybersecurity domain. It also 
shows how the theoretical notion of governance-as-process takes shape in practice in the 
institutionalization of both the energy domain and the cybersecurity domain.  The role of the state 
with regard to governance of this sector often takes on the form of providing a framework of rules 
within the boundaries of which private actors are allowed to act, which helps raise major players’ 
awareness of potential security risks, but should at the same time be approached carefully, as this 
can potentially create too much red tape. 
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The identity infrastructures reviewed in this quick scan are quite new, with most still being 
developed. As with the previous cases, the distributed responsibility and mutual dependency 
between actors is evident as they attempt to ensure the protection of individual privacy and citizen-
specific data. There are four primary issues relevant to governance of these infrastructures: 1) 
architecture and interoperability (with different approaches, from centralised infrastructures to 
decentralised approaches requiring interoperability), 2) the role of citizen engagement in 
identification systems (transparent communication strategies when implementing identification 
infrastructures, and empowering users to protect their identity, being important factors), 3) 
combating fraud and other potential threats (with countries experiencing different types and levels 
of abuse) and 4) the role of regulatory measures (with legislation playing a relatively less prominent 
role, while the high degree of mutual dependence between the different actors provides strong 
legitimisation for regulatory intervention). How the different countries deal with these issues 
exemplifies both the trial-and-error nature of experimentalist governance and many of the tensions 
associated with risk governance. Rather than restricting the capacity of traditional authority as is 
stated in these governance theories, however, how these infrastructures are developing highlights 
areas where traditional governance strategies such as regulation fall short, e.g., in creating a 
security-oriented mentality, but at the same time also legitimize the need for more clarity of roles, 
which can be offered through regulatory (legislative) measures that clarify roles rather than leaving 
decisions to the discretion of multiple actors. 
Reviewing these findings, we can draw some conclusions on the distribution of responsibilities and 
the role of law and other forms of regulation in cybersecurity governance. The distribution of 
responsibilities shows many examples of polycentric governance, with varying constellations of 
actors being involved in different sub-fields of cybersecurity. National government agencies 
responsible for the primary agenda-setting and coordination efforts range from ministries of security 
and justice, defence, and economic affairs. It is less clear to what degree each of the agencies in 
the lead has an identified coordinator status with a given final decision-making authority; the 
coordination role seems better described as one of providing guidance, promoting best practices 
and engaging in activities to facilitate collaboration with and between other actors. Whereas the 
distribution of authority across sectors and many levels of government could potentially be 
problematic from a governance perspective, cybersecurity, particularly in case of critical 
infrastructure protection at the national level, is a key issue that is increasingly seen as a joint task 
of society at large, suggesting more distribution of responsibilities across sectors, levels of 
government and types of individual and corporate actors. The involvement of private actors in 
voluntary cooperation schemes requires attention, because of the influence of economic factors; it 
is important that policy choices for new measures in polycentric arrangements (and thus who is 
responsible for new measures and who should invest in them) factor in the general interest, which 
may legitimise, depending on the context, stronger government involvement. A polycentrically 
governed cybersecurity landscape raises more challenges than only dealing with the mutual 
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interdependence between public and private actors, however. The cases show that counteracting 
the security threats posed to the various infrastructures is rarely a merely technical solution; rather, 
communication is a key part of governance processes, be it informing the affected parties after the 
fact or raising public awareness as part of preventive strategies. Moreover, they all point to the 
need for reflexivity and iterative learning in governance processes, which is especially critical given 
the dynamic nature of the cybersecurity landscape and the fact that actors cannot always foresee 
and oversee all the possible threats and their consequences. 
When it comes to the role of law and other forms of regulation, we can conclude that the regulatory 
framework of cybersecurity has certain international elements, e.g., in cybercrime legislation and 
technical standards, but is largely undertaken at the national (and sometimes sub-national) level. 
Supranational regulation is visible in the EU, but rather limited to certain aspects of cybersecurity, 
such as critical infrastructures and telecommunications regulation. Although policy learning or legal 
transplants might take place, which we cannot determine on the basis of a quick scan, it is clear 
that a comprehensive global regulatory effort to cybersecurity is not visible in the cases we studied. 
A similar observation can be made at the national level: most cybersecurity regulation is relatively 
specific, covering a particular aspect of cyberspace or of security, or cybersecurity in a particular 
context. Comprehensive regulatory frameworks are rare – understandably so, given the complexity 
of cybersecurity. Moreover, law is not the only regulatory instrument in cybersecurity, although it 
plays an important role in all areas, as a general framework or as backstop regulation for situations 
that cannot be dealt with by private regulation alone. Legal frameworks are supplemented by, or – 
more often – expanded and detailed in, lower forms of regulation, such as administrative codes or 
(technical) standards, which may be explicitly made mandatory through a law as a minimum level 
of security or implicitly incorporated through a reference to open norms. Thus, cybersecurity 
regulation is often layered regulation, with more general legislative legal norms and more concrete 
lower-level norms. In several cases, soft law can also be observed that is not necessarily part of 
an overarching legislative framework, in the form of agreements between stakeholders, sectoral 
guidelines or principles that serve as reference points for organisations or professionals, or 
contracts between public and private parties, where Terms & Conditions play an additional role in 
the governance of behaviour. Particularly in the identification infrastructures case, we can see the 
role of the state shift from being (only or largely) a public-policy maker and coordinator of society 
to being (also) one stakeholder among many with an interest in governance. 
To put our findings into perspective, and to assist policy-makers in addressing the challenges raised 
by a complex, not fully overseeable and not fully overseen, landscape of polycentric cybersecurity 
governance, we refer to two concepts from critical literature on cybersecurity governance that can 
help avoid tendencies toward overblown or inefficient measures (‘hypersecuritisation’), and thus 
might help achieve a balanced and realistic approach to cybersecurity governance. First, the 
approach of the ‘cybersecurity ladder’, which considers the likelihood of a cyberattack and the 
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damage it might involve, argues that thinking about and planning for worst-case scenarios (the top 
of the ladder in the air), such as cyberwarfare or cyberterrorism, is a legitimate task of national 
security, but that this should not receive too much attention at the expense of more plausible 
cyberproblems (the bottom of the ladder that is firmly grounded). The focus should be on types of 
attacks that are more likely and even common, such as cybercrime, cyberespionage and attacks 
on critical infrastructures. Second, the ‘balanced risk approach’ deals with cybersecurity through 
the lens of risk governance, involving realistic risk assessment, risk management and risk 
communication. While there is a need for proactive solutions that ensure stability over the longer 
term, at the same time it is important to avoid over-comprehensive approaches (i.e. securing 
everything Internet) that lack focus and concrete goals. This involves avoiding rhetorical or 
emotional responses that are frequently visible in cybersecurity discourse, referring to hypothetical 
disasters that are not evidence-based, but instead conducting a rational risk analysis of the threats 
presented by cybersecurity in terms of (1) calculating the cost per saved life; (2) defining a level of 
acceptable risk; (3) applying a cost-benefit analysis; and (4) adequate communication about taken 
measures and residual, accepted risks.  
Based on use cases and literature, we identified the following six ‘lessons learned’, or points for 
further consideration. 
1. Do not expect to resolve issues merely by establishing more laws. States currently tend to 
attempt to resolve cybersecurity problems by increasing ‘criminalisation’ – i.e. arranging 
tightening the reins through criminal law – but this is not necessarily the best or only solution. 
The countries studied here also illustrate alternative routes to regulating the field. 
2. The multi-stakeholder, private-public partnership approach is considered to be a crucial 
characteristic for governing cyberspace. All countries recognize this and this approach is 
evident in all the cases, albeit in slightly different forms. While there are considerable 
advantages to such an approach, the disadvantages highlighted here (such as coordination 
problems) should not be overlooked. 
3. In light of point 2, in such arrangements, who is coordinating between stakeholders (including 
who takes the lead and who has ultimate responsibility) should be clear and formally delineated.  
4. Policy makers can increase oversight efforts, which will indicate where there are potential gaps 
in both systems and the processes that govern them. Especially in differentiated forms of 
collaboration and cooperation, oversight is crucial. 
5. In multi-stakeholder collaborations, especially where certain actions are based on voluntary 
efforts, trust is a key success factor. Trust cannot be demanded or regulated, but fostered 
through good communication, information exchange and making clear agreements regarding 
division of tasks and actions to be taken.  
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6. Cybersecurity is not necessarily separate from national security or civil protection, but an 
exceptional case that requires specific attention for the aforementioned points. Countries 
should carefully consider whether and how they regulate cybersecurity in relation to national 
security and civil protection: both an integrated governance regime and separate regimes can 
be employed, but either way, public policy should address the pitfalls in an integrated approach 
(e.g., too complex or too vague approaches, insufficient attention for the specifics of 
cybersecurity) or those in a separated approach (e.g., lack of coordination, policy competition, 
redundancy).  
 
This comparative quick scan gives a broad overview of the governance arrangements for three 
cases in five countries. Delving further into the current structures and future plans requires more 
in-depth research, whereby limiting the number of countries is recommended. Given the rapid pace 
of developments in the field and the absence of a central authority to steer or coordinate the process 
in many situations, more discussion is needed on how far society wants to proceed in engaging the 
private sector in public security, what possible tensions may still arise in such an arrangement and 
how this can best be regulated. 
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 1. Introduction 
 
The increased dependency of society on networked technologies and infrastructures poses a new 
challenge to governments and other actors to ensure the sustainability and security of all things 
‘cyber’. Cybersecurity is a particularly complex field, combining domains as diverse as information 
security, critical infrastructure protection, national security, cybercrime, cyber-terrorism and cyber-
warfare. For such a complex field, the question of how cybersecurity can be effectively organised 
is particularly relevant to address. While the threats are real, in many cases, the debate that 
addresses them tends to focus on what might happen in the future,1 whereby the nature and 
imminence of the threat, as well as how to resolve it, is not always immediately evident. As this 
report will further show, ensuring that the appropriate cybersecurity structures, processes and 
measures are in place and working is not only a responsibility and concern of the government, but 
is shared by and distributed among a wide variety of both public and private actors. It is here that 
the question of governance comes in: How are public-policy regulatory measures used to organise 
a process that involves (regulatory) actors outside of the government?2  
Governance currently tends to be the result of a complex interaction of various actors, acting in 
different places and forums – a phenomenon that can be designated as polycentric governance. 
Because both cybersecurity structures and related cybersecurity policy are still in a relatively early 
stage of development, we do not as yet have a clear view what the landscape of cybersecurity 
governance looks like. The aim of this study is therefore to develop a better understanding of this 
landscape. This will be accomplished through a quick scan of current developments in 
cybersecurity policies, institutions, and regulation in several different countries.  
 
The central research question is:  
 
How is cybersecurity governance organised in a number of selected countries? 
 
This question is addressed through the following sub-questions:3  
1) What is cybersecurity?  
2) Which actors are involved in cybersecurity, and how are the responsibilities for cybersecurity 
distributed among these?  
3) How are the responsibilities for cybersecurity regulated by law and other forms of regulation? 
 
                                                   
1 Dennis Broeders, Investigating the place and role of the armed forces in Dutch cybersecurity governance 
(Erasmus University Rotterdam 2014).  
2 Cf. Broeders 2014, p. 12 on ‘governance’.  
3 In the original proposal for this study, a fourth question regarding the application of mandatory security 
standards to information technology was included. This question is not addressed in this report, partly because it 
is a different type of question than the core issue researched in this report—how cybersecurity is organised 
(rather than specifically regulated)—and partly because this question is already addressed in a recent report, see 
T.F.E. Tjong Tjin Tai et al, Duties of care and diligence against cybercrime (Wolf Legal Publishers 2015). 
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 1.1 Methods 
In order to answer the central research question, we will use a comparative case-oriented policy 
and stakeholder analysis. Developments in public policy and political science research have 
repeatedly demonstrated the added value of using a comparative method, which enables one to 
analyse a multitude of relationships (combinations, patterns, interactions), account for irregularities 
and take into account detailed, but relevant, information.4  
For this project, we have chosen to study five countries, as this is a sufficient number of countries 
to acquire an overview of the various ways that cybersecurity governance is, or can be, organised. 
The selection of countries should meet the following criteria: geographic diversity, different legal 
traditions, presence of a national cybersecurity strategy, a high ranking on the ICT Development 
Index,5 and availability of sources. Based on these criteria, we have chosen the following countries: 
Canada, Estonia, Germany, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom.  
In order to flesh out how particular challenges in cybersecurity are organized in these different 
countries, we have selected three illustrative cases in cybersecurity governance. Focusing on 
cases allows us to acquire insight into sub-questions 2 and 3: the organization and regulation of 
cybersecurity, in a sufficiently contextualized manner. In order to enable sufficient focus in the 
analysis, each case zooms in on a concrete question how a particular challenge in cybersecurity 
governance is organized.  
The three cases and concrete questions are: 
 Botnets: how is botnet mitigation, both combating the infection of end-user computers with 
malware and combating denial-of-service attacks committed with botnets, organized?  
 Protection of vital infrastructures: how is continuity of electricity provisioning, particularly the 
protection against cyber-attacks in the context of the transition towards smart grids, organized? 
 Identity infrastructures: how is secure authentication of citizens in the context of e-
government, in particular electronic service delivery, organized? 
 
This selection was made on the basis of three criteria. First, since the landscape of cybersecurity 
governance is relatively unexplored, we chose cases that are diverse, rather than cases that all lie 
close to the core of cybersecurity (a maximum variation approach to case study research)6, as this 
is likely to generate more insights into how cybersecurity is organized in the various countries. 
Second, the cases cover the main aspects of cybersecurity, namely confidentiality, integrity and 
availability. Because these three elements are inextricably intertwined, the cases are should not be 
viewed as a one-on-one match to these ideas, but rather as containing all three, yet reflective of 
different degrees in which the elements may be present, whereby one may be more dominant than 
the others. For example, confidentiality concerns are a primary aspect of botnet mitigation (but 
                                                   
4 Robert H. Blank and Viola Burau, Comparative Health Policy (Palgrave, 2010).  
5 See International Telecommunications Union (ITU), Measuring the Information Society Report 2014, p. 42. 




availability is also important), whereas both authenticity and confidentiality are imperative to 
preserve the integrity of government-citizen relationships and availability is a key issue in relation 
to vital infrastructures. Third, the cases cover various forms of governance. In particular, we have 
looked at three domains in which the government classically plays an important role: law 
enforcement (with which botnet mitigation is primarily associated), national security (of which 
protection of vital infrastructures is traditionally an important part), and service delivery (of which a 
secure identity infrastructure is an important element). Within each of these domains, shifts are 
taking place towards involving private actors, and cases have been selected in which the 
involvement of private actors can be readily seen in current practices. The different extents and 
modalities of public-private interaction can thus provide interesting insights into how cybersecurity 
governance is or can be organized. 
Sub-question 1, on the concept of cybersecurity, is answered through desk research, primarily 
of theoretical and analytical academic literature and policy reports on cybersecurity and 
governance. For answering the sub-questions 2 and 3, involving the three cases in the different 
countries, we rely primarily on desk research, using reports, academic literature, parliamentary 
record (legislative debate) and legislation and case-law. As part of this desk research, we also 
conducted a web search to ensure we had an overview of the relevant actors. The initial findings 
of the desk research were validated through interviews with eight country experts (see Appendix 1 
for a list of interviewees).  
 1.2 Limitations 
The research for this report was limited in time and resources, and therefore has the character of 
a quick scan. As a result, this report can only touch the surface of cybersecurity governance, which 
is an extremely complex (and dynamic) field. Both elements – cybersecurity and governance – are 
large and under-defined concepts and the combination cannot be explored in depth. As can be 
seen in the case-study approach, we do not aim to be comprehensive, and the cases are not 
necessarily generalisable towards other challenges in cybersecurity. Nevertheless, we hope that 
within the limited scope of this quick scan, the discussion of diverse cases in different countries 
illustrates the challenges of cybersecurity governance as well as how countries are addressing 
these challenges.  
The research for the report was finalised in August 2015; the text of the report was finalised 
in October 2015. Developments after August 2015 have not been processed in the text. 
 1.3 Outline of the Report 
In chapter 2, cybersecurity governance is analysed in order to acquire a firmer understanding of 
this complex and under-theorised term. Based on various perspectives, we develop a working 
definition of cybersecurity and cybersecurity governance, and provide some key theoretical insights 
into this concept. Chapters 3 through 5 present the results of the case studies. Chapter 3 outlines 
surveying how the selected countries are dealing with botnet mitigation. Chapter 4 examines the 
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protection of vital infrastructures. Because most countries list multiple types of vital infrastructures, 
we focus in particular electricity provisioning in light of recent high profile cases of cyber-attacks. 
Chapter 5 examines the case of identity infrastructures, in particular the infrastructures currently in 
place or being developed to identify citizens in electronic citizen-government communications. 
These results are brought together in Chapter 6, with particular focus on how cybersecurity 
governance is organised and regulated. This chapter concludes the report with answers on the 






 2. The Concept of Cybersecurity Governance 
 2.1 Introduction 
Cybersecurity governance contains two individual concepts, each of which is a fuzzy concept that 
can be interpreted differently, depending on the perspective from which it is approached. 
Combining two fuzzy concepts potentially yields an even fuzzier concept. In this chapter, we 
therefore endeavour first to conceptualise cybersecurity governance, in order to provide a 
background against which the overview of cybersecurity policy efforts and activities in the following 
chapters can be understood.  
The term cybersecurity is becoming increasingly popular and more widely used, as states 
adopt and revise national cybersecurity strategies (NCSs) that lead to actions with numerous 
consequences, including financial ones, for a broad range of actors. At the same time, however, 
scholars, states and standardisation bodies use and define this term in very different ways. It is 
therefore necessary to develop a clear and sensible conceptual model of the term cybersecurity, 
especially for its use in a specific NCS. In order to develop a better understanding and working 
definition of the concept of cybersecurity for the purposes of this report, recent academic research 
on the issue of cybersecurity is examined, along with proposed definitions of the term and related 
terms (such as information security, computer and network security, infrastructure protection, 
cybersafety) by standardisation bodies and various states.  
Subsequently, we briefly outline the theoretical discussion about the concept of 
governance, a concept that is also very broad and used differently in various contexts. Since 
literature on the concept of governance is more prevalent than literature on the concept of 
cybersecurity, we will limit ourselves here to sketching the basic elements of governance that are 
relevant for the purpose of this report, and refer the interested reader to the available theoretical 
literature on governance.7 
We then combine the insights into both concepts to provide a working definition of the concept 
of cybersecurity governance, and we will briefly discuss some theoretical insights emerging from 
the literature that help understanding the complexity of cybersecurity governance, both in theoretic 
(conceptual) and in practical (policy measures) terms.  
 2.2 Cybersecurity 
The debate on cybersecurity in a broader sense8 originated in the United States of America (US) 
in the 1970s, emerging as a response to technological innovations and changing geopolitical 
conditions, especially after the Cold War.9 The debate did not spread to other countries before the 
                                                   
7 See, e.g., Rod AW Rhodes, Understanding governance: policy networks, governance, reflexivity and 
accountability (Open University Press 1997); Anne Mette Kjær, Governance (Polity 2004). 
8 Using different terms (e.g. computer security) with a different emphasis (e.g. on classified information). 
9 Lene Hansen and Helen Nissenbaum, 'Digital Disaster, Cyber Security, And The Copenhagen School' (2009) 53 
International Studies Quarterly 1155, also Myriam Dunn Cavelty, 'The Militarisation Of Cyber Security As A 
Source Of Global Tension' in Daniel Möckli (ed) Strategic Trends 2012: Key Developments in Global Affairs 
(Center for Security Studies 2012). 
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late 1990s.10 Initially the concern was with classified information residing in government information 
systems. However, as computer networks grew and spread into more and more aspects of 
everyday life, the focus changed. The term cybersecurity was first used by computer scientists in 
the early 1990s, denoting a series of insecurities related to networked computers with the focus 
shifting beyond a mere technical conception of computer security to the threats arising from digital 
technologies, which could have devastating societal effects – on national security and/or economic 
and social welfare of the entire nation.11 The focus was on general vulnerabilities of the entire 
society. Cybersecurity, thus, advanced from the confined realm of technical experts into the political 
limelight. With events such as the discovery of the nuclear-industry sabotaging Stuxnet computer 
worm, numerous tales of cyber espionage by foreign states, the growing dependence on the “digital 
infrastructure” along with the sophistication of cybercriminals and the well-publicised activities of 
hacker collectives, the impression is created that cyber-attacks are becoming more frequent, more 
organised, more costly and altogether more dangerous. As a result, a growing number of countries 
consider cybersecurity to be one of their top security issues.12 After 2010 the tone and intensity of 
the debate changed even further: the latest trend is to frame cybersecurity in strategic-military terms 
and to focus on countermeasures such as cyber-offence and cyber-defence, or cyber-deterrence.13 
In current discussions on cybersecurity, there is a focus on critical infrastructures, due to 
an increasing dependence of societies on the smooth functioning of all sorts of computer-related 
applications, such as software-based control systems – a combination of vulnerabilities, technology 
and transnational interdependence. There is also an increased focus on states as the primary cyber 
“enemy”, coining the term cyber-espionage (meaning high-level penetrations of government and 
business computer systems), as well as on increases in “hacktivism”, a portmanteau combining 
hacking and activism and denoting a phenomenon of deliberately challenging the self-proclaimed 
power of states to keep information considered vital for national security secret (e.g. Wikileaks, 
hacker collectives such as Anonymous and LulzSec). There is also recognition for what may be 
described as a process of “cross-fertilization” of cyber-threats and terrorism, where cyber-threats 
support the claims to the dangerous nature of the terrorists and the terrorist character of the attacks 
makes them more worthy of attention.14 
Against this background of the development of the concept of cybersecurity, in this section 
we attempt to analyse how the term ‘cybersecurity’ can be understood. There are various ways to 
define a term. In this section, we approach the concept of cybersecurity from different angles, in 
order to get a better grasp of the possible meaning(s) of the term. Starting with a grammatical 
approach, we dissect the term into its components (‘cyber’ and ‘security’). We then apply a 
hermeneutic approach, understanding the concept by placing it in the context of related terms with 
                                                   
10 Hansen and Nissenbaum 2009. 
11 Hansen and Nissenbaum 2009, Dunn Cavelty 2012. 
12 Dunn Cavelty 2012. 
13 Against the background of the Stuxnet incident; see Dunn Cavelty 2012. 
14 Dunn Cavelty 2012. 
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which it shares family resemblances, such as information security and cybersafety; discussing the 
commonalities and differences between related concepts is a good way to highlight the nuances of 
a term. Finally, we apply a pragmatist approach, identifying how the concept is used in practice by 
various stakeholders. Having explored the concept from these different angles, we develop a 
working definition of cybersecurity.  
2.2.1 Grammatical approach: the constituent terms 
Cyber 
The term cyberspace literally means “navigable space” and is derived from the Greek word kyber, 
meaning to navigate. It was composed by fiction (sci-fi) writer William Gibson in his 1984 novel 
Neuromancer, where cyberspace refers to a navigable, digital space of networked computers 
accessible from computer consoles.15 Since its introduction in Neuromancer, the term cyberspace 
has become widely used. It has, moreover, been re-appropriated, adapted and used in a variety of 
ways, all of which refer in some way to emerging computer-mediated communication and virtual 
reality technologies.16  
“Cyberspace is geographically unlimited, non-physical space, in which – independent of 
time, distance and location – transactions take place between people, between computers and 
between people and computers. Characteristic of cyberspace is the impossibility to point to the 
precise place and time where an activity occurs or where information traffic happens to be.”17 
Cyberspace should not be equated with the technological components that constitute this space: 
apart from the technological layer, there is also a socio-technical layer in which cyber-activities take 
place, and this socio-technical layer is equally important to protect as the technology layer itself.18  
Cyberspace today does not consist of one homogenous space; rather, it is a myriad of 
rapidly expanding cyberspaces, each providing a different form of digital interaction and 
communication. These spaces can be categorised into those existing within the technologies of the 
Internet, those within virtual reality19 and conventional telecommunications such as the phone, and 
the hybrid spaces that emerge through the rapid convergence of these technologies.20 In view of 
this, Dodge and Kitchin propose that the definition of cyberspace should focus on cyberspace as 
conceptual space within ICTs (information and communication technologies), rather than on 
technology itself.21 
Certain states give their own definition of cyberspace in their NCSs. For example, Germany 
defines cyberspace as, “the virtual space of all IT systems linked at data level on a global scale. 
                                                   
15 Martin Dodge and Rob Kitchin, Mapping Cyberspace (Routledge 2000), p.1. 
16 Dodge and Kitchin 2000, p.1. 
17 Cees J Hamelink, The ethics of cyberspace (Sage 2001), p. 9. 
18 Jan van den Berg and others, ‘On (the Emergence of) Cyber Security Science and its Challenges for Cyber 
Security Education’ (NATO STO/IST-122 symposium, Tallinn, 13-14 October 2014), p. 12-2.  
19 Virtual reality technologies create visual, interactive computer-generated environments in which the user can 
move and explore (currently there are two forms of it: as a totally immersive environment and as screen-based). 
20 Dodge and Kitchin 2000, p.1.; also Hamelink 2001, p.9. 
21 In line with Gibson’s original definition; Dodge and Kitchin 2000, p.1. 
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The basis for cyberspace is the Internet as a universal and publicly accessible connection and 
transport network which can be complemented and further expanded by any number of additional 
data networks. IT systems in an isolated virtual space are not part of cyberspace.”22 Such a 
definition, as is common, focuses on the Internet, although it does acknowledge other “virtual 
spaces of all IT systems”. The 2009 UK NCS defined cyberspace as encompassing all forms of 
networked, digital activities, including the content of and actions conducted through digital 
networks. When the UK revised its NCS in 2011 it also revised its definition of cyberspace, which 
was then re-defined as, “an interactive domain made up of digital networks that is used to store, 
modify and communicate information. It includes the Internet, but also the other information 
systems that support our businesses, infrastructure and services. Digital networks already underpin 
the supply of electricity and water to our homes, help organise the delivery of food and other goods 
to shops, and act as an essential tool for businesses across the UK. And their reach is increasing 
as we connect our TVs, games consoles, and even domestic appliances.” France defines 
cyberspace as, “the communication space created by the worldwide interconnection of automated 
digital data processing equipment” in its 2010 Information system defence and security document. 
Security 
Of the various meanings of security, the most important ones in the context of cybersecurity are:23 
2. Freedom from danger or threat. 
a. The state or condition of being protected from or not exposed to danger; safety. 
b. The safety or safeguarding of (the interests of) a state (or, sometimes, a coalition of states) 
against some internal or external threat, now esp. terrorism, espionage, etc.; the condition of 
being so safeguarded. 
c. The condition or fact of being secure or unthreatened in a particular situation; freedom 
from material or financial want; stability, assurance (of rights, position, employment, etc.). 
d. The safety of an organization, establishment, or building from espionage, criminal activity, 
illegal entrance or escape, etc. 
e. With reference to encryption, or telecommunications or computer systems: the state of 
being protected from unauthorized access; freedom from the risk of being intercepted, 
decoded, tapped, etc. (…) 
9. orig. Mil. 
a. Measures taken to safeguard the interests of a state or organization against threat; in early 
use spec. the maintenance of secrecy or cover. Hence more generally: any checks and 
procedures intended to keep a person, place, or thing secure and to prevent criminal activity, 
                                                   
22 Germany’s NCS from 2011. 
23 Oxford English Dictionary, entry ‘security’, http://www.oed.com (accessed 1 April 2015).  
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illegal entrance or escape, etc.; (concr.) the area or place in which such checks are 
conducted. Cf. sense 2b. 
b. Sometimes with capital initial. A department responsible for guarding an organization 
against criminal activity, unauthorized access, etc. Also (orig. U.S.): the members of such a 
department collectively. 
Security as it is used in the term ‘cybersecurity’ has connotations of many of these meanings: it is 
both the process (meaning 9) and the result (meaning 2) of taking measures to protect things, 
people, organisations, society, and the state itself. Security can thus be seen as a particular type 
of politics applicable to a wide range of issues – not only to the military and political context 
(traditional view) but also to the economic, environmental and societal context.24 Whereas the 
military and state elements once primacy in the conceptualisation of security, since the 1970s the 
security agenda has widened, especially with the rise of economic and environmental agendas in 
international relations, concerns with identity issues and the rise of international crime.25 The term 
security itself has a political function, demanding state action in a broad range of issues.   
The general concept of security is at least partially drawn from the national security discourse 
– within that discourse it implies an emphasis on authority, the confronting and construction of 
threats and enemies, an ability to make decisions, and the adoption of emergency measures.26 
According to certain theoretical perspectives, security has a particular discursive and political force 
and is a concept that does something – it “securitizes” – rather than being an objective (or 
subjective) condition (see below). According to the perspective of the Copenhagen School’s theory 
of securitization, security is, “the product of an historical, cultural, and deeply political legacy”27 and 
is a discursive and political practice rather than a material condition or a verifiable fact. The “threat-
danger-fear-uncertainty discourse” that the Copenhagen School defines as securitization is not 
universal, but “contextually and historically linked to shifting ontologies of uncertainty.”28 The 
understanding of security as a discursive modality with a particular rhetorical structure and political 
effect makes it particularly suited for a study of the formation and evolution of cybersecurity 
discourse. 
2.2.2 Hermeneutic approach: related terms 
Computer security 
The Klimburg NATO National Cybersecurity framework states that computer security usually seeks 
to ensure the availability and correct operation of a computer system without concern for the 
                                                   
24 Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, and Jaap de Wilde, Security: A new framework for analysis (Lynne Riener 1998); pp. 
vii, 1. 
25 Buzan, Waever and de Wilde 1998, p. 2.  
26 Hansen and Nissenbaum 2009. 
27 Michael C Williams, Culture and Security: Symbolic Power and the Politics of International Security (Routledge 
2007), p. 17, as cited in Hansen and Nissenbaum 2009, p.1156. 
28 Niels Bubandt, ‘Vernacular Security: The Politics of Feeling Safe in Global, National and Local Worlds’ (2005) 
36 Security Dialogue 275, p. 291, as cited in Hansen and Nissenbaum 2009, p.1172. 
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information stored or processed by the computer.29 The history of cybersecurity began with the 
disciplines of computer and information science as computer security.30 One use was in the 
Computer Science and Telecommunications Board’s (CSTB) report from 1991,31 which defined 
security’ as, “protection against unwanted disclosure, modification, or destruction of data in a 
system and also [to] the safeguarding of systems themselves.”32 Security, in the sense of computer 
security, comprises both technical and human aspects;33 it ‘‘has significant procedural, 
administrative, physical facility, and personnel components.’’34 (CSTB 1991) Threats to 
cybersecurity, thus, not only arise from (usually) intentional agents, but also from systemic threats. 
Computer security, as used by the majority of computer scientists, adopts a technical discourse 
that is focused on developing good programs with a limited number of (serious) bugs and systems 
that are difficult to penetrate by outside attackers.  
Information security 
Information security ‘is concerned with the protection of confidentiality, integrity, and availability of 
information in general, to serve the needs of the applicable information user’.35 Although the term 
information security focuses on information, it should be observed that the focus of the security 
usually is data. The protection of information or data should be regardless of the form the data may 
take: electronic, print or other forms. 
Information assurance 
Information assurance is a superset of information security, and deals with the underlying principles 
of assessing what information should be protected. Even though the terms information security, 
computer security and information assurance address slightly different viewpoints, the terms are 
often used interchangeably.36 
ICT security 
ICT security is more directly associated with the technical origins of computer security, and is 
directly related to ‘information security principles’ including the confidentiality, integrity and 
availability of information resident on a particular computer system. ICT security, therefore, extends 
beyond devices that are connected to the Internet to include computer systems that are not 
connected to any network. At the same time, the use of the term ICT security usually excludes 
questions of illegal content, unless they directly damage the system in question, but it does include 
the term ‘supply chain security’. The term “ICT security” substituted the term ‘Application Security’, 
which was defined as ‘a process to apply controls and measurements to an organisation’s 
                                                   
29 Klimburg NATO, ‘National cybersecurity framework manual’ (2012). 
30 Hansen and Nissenbaum 2009. 
31 Computer Science Telecommunications Board (CSTB), ‘Computers at Risk: Safe Computing in the Information 
Age’ (National Academy Press, 1991).  
32 CSTB 1991, p. 2. 
33 Hansen and Nissenbaum 2009, p. 1160. 
34 CSTB 1991, p. 17. 




applications in order to manage the risk of using them. Controls and measurements may be applied 
to the application itself (its processes, components, software and results), to its data (configuration 
data, user data, organisation data), and to all technology processes and actors involved in the 
application’s life circle.’37 ICT threats arise from both software and hardware failures; since both 
software and hardware can never be made completely fool-proof in practice there is an inherent 
ontological insecurity within computer systems.38 Complete ICT security can, thus, never be 
achieved and also should not be the goal of cybersecurity policy. 
Network security 
The Klimburg NATO National Cybersecurity framework states that network security is concerned 
with the design, implementation, and operation of networks for achieving the purposes of 
information security on networks within organisations, between organisations, and between 
organisations and users.39 
Infrastructure protection 
According to the Klimburg NATO National Cybersecurity framework, critical information 
infrastructure protection (CIIP) is concerned with protecting the systems that are provided or 
operated by critical infrastructure providers, such as energy, telecommunication, and water 
departments. CIIP, thus, ensures that those systems and networks are protected and resilient 
against information security risks, network security risks, Internet security risks, as well as 
Cybersecurity risks.40 This term is connected to the terms ‘critical infrastructures’ and ‘vital 
infrastructures,’ which are also sometimes used interchangeably. Protecting critical or vital 
infrastructures usually focuses on securing the systems operating them, but they may have wider 
or other implications (e.g., protecting the water infrastructure against bio-hazards) outside of the 
sphere of critical information infrastructure protection or vital infrastructure system security. 
Cybersafety 
The Klimburg NATO National Cybersecurity framework defines cybersafety as, “the condition of 
being protected against physical, social, spiritual, financial, political, emotional, occupational, 
psychological, educational or other types or consequences of failure, damage error, accidents, 
harm or any other event in the Cyberspace which could be considered non-desirable.”41 
Cybersafety can also be defined in a simpler manner as safety within the social structure of the 
Internet.42 Safety, here, is a broader notion than security, involving not only the freedom from 
danger or threat through malfunctioning of cyberspace infrastructure or components, but also 
through undesirable content or content-related criminal activities, such as online grooming or hate 
speech. In this sense, cybersafety is a broader notion than cybersecurity.  
                                                   
37 Idem. 
38 Hansen and Nissenbaum 2009. 
39 Klimburg NATO, ‘National cybersecurity framework manual’ (2012).  
40 Idem. 
41 Idem. 




Cyber-risk management has been described as, “a type of risk management that – complementary 
to the technical focus of information security risk management in the technical layer – focuses on 
the risks the [sic] have emerged in the socio-technical layer of cyberspace. Cyber risks concern the 
IT-dependent risks all cyberspace actors in the various cyber dub-domains are exposed to when 
performing their above-mentioned cyber activities.”43 Cyber-risk management can be seen as an 
evolution of classical information or computer security, with an increasing incorporation of business-
oriented concerns such as business continuity management,44 and in that sense it can be used a 
synonym of cybersecurity.   
2.2.3 Pragmatist approach: how the term is used 
Following from state-specific definitions of cyberspace, related policy documents and NCSs provide 
some form of definition of the term cybersecurity. This section outlines three international 
definitions, followed by a selection of state-specific definitions (European countries only). 
International definitions 
a. Klimburg NATO (2012)  
“‘Cybersecurity’, or ‘cyberspace security’ has been defined as the ‘preservation of confidentiality, 
integrity and availability of information in the Cyberspace’. However, it has also been noted that 
other properties such as authenticity, accountability, non-repudiation and reliability can be involved 
in cybersecurity.”45 
 
b. International Telecommunication Union (2010)   
Cybersecurity represents “the collection of tools, policies, security concepts, security safeguards, 
guidelines, risk management approaches, actions, training, best practices, assurance and 
technologies that can be used to protect the cyber environment and organization and user’s assets. 
Organization and user’s assets include connected computing devices, personnel, infrastructure, 
applications, services, telecommunications systems, and the totality of transmitted and/or stored 
information in the cyber environment. Cybersecurity strives to ensure the attainment and 
maintenance of the security properties of the organization and user’s assets against relevant 
security risks in the cyber environment. The general security objectives comprise the following: 




                                                   
43 Van den Berg et al. 2014, p. 12-3. 
44 Van den Berg et al. 2014, p. 12-2—12-3. 
45 Klimburg NATO, ‘National cybersecurity framework manual’ (2012), p. 10 (references omitted).  
46 ITU homepage: https://www.itu.int/net/itunews/issues/2010/09/20.aspx. This definition is also accepted in the 




c. EU (2013) 
The 2013 cybersecurity strategy for an open, safe and secure cyberspace defines cybersecurity in 
a footnote, stating that “cybersecurity commonly refers to the safeguards and actions that can be 
used to protect the cyber domain, both in the civilian and military fields, from those threats that are 
associated with or that may harm its interdependent networks and information infrastructure. 
Cybersecurity strives to preserve the availability and integrity of the networks and infrastructure 
and the confidentiality of the information contained therein.”47 It also introduces “principles of 
cybersecurity”: (1) the EU's core values apply as much in the digital as in the physical world; (2) 
protection of fundamental rights, freedom of expression, personal data and privacy; (3) access for 
all; (4) democratic and efficient multi-stakeholder governance; (5) a shared responsibility to ensure 
security.  
Selected national definitions 
a.        Austria (2013) 
Austria’s National ICT Security Strategy uses the broader concept of ICT Security and addresses 
cybersecurity and cyberdefence as vital and integral, but reactive strategies. However, neither 
cybersecurity nor cyberdefence can be applied effectively unless complemented by proactive 
strategy elements on a larger scale. The ICT Security Strategy is a proactive concept designed to 
protect cyberspace and human beings in this virtual space by taking into account their fundamental 
rights and freedoms. The country’s specific approach to cybersecurity is closely linked to its existing 
stakeholders and structures, where cybersecurity refers to organisations, institutions or persons 
with a vested interest in, or particularly severely affected by, how it is defined.  
 
b. Denmark (2013) 
Denmark’s NCS does not provide for a direct definition of cybersecurity. The NCS connects 
cybersecurity to cyberdefence. It states that with society's increased dependence on a properly 
functioning ICT infrastructure and an appropriate level of information security, there is an increased 
need for higher protection against cyberattacks. Also, military capacities are dependent on well-
functioning ICT systems. The task of protection mainly falls under the Danish Ministry of Defence, 
needing to provide the capacity to execute both defensive and offensive military operations in 
cyberspace. 
 
c. Estonia (2010) 
The Estonian NCS contains a very broad national security concept, but refers specifically to 
cybersecurity, stating: “for ensuring cybersecurity it is essential to reduce the vulnerability of critical 
information systems and data communication connections and to contain possible damage from 
cyber attacks. Critical service information systems must be held operational throughout the entire 
                                                   
47 European Commission, ‘Cybersecurity Strategy of the European Union: An open, safe and secure cyberspace’ 
(2013), p. 3. Available online: http://eeas.europa.eu/policies/eu-cyber-security/cybsec_comm_en.pdf.   
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territory and on the basis of domestic resources, including in situations where connections with 
foreign countries are temporarily malfunctioning or have failed.” 
 
d. Finland (2013) 
Finland’s NCS defines cybersecurity as the desired end state in which the cyber domain is reliable 
and in which its functioning is ensured. In this desired state, the cyber domain will not jeopardise, 
harm or disturb the operation of functions dependent on electronic information (data) processing. 
Reliance on the cyber domain depends on its actors implementing appropriate and sufficient 
information security procedures, which can prevent the materialization of cyber threats, and, should 
they still materialize, prevent, mitigate or help tolerate their consequences. Cybersecurity 
encompasses the measures applied to the functions vital to society and the critical infrastructure 
that aim to achieve the capability of predictive management and, if necessary, tolerance of cyber 
threats and their effects that can cause significant harm or danger to Finland and its population. 
Cybersecurity is not meant to be a legal concept, the adoption of which would lead to granting new 
competences to authorities or other official bodies. In this respect no changes are proposed to the 
bases of contingency arrangements or to regulations concerning the competences of authorities. 
 
e. France (2010, 2013)  
Both the Information System Defence and Security Document (2010 and the White Paper on 
National Security (2013) centre on the notion of cyber defence, rather than cybersecurity. This is 
due to the recognition of cyber threats and development of cyber defence capabilities. The 2013 
White paper notes the growing vulnerability of the state and society to increasingly dangerous 
attacks: attempts to penetrate networks for purposes of espionage, remote takeover, paralysis and, 
in the near future, destruction of infrastructures of vital importance, or even weapons systems and 
strategic military capabilities. The 2010 Information system defence and security document defines 
cyber defence as a set of all technical and non-technical measures allowing a State to defend in 
cyberspace information systems that it considers to be critical. In this document, cybersecurity is 
defined as the desired state of an information system, in which it can resist events from cyberspace 
likely to compromise the availability, integrity or confidentiality of the data stored, processed or 
transmitted and of the related services that these systems offer or make accessible. Cybersecurity 
makes use of information systems’ security techniques and is based on fighting cybercrime and 
establishing cyber defence. The 2010 document also states that in order for France to attain the 
primary goal of becoming a world power in cyber defence, cybersecurity of critical national 
infrastructures (among other things) needs to be strengthened and security in cyberspace needs 






f. Germany (2011) 
The German NCS distinguishes between civilian and military cybersecurity. Generally, 
cybersecurity is the desired objective of the IT security situation, in which the risks of cyberspace 
have been reduced to an acceptable minimum. Cybersecurity is the sum of suitable and appropriate 
measures. Civilian cybersecurity focuses on all IT systems for civilian use in German cyberspace. 
Military cybersecurity focuses on all IT systems for military use in German cyberspace. Germany’s 
NCSs also makes clear that the protection of critical information infrastructures is the main priority 
of cybersecurity, since they are a central component of nearly all critical infrastructures and have 
become increasingly important. Another focus is on protection against cybercrime. 
 
g. Hungary (2013) 
According to Hungary's NCS, cybersecurity is the ongoing and planned application of political, 
legal, economic, educational, awareness-raising and technical tools capable of managing 
cyberspace risks, transforming the cyberspace into a reliable environment by ensuring an 
acceptable level of such risks for the smooth functioning and operation of social and economic 
processes. 
 
h. Italy (2013) 
Italy’s National Cybersecurity Strategic Framework does not define cybersecurity. It states that the 
Framework and related National Plan aim at enhancing the national preparedness to respond to 
present and future challenges affecting cyberspace, and are devoted to directing all national efforts 
toward common and agreed solutions, knowing that cybersecurity is a process rather than an end 
to itself, that technical innovations will always introduce new vulnerabilities in the strategic and 
operational horizon, and that the intrinsic nature of the cyber threats makes our defense, at least 
for the time being, mostly – although not exclusively – reactive. 
 
i. Netherlands (2013) 
The Dutch NCS defines cybersecurity as “the effort to prevent damage due to disruption, failure 
or abuse of ICT and to restore damage in case it occurs”. 
 
j. Poland (2013) 
Poland’s NCS defines cyberspace security as a set of organizational and legal, technical, physical 
and educational projects aimed at ensuring the uninterrupted functioning of cyberspace. 
 
k. Spain  (2013) 
Spain’s NCS states that cybersecurity previously followed an information security approach, which 
only protected information against unauthorized access, use, disclosure, disruption, modification 
and destruction. Currently this approach is evolving towards cyberspace risk management 
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(information assurance) where cybersecurity consists of the application of an analysis and 
management process for risks associated with use, processing, storage and transmission of 
information and data, as well as risks associated with the systems and processes used, based on 
internationally accepted standards. Cybersecurity should be formulated proactively as an ongoing 
process of analysis and management of risks associated with cyberspace. 
2.2.4 A working definition of cybersecurity 
Given the notion of cyberspace as an abstract term denoting the conceptual space constituted by 
computers and networks, cybersecurity can be seen as a comprehensive concept that builds on all 
the previous terms that focus on the security of particular components of cyberspace: computers, 
information, ICT, networks, and (ICT-based) infrastructures. Cybersecurity thus encompasses 
computer security, information security, ICT security, network security, and infrastructure 
protection. In line with the notion of information security, cybersecurity is concerned with the 
protection against threats to the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of information or data (and 
of the computers and networks in which data are processed); but it is not concerned with 
information as a threat in itself as such, i.e., with information that poses a risk qua information, such 
as hate speech or revenge porn. This distinguishes the concept from the broader notion of 
cybersafety, which also encompasses risks constituted by the informational content of the data 
processed within cyberspace.  
Cybersecurity thus denotes the process and result of making cyberspace secure. 
Cyberspace in this context denotes a space that is constituted by information, ICT, networks, and 
(ICT-based) infrastructures. Although cyberspace is based on technological components, it is not 
identical to the technological layer itself; it denotes, rather, the conceptual space – facilitated by 
computer and networked technologies – that allows human and organisational activities to take 
place in a digital, interconnected environment. The security of this space consists of being free from 
threats to the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of the computers, networks, and information 
that together make up this space. Cyberspace itself, and the human and organisational activities 
using this space, should – as an ideal, not as a fully achievable goal – not suffer from malfunctioning 
of the infrastructure or any of its components, or from attacks on the infrastructure, its components, 
or the information processed using the infrastructure or its components. In short, cybersecurity can 
be defined as the proactive and reactive processes working toward the ideal of being free from 
threats to the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of the computers, networks, and information 
that form part of, and together constitute, cyberspace – the conceptual space that affords digitised 
and networked human and organisational activities. 
2.3 Governance 
Much like the terms discussed in the preceding section, the concept of governance has multiple 
definitions and can be used in various ways. When thinking about the term, it is therefore important 
to start with two basic distinctions: 1) government versus governance and 2) governance versus 
regulation. These distinctions already provide a route toward (partial) definitions of the term and at 
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the same time point to some weaknesses of its use – and the related need for alternative (but still 
related) concepts.  
2.3.1 Government versus governance 
Traditionally, the governing authority at the centralized (nation-state) level was considered to have 
a monopoly on power not only in determining how a state was run, but also in defining which issues 
constituted the so-called public interest. In modern societies, however, non-governmental actors 
have played an increasing role in influencing policy outcomes, whereby the role of the centralized 
government (and, as such, its relationship to society) has changed. Most especially, changing 
dynamics in public-private relationships and influences at the systemic (international) level put the 
effectiveness and legitimacy of classical policy strategies and instruments up for discussion. In 
reignited academic debates about the role of governments, governance was (re-)introduced in the 
Political Science and Public Policy academic vernacular in an attempt to expand scholarly 
perspectives on politics and policy-making. Use of this term was intended to acknowledge that 
government is not the only (and may not even be the most important) actor in managing and 
organizing society and social processes.48  Rather, in modern societies, the state increasingly finds 
itself in a mutually dependent triangle with the community and the market, all of which have 
particular (self-)regulatory processes that interact in complex ways. These three are thus 
dependant on one another and are increasingly affected by each other’s unresolved problems.49 In 
this respect, ‘government’ may be just one particular form of ‘governance’. 
The interdependent nature of the state-community-market relationship moved away from 
the traditional hierarchical structure where the state had the monopoly on power to a network 
structure involving new (types of) actors.50 Moreover, government structures and authority were 
increasingly decentralized to localities. To reflect this, in the policy arena, a distinction is often made 
between horizontal and vertical relations. Horizontal refers to organizing the relevant public and 
private actors within a defined geographical or functional segment that play a role in steering society 
around a common aim, whereas vertical shows the links between them, such as institutional 
relations and balance of power.51 It is important to note that at the nation-state level, it is not a 
question of whether the governance structure is horizontal or vertical; there is always a mix of 
central and local, hierarchical and networked, horizontal and vertical (this is sometimes referred to 
as polycentric governance).52 To understand influences in the policy arena, it is therefore necessary 
to understand the interrelation between all elements. Broeders especially shows how crucial 
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public/private relations are in the cyberdomain and thus how new and emergent governance 
structures in the area of cybersecurity are both horizontal and vertical.53 
2.3.2 Governance versus regulation 
The shift in conceptual thought from government to governance and the related search for 
understanding emerging mechanisms of coordination between state and society raised questions 
regarding the new/changing role of regulatory mechanisms and subsequently led to attempts to 
distinguish between governance and regulation. While some authors still seem to define 
governance in more hierarchical terms, e.g. Colbridge et al. cite Jenkins when defining governance 
as prevailing patterns by which public power is exercised in a given social context 54 and van Hout 
et al (despite their description of moves to networks) discuss the influence of conduct to achieve 
goals, others frame governance in broader terms. 
 Van Asselt and Renn describe governance as, “the multitude of actors and processes that 
lead to collective binding decisions. Governing choices in modern societies is generally 
conceptualized as an interplay between governmental institutions, economic forces and civil 
society actors (such as NGOs),”55 while Tuohy refers to governance in ‘loosely coupled networks.’ 
Tuohy further states, “this new governance paradigm is meant to connote the processes and 
instruments of governing in the context of complex organizational networks in which no one set of 
actors has authority to ‘command and control’”.56 This last point is also seen as one hindrance to 
effective governance and will be discussed in the next section.  
The best explanation regarding the distinction between governance and regulation is found 
in the work of Helderman et al: “Whereas ‘governance’ can be used for several different institutional 
orders (including spontaneous coordinated action) with multiple centers or networks, regulation is 
more restrictedly confined to the ‘sustained and focused control exercised by a public – 
independent – agency, over private activities that are socially valued.’”57 Helderman et al further 
explain that the inclusion of socially valued activities in the definition distinguishes regulatory 
regimes from e.g. criminal justice systems and the reference to sustained/focused control implies 
that regulation is not just about law-making. It extends to include gathering information, monitoring 
performance and ensuring enforcement of established rules/standards. In other words, regulation 
is one distinct feature of how modern states steer society (including the economy) and while it is a 
significant feature, it is not the only mode. It is yet one of several possible examples of a 
strategy/process that may be employed to steer behaviours. 
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What these definitions make clear is that governance reflects a transition in modern 
societies that expands the arena of actors and actions being taken, simultaneously restricting the 
capacity of the traditional authority (government of the nation-state to act). Governance refers to 
coordinating systems and their multiple actors and is underpinned by tensions between 
public/private (state and market) and between the centre and localities (different governmental 
levels).58 Moreover, as van Asselt and Renn point out, the term governance often simultaneously 
contains both descriptive (observation and approach; who are the actors and what are the 
interactions between them?) and normative (an idealized model or framework for organizing and 
managing society) connotations. When discussing governance, the combination of actors, 
structures and processes, as well as the direct and indirect relations between them and ideas 
underlying their interactions, must be taken together.  
2.3.3 Re-conceptualizing governance  
While governance theory has moved scholars to think differently about the changing relationship 
between states and societies, governance itself remains a dynamic concept. Studying governance 
structures and processes empirically has revealed a number of practical issues that signify the 
need to refine what is meant by governance. Moreover, as modern societies progress and change, 
new challenges to these structures and processes arise (exemplified by the challenges of 
cybersecurity discussed in this report), also pointing to the need for more refined and specific 
concepts of governance in practice. Some authors have even suggested the need to move away 
from the typology of community-market-state, distinctions between public and private and notions 
such as hierarchy altogether, as these domains and the mechanisms at work within and between 
them are also in a state of flux.59 Moreover, the changing relationship between government and 
social actors and is increasing the need for actors to be able to change roles in public and private 
environments,60 which may lead to new types of social actors or ad hoc coalitions.61 As such these 
authors have suggested using terms such as ‘multiple modes of governance’, ‘indirect governance’ 
and ‘co-governance’, which in many ways remain quite vague and fail to indicate how these apply 
to practical challenges. 
First of all, the incorporation of multiple players interacting on multiple levels also implies 
multiple loci of responsibility and, as such, problems with ensuring accountability for enforcement.62 
There are limits to the technical capacity of government actors to define problems and understand 
what needs to be done in response, as well as to their institutional capacity of government to take 
action in response once the problem has been defined. Broeders’ reflection on the Internet as a 
particular challenge for governments is prime example of this. He shows the multi-centric nature of 
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cybersecurity governance and the multiple agendas that come into play in attempting to identify 
problems and create common goals that lead to direct action. This is where the issue of command 
and control is once again raised. Sabel and Zeitlin argue that the combination of transnational 
connections and increased technological innovations have undermined the effectiveness of 
command and control. Where Broeders refers to the need to understand governance as 
“governance in progress,” Sabel and Zeitlin offer a similar notion – “experimentalist” governance, 
which they define as a recursive process of provisional goal-setting and revision based on learning 
from the comparison of alternative approaches to advancing them in different contexts.63 In its 
terminology the notion experimentalist also points to the sometimes trial-and-error nature of dealing 
with new challenges – and sometimes, finding creative solutions in the process. 
The iterative, learning nature required of current governance structures and processes is 
related to a second practical challenge. The current issues confronting society are often ambiguous 
and complex – demanding a flexible response in the face of strategic uncertainty regarding what 
the nature of the problem is (and thus how best to approach it). This challenge has especially been 
highlighted in the area of scholarship devoted to theorizing so-called ‘risk governance’. Risk 
governance tries to anticipate and respond to uncertainty regarding what might happen and 
what the consequences will be if it does. Whereas many discussions of governance implicitly 
seem to assume it is reactive (‘as a response to changes in modern society…’), theories of 
risk governance and anticipation in the face of uncertainty show that governance structures 
and strategies must also often be proactive – which is where the coordinating mechanism 
aspect of the aforementioned definitions comes in.  
The nature of many risks requires cooperation, coordination, trust and mutual 
understanding between a range of (types of) stakeholders, who often have not only diverging 
interests and but also contrasting perceptions of potential risks involved, whereby the various actors 
(including governments) have difficulty making decisions with confidence and legitimacy.64 
Moreover, they must act not just to minimize risk, but also to establish resilient systems that 
decrease general vulnerability to unanticipated events over a longer term. Similar to the idea of 
experimentalist governance, dealing with perceived risks often requires learning by doing (trial and 
error) and seeking creative solutions. Translated to the case of cybersecurity, minimizing risks to 
systems and establishing longer-term resilience within systems is a particular challenge. Inherent 
to risk governance is difficulty in pinpointing the source of (and, thus, the concrete solution to) a 
problem. As Broeders clearly shows, responses to threats are often demanded in situations where 
there is not a clear analysis of the actual problem, which can lead to e.g. alarmism and over-inflated 
threats.65  
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Finally, the legitimacy issues that accompany the introduction of new actors, action under 
uncertainty and the sometimes creative solutions that emerge from this combination have also led 
to a rise in demand for reflection on the policies and strategies that are adopted and enacted. In 
addition to the iterative learning process discussed by Sabel and Zeitlen, Corbridge et al point to 
the importance of paying attention not just to notions of governance, but to notions of what 
constitutes good governance66 (in accordance with social understandings of what constitutes ‘right 
and wrong’) and how these policies and strategies are assessed. Although agendas of good 
governance (and the very idea) themselves may be open to critique, the primary concern from a 
practical perspective is ensuring the balance between individual representation and the various 
actors involved in governing specific situations.  
Whereas much of the impetus behind shoring up cybersecurity infrastructures in many 
cases seems to be premised on the idea of increased criminalization of threats to or occurring 
via networked technologies, this review of governance literature shows that governance is not 
only about command-and-control regulation to prevent ‘bad’ behaviour. Rather, it is about how 
various parties coordinate (or are coordinated in) anticipation of (and working responses to) 
potential threats, while at the same time developing and implementing longer term structures 
and processes that reduce ambiguity, uncertainty and the immediacy of threats from 
unanticipated events. Governance is thus about proactive and reactive approaches to social 
steering that strike a balance between multiple interests from various types of stakeholders 
and the overall steering of social processes in a politically legitimate manner (i.e., that has 
legitimacy in the eyes of individual citizens).  
With regard to cybersecurity, key notions are the ambiguity and uncertainty with regard to 
threats and their potential solutions. This means that the issue of how the network 
infrastructure is conceptualized is important, because different conceptualizations can lead to 
different questions.67 Moreover, how coordination mechanisms are used to ensure that the 
parties that must work together do so with confidence and trust is crucial. 
2.4 Conclusion 
Based on the above literature review, we develop the following working definition: cybersecurity 
governance refers to the approaches used by multiple stakeholders to identify, frame and 
coordinate proactive and reactive responses to potential threats to the confidentiality, integrity, or 
availability of the computers, networks, and information that together constitute cyberspace (the 
conceptual space that affords digitised and networked human and organisational activities). This 
includes not only short-term and concrete approaches to address known threats, but particularly 
also the development and implementation of structures and processes to reduce uncertainty and 
to enable to respond to threats from unanticipated events over the longer term. Hereby it is 
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important to keep in mind that cybersecurity involves not only protecting the technology itself, but 
also the activities taking place in or facilitated by cyberspace. As such, how problems are identified, 




 3. Case 1: Botnet Mitigation 
3.1 Introduction 
Botnets are collections of compromised machines infected by bots – pieces of advanced malicious 
software that install system backdoors that connect back to remote machines via common 
communication channels. Every botnet has bot-masters (a.k.a. bot-herders), the actual agents in 
control of the common communication channels and thus capable of manipulating the infected 
machines. The power acquired by bot-masters is reflected in the size and resilience of the botnet, 
which can be used to perform further criminal acts. As a result, botnets can be very lucrative, as 
they generate income to their masters via a multitude of cybercrimes, i.e. data copying, extortion 
demands through DDoS attacks and ransomware, spam, search engine poisoning, and click 
fraud.68 Mostly, infected users are unaware of their condition, as there may be no clear sign the 
device is contaminated. Moreover, botnets have grown to become complex, resilient infections, 
remaining under the radar of security tools such as firewalls and anti-viruses.  
Recent industry reports revealed botnet infections affect 500 million computers every year, 
at a rate of 18 victims per second.69 While statistics seem to vary and industry reports should be 
read cautiously (since security companies may have an interest in presenting high threat levels), a 
consensus exists that botnets are among the most serious threats to information security. A 
contemporary botnet trend is to exploit darknet, a collection of non-indexed domains, which makes 
authorship attribution a greater challenge. Darknet domains cannot be detected through regular 
internet search, since they are protected by multi-layered structures known as The Onion Router 
(TOR).70 In addition, TOR enables anonymous internet communication between users, protecting 
their identities.71 As a result, botnets operating in darknet domains present increased obstacles for 
law enforcement.  
A typical botnet is developed through a lifecycle of multiple, connected stages:  Conception; 
Recruitment; Interaction; Marketing; Execution and Success.72 Therefore, any attempt to mitigate 
botnets must target and stop at least one of phases of the botnet lifecycle. In fact, by hindering the 
completion of any of these stages, the botnet success will be frustrated.73 Ideally, however, botnet 
mitigation should occur as early as possible, starting in the recruitment or contamination phase, 
preventing malware from effectively infecting targeted machines. In practice, however, most botnet 
countermeasures only occur after the success of the operation has gained notoriety and/or caused 
significant costs to business and society.  
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Mitigation efforts may refer to different initiatives in different areas of society to minimise the threat 
posed by botnets. The European Union Agency for Network and Information Security (ENISA) calls 
identifies three specific approaches to fighting botnets: 1. Preventing new infections; 2. Mitigating 
existing botnets; and 3. Minimising criminal profit.74 Any activity aiming at improving resilience 
against cybercrime, including prevention of new infections, mitigation of existing botnets, and efforts 
to minimise the profit of these criminal attacks, contributes to botnet mitigation at large. Each of 
these steps requires a multifaceted approach to deterrence and prevention: detection and 
mitigation of botnets requires efforts beyond the technical level, and must include measures 
targeting public policy, social awareness and training, legislation, and economics of cybercrime.  
In this context, botnet takedowns are important means to interrupt on-going botnet activity. 
A takedown, in the very sense of the term, brings down the botnet by disrupting the common 
communication channel that determines the behaviour of the infected machines. Another form of 
disrupting a botnet is through takeovers, by which an external agent takes control of the central 
servers and injects code to block the communications with the malicious centres, to redirect 
infected machines to a white server, or to remotely disinfect all zombies and therewith liberate 
machines from the poisonous network. One important element of botnet disruption is the 
involvement of private sector agents, especially the participation of ISPs, which are often in a better 
position to collect information about the attacker and identify infected machines. Yet, it is not clear 
how far ISPs can go in cooperating with public authorities, in particular law enforcement, in the 
context of disruption. On the one hand, ISPs have the overarching right to secure their networks, 
their reputation, and to protect their customer, what could legitimise the launch of countermeasures 
from their side. On the other hand, it is not clear how these activities could be compatible with the 
right to privacy of users, as the collection of intelligence data about botnets often involved gathering 
of personal data flowing in the zombie machines. Finally, ISPs face liability issues in the event of 
false positive or unintended consequences following countermeasures, making the decision of 
launching countermeasures even more daunting.   
It follows from the above that takeovers and takedowns are time-consuming and require 
large resources, as well as a solid network of public and private sector agents cooperating with one 
another. Therefore, a holistic front against botnets must involve coordinated actions in different 
areas of computer security. This report focuses on legislation and organisational structures dealing 
with botnets and cybercrime mitigation in relation to the three areas suggested by ENISA.  
3.2.1 Preventing new infections 
Important steps in preventing new infections include patching existing vulnerabilities and fostering 
a culture of security-by-design. By patching infections, exposed vulnerabilities are shielded from 
contamination, or immunized against new exploitation. Fixing non-zero-day exploits is paramount 
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in thwarting many forms of botnets whose modus operandi are already known to developers. In 
addition, a culture of security-by-design involves investment in awareness, capacity building, and 
training, and has long been promoted as an efficient way to empower users in keeping devices free 
from contamination. Fostering a cybersecurity mind-set among stakeholders would provide 
incentives for developers and manufacturers to be attentive to all security matters even before the 
product or service is placed on the market and empower users to protect themselves against botnet 
infections.  
3.2.2 Mitigating existing botnets 
Disrupting widespread, notorious botnets is key in botnet fighting. While security specialists have 
developed powerful technical solutions to tackle botnets (P2P polluting, PeerShark, Sinkholing, 
Sybil attacks, Crawling, among others), the preparation, resources, and costs associated with large 
operations are often prohibitive when not supported by law enforcement and State authorities. 
Additionally, effective botnet mitigation tools can be highly invasive, cause collateral damages, and 
raise ethical and legal issues. To that end, there is a need to invest in legal research exploring the 
use of anti-botnet solution. Likewise, mitigating existing botnets also includes disinfection of 
currently infected machines, which can be achieved by remote disinfection and awareness-raising 
campaigns aimed at diagnosis and disinfection by end-users. By enabling an efficient legal 
framework and supporting private sector participation and innovation in this area, public authorities 
can deliver important results, and prevent market failures from dictating security standards. Botnet 
mitigation, from a legal perspective, involves important discussions on fine-tuning international 
cooperation models and law enforcement powers, while safeguarding individuals’ fundamental 
rights.  
3.2.3 Minimising criminal profit 
As long as botnets remain a profitable business, criminals will invest in circumventing security 
measures and find a way through them. Evidently, the economics of botnets depends on their 
modus operandi – every design has its own weaknesses. Increasing the costs of botnets in a given 
jurisdiction means enhancing prevention to the point that the effort to create and operate a botnet 
infrastructure is no longer interesting, and even when machines are infected, disruption is quick 
and effective. Moreover, increasing the costs of botnets in a given sector or jurisdiction may have 
only local effects. Criminal organisations targeting a specific company will shift to other same sector 
companies, if the costs of cybercrime became unattractive from the outset. Lastly, if a given 
jurisdiction makes cybercrime harder to generate income, botnets will migrate to countries that are 
more profitable. Ideally, countries should work together to provide a minimum level of prevention 






3.3 Case Study Countries 
The following sections describe the approaches adopted in the case study countries, which 
includes both the legal and organisational measures and the distribution of responsibilities 
between different sectors and agents. The cases are discussed in the following order: Canada, 
Estonia, Germany, the Netherlands and the UK.  
 
3.3.1 Canada 
The Canadian Cyber Security Strategy,75 launched in 2010, included a five-year action plan (2010-
2015), built on three pillars: helping citizens be secure online, securing government systems and 
partnering to secure vital cyber systems outside the Federal Government. Since 2010, the 
Canadian Government recognises the need for collaboration with stakeholders, especially 
internationally, as an essential step into security. Public Safety Canada, the government 
department responsible for protecting Canadians and helping to maintain a peaceful and safe 
society, is responsible for coordinating the implementation of the Strategy together with private 
sector and international partners. In 2014, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police launched a 
Cybercrime Report with a specific section dedicated to botnets. The overall cyber security policy 
highlights the importance of shared responsibilities in ensuring security and the need to enforce 
collaboration across sectors, industry, and government.  
CERTs 
The Canadian Cyber Incident Response Centre (CCIRC) is the national Computer Emergency 
Response Team (CERT) of Canada, with the mandate of the federal government, to build safe and 
resilient internet in the country.76 CCIRC acts as the national coordination centre for prevention and 
mitigation of attacks, as well as preparedness, response and recovery, providing authoritative 
support and advice, and coordinating information sharing among key partners. CCIRC collaborates 
with partners from public and private sectors, as well as international partners, producing 
information and distributing data that can improve cyber security. In case of infections, CCIRC 
notifies users of compromised systems on the nature of the contamination and on the steps for 
immunization. Besides, it shares best practices and guides with security tips and advices to mitigate 
malicious events CCIRC provides its partners with technical assistance, performing malware 
analysis and computer forensics. CCIRC partners include government, public and private sector 
organizations, security researchers and the national cyber security incident response teams 
(CSIRTs) of other countries. The community of partners working together with CCIRC have resulted 
in the creation of a CCIRC Community Portal, which provides tools and recent documents against 
threats. CCIRC was involved in the activities that led to the disruption of Gameover Zeus and 
Cryptolocker in 2014.77 
                                                   
75 Available at http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/rsrcs/pblctns/cbr-scrt-strtgy/cbr-scrt-strtgy-eng.pdf  
76 See http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/ntnl-scrt/cbr-scrt/ccirc-ccric-eng.aspx  





The Canadian Criminal Code, combined with special legislation, is the main source of substantive 
criminal law in the country. Under Section 342.1(1) of the Canadian Criminal Code it is an offence 
to fraudulently and without right obtain any computer service, use (or cause to be used) a computer 
system with the intent to commit an offence in relation to computer data and to computer system, 
and to use, possess, traffic in or allow another person to have access to a computer password that 
would enable a person to commit an offence, as well as to intercept or cause to be intercepted any 
function of a computer system. The offence of Section 342.1 (Unauthorized access) is broad to 
cover hacking in the context of botnets. Additionally, Section 342.2 criminalises the unlawful 
making, possession, selling, offering for sale or distribution of any instrument or device or any 
component thereof designed to commit any offence under Section 342.1 or which renders it 
primarily useful for such offences. Section 342.2 thus criminalises a wide range of activities 
connected to handling of malicious codes, which is utmost relevant for criminalising bots. Data 
interference such as DDoS attacks are covered by Section 430(1.1) – Mischief of computer data – 
which defines as an offence, among others, to obstruct, interrupt or interfere with the lawful use of 
computer data, to obstruct, interrupt or interfere with a person in the lawful use of computer data or 
to deny access to computer data to a person who is entitled it.  
 
Investigatory powers 
On July 8, 2015, Canada ratified the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime. According to 
Canadian authorities, the 2014 Protecting Canadians from Online Crime Act78 (which criminalises 
cyberbullying and widens investigative powers “to help police and prosecutors investigate not only 
the proposed new offence, but other existing offences that are committed via the Internet or that 
involve electronic evidence”79) already provided the necessary means for police to duly investigate 
cybercrime, fulfilling the requirements for ratification.80 The summary of the Protecting Canadians 
from Online Crime Act describes the new powers as: “... (b) the power to make preservation 
demands and orders to compel the preservation of electronic evidence; (c) new production orders 
to compel the production of data relating to the transmission of communications and the location of 
transactions, individuals or things; (d) a warrant that will extend the current investigative power for 
data associated with telephones to transmission data relating to all means of telecommunications; 
(e) warrants that will enable the tracking of transactions, individuals and things and that are subject 
to legal thresholds appropriate to the interests at stake; and (f) a streamlined process of obtaining 
warrants and orders related to an authorization to intercept private communications by ensuring 
that those warrants and orders can be issued by a judge and by specifying that all documents 
relating to a request for a related warrant or order are automatically subject to the same rules 
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respecting confidentiality as the request for authorization.”81  These powers can also be used for 
executing incoming requests for mutual legal assistance in criminal matters.   
The Cybercrime Convention will enter into force exactly three months after the ratification is 
officially communicated to the Secretariat of the COE. Currently, the Canadian Criminal Code, 
combined with special legislation, is the main sources of criminal procedure rules in Canada. The 
production order (Art. 18 Cybercrime Convention) is regulated in Section 487.014 et seq. Criminal 
Code, whereby law enforcement can request data about a subscriber or traffic data from a 
telecommunication operator. This provision finds a parallel in Section 7(3)(c.1) of the Personal 
Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act, which allows data controllers to disclose 
personal data, such as name, IP address, email, and telephone number to law enforcement,82 
without user knowledge or consent. Search and seizure of networks, as well as interception of 
communications data, form the concept of lawful access powers given to Canadian law 
enforcement, as provided in the Criminal Code and special acts, comparable to Arts. 19 (search 
and seizure of stored computer data); Art. 20 (collection of traffic data); and Art. 21 (interception of 
content data) of the Cybercrime Convention. All powers are subject to compliance with national 
privacy laws and the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.83 These powers give law 
enforcement the possibility to intercept, search and seize or copy documentation, computer data, 
and other relevant evidence.84 A bill to expand the scope and possibilities of lawful access in the 
context of cybercrime (Bill C-30),85 proposed in 2012 with the purpose of amending the Criminal 
Code, died in parliament.86  
Mitigation efforts  
Canada has been involved in international efforts tacking botnets worldwide, such as the MDUS 
led initiative to takedown Gameover Zeus and Cryptolocker87 and the Operation Clean Slate that 
targeted Citadel. In the latter, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police seized more than 80 physical 
servers connected to Citadel, in support to the activities initiated by the FBI.88 Finally, Canadian 
stakeholders have worked together under the guidance of the European Cyber Crime Centre (EC3) 
in coordinated international efforts against cybercrime. The expectation is that the ratification of the 
Cybercrime Convention will intensify the cooperative efforts between Canadian law enforcement 
and other countries parties to the convention. 
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No particular multistakeholder initiative in Canada dealing with botnets was identified during this 
quick scan. It is important to note that multistakeholder initiatives often operate within sectors, 
where there is no clear interest for making this information available to the general public. Other 
multistakeholder initiatives in general areas of cybersecurity and crime include:  1. the activities led 
by Public Safety Canada with private sector agents; 2. the Canadian Telecommunications Cyber 
Protection Working Group, which promotes multiples partnerships between private and public 
sector in protecting Canadian networks; and 3. the Network for Security Information Exchange, 
which promotes collaboration between a larger community of cyber security stakeholders such as 
the telecommunications, financial, energy, and vendor communities and other government 
departments.  
3.3.2 Estonia 
The Cyber Security Strategy 2014-2017 (the Strategy) adopted by the Ministry of Economic Affairs 
and Communications of Estonia (MEAC) sets out the goal to increase cybersecurity capabilities 
and raise the population’s awareness of cyber threats, thereby ensuring continued confidence is 
cyberspace. 89 MEAC is responsible for the security of state information systems, e-services and 
critical infrastructures and the overall policy coordination of cyber security.90 The Strategy does not 
make explicit references to the need to fight or mitigate risks arising from botnets. However, the 
Strategy emphasizes that cybercrime is a general threat to the overall growing tendency of 
dependence of technology, use of government e-solutions and trust in cyberspace.91 Also, the 
Strategy stresses the need for meaningful and effective cooperation between public and private 
actors in the development of cyber security organisation as well as in preventing and resolving 
cyber incidents that are becoming increasingly unavoidable.92  
The Ministry of Justice (MJ), responsible for fighting and combating cyber-crime, has 
prepared a document “Criminal Policy Trends up to 2018” which noticeably lists prevention and 
effective reaction to cybercrime as a top priority in the field of criminal law.93 The document sets 
out that the fight against cybercrime must focus on, inter alia, the prevention of computer-related 
fraud and the spread of computer viruses and hacking.94  
                                                   
89 Ministry of Economic Affairs and Communications, ‘Cyber Security Strategy 2014-2017’ (2014), p 4 and 8. 
Available at https://www.mkm.ee/sites/default/files/cyber_security_strategy_2014-2017_public_version.pdf  
90 In fact, these responsibilities are delegated to the Estonian Information Systems Authority (ISA) which is a 
subunit of MEAC. ISA is responsible for the development and administration of state information systems, drafting 
related policies and strategies, coordinating the implementation of security standards, manages the security 
incidents occurring in Estonian networks. 
91 According to the CCDCOE study National Cyber Security Organisation: Estonia, 94% of Estonians submit their 
income tax return via e-Tax Board and more than 90% of the residents of Estonia use the ID card that enables 
electronic authentication when using online services and vote online. E-voting has been used for local and 
parliamentary elections in Estonia eight times since 2005 (http://www.vvk.ee/voting-methods-in-
estonia/engindex/statistics). Available at 
https://ccdcoe.org/sites/default/files/multimedia/pdf/CS_organisation_ESTONIA_032015.pdf.   
92 Cyber Security Strategy 2014-2017, p 5. 
93 Ministry of Justice, ‘Criminal Policy Trends up to 2018’ (2010), p 1. Available at 
http://www.just.ee/sites/www.just.ee/files/elfinder/article_files/kriminaalpoliitika_arengusuunad_aastani_2018.pdf.  




As a subunit of Information System Authority (ISA), CERT-EE was established in 2006. It works as 
the governmental body responsible for assisting Estonian Internet users in the implementation of 
preventive and response measures. CERT-EE deals with security incidents that occur in Estonian 
networks or reported as such by citizens or institutions in Estonia or abroad. CERT-EE’s incident 
response procedure is described as follows in the RFC 2350 of CERT-EE: a) incident triage: 
investigating whether an incident has indeed occurred and determining the extent thereof; b) 
incident coordination: contacting and determining relevant involved organizations; facilitating 
contacts and asking and composing reports; communicating with media, if necessary; c) incident 
resolution: advising involved organisations, following up the incident solution process, collecting 
evidence and interpreting data.95 CERT-EE is affiliated with FIRST (the global Forum of Incident 
Response and Security Teams) as well as European regional forums TERENA (Trans-European 
Research and Education Networking Association), TF-CSIRT and TI (Trusted Introducer for 
European CERTs). CERT maintains affiliations with various CSIRTs around the world as needed.96 
Applicable Framework 
The Estonian Penal Code together with the Electronic Communications Act and the Code of 
Criminal Procedure are the main sources of law in regards to prevention, mitigation and 
apprehension of cyber-criminals.  
 
Criminal Offences 
Because the basis of the bot is hacking or ‘electronic break-in,’ section 217 of the Penal Code 
criminalises the act of illegally obtaining access to a computer system which is punishable up to 
three years’ imprisonment. If aggravating circumstances exist (e.g. access was obtained to a state 
secret), the crime is punished with up to five years of imprisonment.97 A serious shortcoming of 
section 217 is that it does not criminalise the act of obtaining illegal access to a part of the computer 
system.98 Therefore, if an insider (e.g. an employee) has access to one part of a computer system 
and then illegally obtains access to another part that he or she had no authorisation to access, then 
the insider does not infringe section 217 of the Penal Code. 
Once access to a computer system is obtained, a botmaster’s further activities could fall 
under section 206, 207 or 406 of the Penal Code. Section 206 criminalises the act of interference99 
of computer data which is punishable by up to three years of imprisonment. If the act is committed 
against data in numerous computer systems, and if the perpetrator committed the act by using a 
                                                   
95 See https://www.ria.ee/public/CERT/CERT-EE_rfc2350.pdf.  
96 Ibid. 




98 E Hirsnik, ‘Arvutikuritegevuse regulatsioon Eestis: karistusõiguse revisjoniga toimunud muudatused ja 
lahendamata jäänud probleemid’ (2014) VIII Juridica, p 613. Available at 
http://www.juridica.ee/juridica_et.php?document=et/articles/2014/8/244874.SUM.php.    
99 I.e. illegal alteration, deletion, damaging or blocking of data in a computer system. 
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device or a computer program that was created or adjusted in particular for the commission of the 
cyber-crimes, then the act is punishable with up to five years of imprisonment. According to the 
explanatory notes of subsection 206(2)(1), this is a botnet specific provision.100  
Section 207 of the Penal Code criminalises the act of hindering the functioning of a 
computer system that must be seen as an extension of the aforementioned section 206 of the Penal 
Code101 – if the act of illegal interference of data also hinders the functioning of a computer system, 
the act should be qualified as an act under section 207. This section criminalises the DoS attacks.102 
The Harju County Court (court of first instance in Tallinn) made a judgement regarding a DoS attack 
made during the events of the Bronze Night in 2007.103 The DoS attack was made by a sophomore 
student against the website and intranet of the leading centre-right political party Reformierakond. 
The student was found guilty and had to pay a pecuniary punishment of EUR 1090.104 In 2014, 
there were 9 registered infringements of section 207.105 
In case the botmaster targets a vital service or a vital public utility system (e.g. a structure 
or a device of the energy, communication, signalling, water supply or sewerage system or traffic 
control) and as a result it causes interference with or interruption of the functioning of a vital public 
utilities system, section 406 of the Penal Code punishes the act up to five years’ imprisonment.106 
The Penal Code also criminalises the act of preparation of a cybercrime. There were 37 of such 
registered incidents in 2014.107 
 
Investigatory Powers 
The Code of Criminal Procedure enables the police officer and the officer of the Internal Security 
Service covert access to the computer system to conduct surveillance if it is unavoidably necessary 
for the achievement of the objectives of the surveillance activities.108 The Prosecutor’s Office directs 
pre-trial proceedings and ensures the legality and efficiency thereof; also, it represents public 
prosecution in the court.109 The Prosecutor’s Office may issue orders to investigative bodies in 
order to meet the aim set out above.110 In the context of botnets, the Police and Border Guard 
                                                   
100 Added to the Penal Code on 1 January 2015. 
101 Hirsnik 2014, p. 613. 
102 According to the report of ISA regarding cyber security in 2014 (See 
https://www.ria.ee/public/Kuberturvalisus/RIA-Kyberturbe-aruanne-2014.pdf), there were 22 DoS attacks in 
Estonian networks in 2014. The report shows that this number has increased – in 2013, there were 13 DoS 
attacks. Sadly, the provision itself does not carry out the expectations it has been set – the sanction under section 
207 is exactly the same as under section 206 – up to three years of imprisonment and up to five years if 
aggravating circumstances exist. 
103 See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bronze_Night.   
104 Judgement of the Harju County Court, 13 December 2007, court case number 1-07-15185. Available at 
https://www.riigiteataja.ee/kohtuteave/maa_ringkonna_kohtulahendid/download.html?fail=2008%5c1%5cCWLDX
DHSYXHACMCALHMSYZQHNHZQDSST.pdf&viideFailile=1-07-15185.pdf.  
105 Crime in Estonia, Annex I, p 86. 
106 In 2014, there were 4 of reported section 406 infringements, however, the statistics do not reflect if any of 
those could be qualified as cyber-attacks. 
107 Crime in Estonia, Annex I, p 87. 
108 Section 1263(5) of the Code of Criminal Procedure: 
(5) Covert entry into a building, premises, vehicle, enclosed area or computer system is permitted upon conduct 
of the surveillance activities specified in subsection (1) and clauses (2) 2) and 3) of this section in the case this is 
unavoidably necessary for the achievement of the objectives of the surveillance activities. 
109 Subsection 30(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 
110 Subsection 213(1)(5) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 
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Board (the Police) and the Estonian Internal Security Service are investigative bodies who conduct 
pre-trial proceedings and may perform the procedural acts provided in the Code of Criminal 
Proceedings (the Code) independently unless the permission of a court or the permission or order 
of a Prosecutor's Office is required according to the law.111 
The investigative bodies may make inquiries on the permission of the Prosecutor’s Office 
to electronic communications undertakings about the data required for the identification of an end-
user related to the identification tokens used in the public electronic communications network112 if 
this is unavoidably necessary for the achievement of the objectives of criminal proceedings. Section 
215 of the Code, combined with subsections 901(1) and 901(3) of the Code, provide the equivalent 
of Art. 18 of the Cybercrime Convention and grants the Public Prosecutor the power to issue 
production orders.113 Search and seizure of stored computer data is covered by section 91 of the 
Code. Subsections 1111(2) and 1111(3) of the Electronic Communications Act together with 
subsection 901(2) of the Code cover the collection of information concerning messages transmitted 
through commonly used technical communication channels, in other words, the power to order 
production of traffic data, as provided by Art. 20 of the Cybercrime Convention. Interception of 
content data, an investigatory power covered by Art. 21 of the Cybercrime Convention, is 
implemented by subsection 1233(2)(2) together with section 1267 of the Code, which regulates 
wiretapping or covert observation of information transmitted through technical communication 
channels or other information. 
Multistakeholder initiatives 
In the area of cyber incident prevention and cooperation, CERT-EE operates the Virtual Situation 
Room (VSR) which is a collaboration tool for crisis prevention and risk management where service 
providers, government agencies and service providers themselves can cooperate.114 The VSR is 
a single communication platform for sharing situational data between companies providing vital 
services (such as electricity, data communications, water, fuel supplies, public transport) and 
government agencies responsible for detecting, managing and preventing crises. The VSR records 
all crisis management communication and decisions together with situational data which enables 
the improvement of risk management procedures. In order to be effective, the data that is shared 
                                                   
111 Ibid, subsections 32(1) and 212(1). 
112 Except for the data relating to the fact of communication of messages, see subsection 901(1) of the Code of 
Criminal Procedure. 
113 Subsection 901(1) and 901(3) of the Code of Criminal Proceedings. The inquiry may concern the following data: 
(i) user IDs allocated by the communications undertaking; (ii) user ID of the incoming communication in the mobile 
network; (iii) the name and address of the customer to whom an IP address, user ID or telephone number was 
allocated at the time of communication; (iv) user ID and number of the intended recipient of the internet telephony 
communication; (v) the name, address and user ID of the intended recipient of the e-mail and internet telephony 
service; (vi) start and end dates and times of the Internet session, IP address allocated by the Internet service 
provider to the user; (vii) the start (log-in) and the end (log off) date and time of the e-mail or internet telephony 
service; (viii) the used Internet service of e-mail and Internet telephony services; (ix) the caller's number in case of 
a dial-up Internet connection; (x) Digital Subscriber Line (DSL) or other end point identifier of the originator of the 
communication. 
114 See https://www.ria.ee/vsr/.   
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with the CERT-EE must be up to date. It is highly sensitive information in nature for the service 
providers; therefore, the confidentiality of this information is of utmost importance.115 
3.3.3 Germany 
Launched in 2011, the German National Cyber Security Strategy116 aims at protecting Critical 
Infrastructures, securing IT systems in Germany, strengthening IT security in the public 
administration, establishing a National Cyber Response Centre and a National Cyber Security 
Council, effective control of cyber crime and coordination of cyber security in Europe and 
worldwide, use of reliable and trustworthy IT, development of  personnel development in federal 
authorities, developing tools to respond to cyber attacks. The document mentions the on-going 
efforts to tackle botnets undertaken by the G8 and the participation of Germany therein, while 
explicitly addressing the issue of large-scale attacks against critical infrastructure.117 Recent 
concepts of multi-stakeholder participation and shared cyber security responsibilities are 
insufficiently presented in the strategy, seemingly as result of the time in which it was issued. 
However, recent developments of cyber security initiatives in the country demonstrate the 
collaborating effort between private and public actors in fighting botnets.   
CERTs/CSIRT 
Germany uses several Computer Security and Incident Response Teams, distributed in sectors, 
such as Service Providers, Research and Education, Finance, Commerce, and ICT vendors, as 
well as among public institutions. Additionally, CERT-Bund,118 a national governmental institution 
that is part of the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI), is responsible for monitoring 
IT incidents and acting as the main point for prevention and response against cyber incidents. 
CERT-Bund regularly issues feeds that raise awareness on vulnerabilities and on how to protect 
computers from attacks, supports efforts to respond to IT security incidents, issues 
recommendations on cybercrime mitigation, and operates Germany’s national IT Situation Centre. 
The early warning information service (WID) operated by CERT-Bund is distributed among the 
federal administration, critical-infrastructure companies, citizens and other CERTs. CERT-Bund 
operates 24-hour on-call duty, alerting public authorities in case of imminent threats, and offers 
additional tools, such as Bürger-CERT,119 which informs and warns citizens and small businesses 
about viruses, worms and other threats.  
As described in their RFC2350 document, CERT-Bund does not publish incident-related 
information (e.g. names, technical details) without the consent of the parties involved. Certain 
circumstances may require disclosure of these types of information, for instance, to foster closer 





117 HAM Luijf, Kim Besseling, Maartje Spoelstra, and Patrick de Graaf, ‘Ten National Cyber Security Strategies: A 
Comparison’ in S Bologna et al. (eds.), Critical Information Infrastructure Security (Springer 2013). 
118 See https://www.cert-bund.de/  
119 See https://www.buerger-cert.de/  
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cooperation between affected ISPs or hosting providers, on the basis of CERT-Bund’s participation 
in the FIRST network, and if the attack involves parties of the Bun-CERT constituency. Moreover, 
information may also be disclosed for supporting the tasks of the law enforcement (albeit there is 
no regulation in Germany requiring CERT-Bund to do so), the analyses conducted in the National 
IT Situation Centre, and the Federal Ministry of Interior’s situation centre. CERT-Bund reported 
efforts against botnets include the discovery of a Unix botnet in 2014 via Operation Windingo, which 
involved private and public sector agents.120 
Applicable framework 
Criminal offences 
As discussed, multiple criminal offences can be committed via botnets. The German Criminal Code 
(Strafgesetzbuch) criminalises as data espionage (Section 202a) with a maximum of 3 years of 
imprisonment, defined as the unlawful obtaining of data protected against unauthorised access. 
Data espionage can thus be read as a general hacking offence in German criminal law. However, 
for the purpose of the German Criminal Code, data espionage is only configured if the perpetrator 
circumvented a protective mechanism in the process. The preparatory acts towards data espionage 
are criminalised under Section 202c with penalty of imprisonment not exceeding one year or a fine 
for whoever produces, acquires for himself or another, sells, supplies, disseminates or makes 
otherwise accessible passwords or security codes enabling access to data.  
Whoever develops bot malware can be liable to imprisonment for up to 5 years in the terms 
of Section 263a – Computer fraud. Paragraph 1 of Section 263a defines computer fraud as 
damaging the property of another by influencing the result of data processing through incorrect or 
unauthorized influence on the course of processing of data, with the aim of obtaining an unlawful 
profit. Again, preparatory acts configure a criminal offence in itself, for which the perpetrator will be 
liable with imprisonment for up to three years. Moreover, Section 303b – Computer sabotage is 
largely applicable to DDoS attacks. In the terms of the provision, whoever causes considerable 
data processing interference by unlawful data interference, entering or transmitting data with the 
intention of causing harm, or destroying, damaging, rending unusable, removing or altering a data 
processing device is liable for the offence. Aggravated forms with imprisonment penalties of up to 
10 years are established for interferences causing major financial losses to companies, connected 
to criminal organisations or compromising critical infrastructures.  
 
 
Investigatory powers  
German law attaches a constitutional value to the activities of law enforcement in limiting these 
interventions in the rights and liberties of citizens.121 The current German Criminal Procedure Code 
(Strafprozessordnung, hereinafter: GCPC) dates from 1887 and although several legislative 
                                                   
120 See http://www.eset.com/int/about/press/articles/article/operation-windigo-largest-server-botnet-uncovered/  
121 Antje Pedain, ‘German criminal procedure’ (University of Cambridge, Faculty of Law 2006). Retrieved from 
http://www.law.cam.ac.uk/faculty-resources/summary/german-criminal-procedure/6368   
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reforms have followed ever since, the original structure of the code has remained the same since 
its enactment. Germany ratified the Cybercrime Convention and adapted its body of laws to comply 
with the provisions of the international instrument. As a consequence, the investigatory powers of 
German law enforcement can be analysed in light of the convention.  
The production order (Art. 18 of the Cybercrime Convention production order) is 
implemented by Section 95 of the GCPC and Sections 112 and 113 of the German 
Telecommunications Act. Section 112 of the German Telecommunications Act expressly obliges 
any publicly available telecommunications services to store customer data files and to provide 
these data to courts and criminal prosecution authorities, and to federal and state police 
enforcement authorities for purposes of averting danger.  
With respect to computer data, Sections 94, 95, 102, 103, 105 and 110(3) of the GCPC 
deal with particular aspects of search and seizure in the course of criminal investigations (Art. 19 
of the Cybercrime Convention). Section 94 establishes that objects that may be of importance as 
evidence for the investigation shall be seizer or otherwise secured, regardless of the resistance 
presented by the person holding the custody of the object. Section 95 continues to determine an 
obligation to surrender. The order to seizure, as clarified in Section 98, is an exclusive competence 
of the court, which can be exceptionally granted to public prosecutors and assisting agents. Data 
search in respect of the suspect is enabled by Section 102 of the GCPC, which allows for the 
search of the property and of the private and other premises of a suspect, including cases in which 
the search is believed to lead to further evidence. Section 103 broadens the scope of search and 
seizure to other persons, admissible for the purpose of apprehending the suspect or to investigate 
the traces of the offence or to seize other objects, whenever certain facts support the conclusion 
that the person, trace or object sought is located on the premises to be searched.  
Section 105 determines searches may be ordered only by the judge and, in exigent 
circumstances, also by the public prosecution office and the officials assisting it. The scope of 
search powers is complemented by Section 110(3), which determines that the examination of an 
electronic storage medium at the premises of the person affected by the search may be extended 
to cover physically separate storage media. The use of Section 110(3) is possible insofar as the 
separate storage media are accessible from the initial storage medium and if there is a concern 
that the data sought would otherwise be lost. An accurate evaluation on the use of the provisions, 
especially in regards to jurisdictional limitations, must follow analysis of case law, which goes 
beyond the scope of this report.  
Real-time collection of traffic data (Art. 20 of the Cybercrime Convention) is covered by 
Section 100g and 100j of the GCPC. The GCPC provides a detailed framework for data production 
requests to telecommunications providers in relation to a suspect of a crime. Section 100g on 
Information on Telecommunications Connections establishes that if certain facts give rise to the 
suspicion that a person, either as perpetrator, inciter or accessory, has committed a criminal 
offence, to the extent that this is necessary to establish the facts or determine the location of the 
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accused, traffic data may be obtained also without the knowledge of the person concerned. Section 
100j on Request for Information can be used to obtain data such as traffic data and IP address for 
the purpose of clarifying facts or locating the accused. 
Finally, interception of content data (Art. 21 of the Cybercrime Convention) is covered by 
Sections 100a and 100b of the GCPC, which establish the conditions to intercept communications 
and the official requirements of the interception order. An order to intercept communications may 
be ordered by the court only upon application by the public prosecution office. In exigent 
circumstances, the public prosecution office may also issue an order, which shall become 
ineffective if it is not confirmed by the court within three working days. The order shall be limited to 
a maximum duration of three months.  
Mitigation efforts  
German authorities have been prominently active in international efforts against botnets. 
International consortia involving Dutch law enforcement were responsible for disrupting 
ZeroAccess,122 GameOver Zeus & Cryptolocker,123 Ramnit,124 and, more recently, Beebone 
(AAEH),125 benefiting a large sum of users worldwide. The following paragraph gives a brief 
overview of the Ramnit takedown. 
In February 2015, the German Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA) efforts against the 
Ramnit botnet infrastructure were successful. The takedown was a coordinated endeavour led by 
BKA and the Joint European Cybercrime Action Task Force (J-CAT).126 With an estimated 3.2 
million infections, Ramnit is a variety of bank Trojan designed to harvest banking credentials, 
passwords, cookies, and personal files from victims.127 Ramnit was also capable of monitoring a 
victim’s browsing activities, manipulating banks’ websites, scanning a computer’s hard drive and 
stealing files, among other criminal activities.128 The consortium acted in different countries and 
with the support of large companies, including Microsoft, AnubisNetworks and Symantec. The 
disruptive efforts shut down the command and control servers connected to Ramnit, and worked 
towards redirecting over 300 domains associated with the fraudulent activities. Press releases 
issued by authorities involved in the case have called users to verify their systems through special 
tools made available online.  






125 See https://www.europol.europa.eu/content/international-police-operation-targets-polymorphic-beebone-botnet   
126 According to Europol, J-CAT was initiated by Europol's EC3, the EU Cybercrime Taskforce, the FBI and the 
NCA, and the J-CAT comprises a team composed of Cyber Liaison Officers from committed and closely involved 
Member States, non-EU law enforcement partners and EC3. Retrieved from 
https://www.europol.europa.eu/content/expert-international-cybercrime-taskforce-launched-tackle-online-crime  
127 http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/ramnit-cybercrime-group-hit-major-law-enforcement-operation  





The German Anti-Botnet Initiative is an industry initiative for enabling better detection, response 
and consumer protection. Officially launched in 2010, hosted by ECO (the association of German 
ISPs) and supported by the Federal Office for Information and Security (BSI), botfrei.de stimulates 
cooperation and accountability of private sector in combating cybercrime. The adopted strategy 
works in three levels: 1. Identification of compromised users; 2. User notification; 3. Disinfection 
support via a national support centre.  Identification of victims is made possible by information 
sharing between private sector partners and further analysis of the data. Data feeds on detected 
malware are distributed among partners, which are then responsible for alerting compromised 
customers. The notification is accompanied by information about the national support centre, which 
offers online disinfection tools in their website and a central help desk. Support via the help desk is 
provided via ticket numbers distributed by the informing ISPs, protecting the privacy of the infected 
user, whose identity is preserved in the process. Due to the ticket system, ISPs don’t enter personal 
customer information in the central data base.129 Exceptionally, this information could be entered 
for allocation reasons; however, only the project management and the second level senior help 
desk agents would be granted access to it. The approach implemented in Botfrei has been 
developed in consultation with the German Federal Data Protection Commissioner. In 2013, ECO 
and partners started the ACDC project,130 an EU-funded initiative with the purpose of expanding 
botfrei.de to other Member States.  
3.3.4 The Netherlands 
The 2013 Dutch National Cyber Security Strategy 2 – from awareness to capability (NCSS 2) 
recognises botnets as a threat to national cyber security. As described in the report, citizens, 
businesses and governments are highly targeted by botnets, becoming victims of cybercriminals. 
It follows that the NCSS 2, especially regarding botnets, is a miscellany of initiatives and actions 
by the public and private sectors. Efforts to regulate botnets follow the formal legislative procedure, 
aligned with the civil law tradition of the country. In this regard, the NCSS 2 expressly states the 
need for more effective and efficient enforcement of cybercrime legislation, with clear norms. To 
that end, the Netherlands aims to strengthen its legislation by updating the applicable laws, 
including the Dutch Criminal Code and Criminal Procedure Code. The NCSS 2 would have been a 
good opportunity for the policy makers to provide further clarity on how to strengthen law 
enforcement tasks.  
Currently, the long-awaited Computercriminaliteit III (Computer Crime III) Bill (hereinafter 
CC III) has, as of September 2015, still not been introduced in parliament. Moreover, it is already 
clear that CC III by itself will not attain all the objectives set forth in the NCCS 2. The hard law 
approach, of which CC III is an example, is supplemented by other, voluntary, arrangements in the 
form of public-private partnerships and cooperative networks that bring together different 
                                                   
129 See http://www.oecd.org/sti/ieconomy/45509383.pdf  
130 See https://www.acdc-project.eu  
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stakeholders working to reduce botnet infections. These partnerships and networks work either on 
a permanent basis, for instance, sharing best practices and infection data, or ad hoc, addressing 
particular investigations. The shared responsibilities system for cybersecurity, as defended in the 
NCSS 2, asserts the existence of duties for both the private and the public sector to act in ensuring 
cleaner information systems.  
CERTs/CSIRT 
The National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) performs the activities of the national computer 
emergency response team in the Netherlands. Additionally, several non-governmental CERTs 
coexist,131 many of them affiliated to the FIRST network.132 The mission of NCSC is to contribute 
to improved resilience of networks in the Netherlands, acting as the main point of contact in the 
country for cybersecurity incidents. The responsibilities of the NCSC include the operational 
coordination of IT crises and the Dutch central government CERT, response to threats and 
incidents, perception and action prospects, and fostering cyber security collaboration.  
Officially, the NCSC is a division of the Cyber Security Department (DCS), part of the 
National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism (NCTV), within the Ministry of Security and 
Justice. Despite its governmental constituency, the NCSC works in collaboration with private 
sector. The NCSC makes use of two tools to monitor the threats and vulnerabilities of Dutch 
networks, namely Taranis and Beita. Taranis works as an application for data collection and 
analysis, enabling experts to send warning to interested parties. Beita is a set of spread honeypots 
installed in governmental organisations, acting as a tool for automatic monitoring of attacks. By 
collecting attack data, Beita offers a deeper insight into the operation of the malware, which 
contributes to developing better response. Within the structure of the NCSC, a National Response 
Network (NRN) was created in 2014, approximating the activities of the NCSC and public-private 
IT response actors in different sectors with the purpose of sharing scarce resources. NRN is 
expected to expand in 2015. A counter part of the NRN, the National Detection Network (NDN) 
works on a similar basis, enabling timely sharing of resources that may help parties take 
appropriate measures to prevent or minimise damages. NCSC has been involved in the activities 




The Dutch Criminal Code and the Dutch Criminal Procedural Code are the main sources of legal 
provisions directly applicable to botnets and their investigation. Because a botnet develops in 
phases, as discussed before, it is possible to identify multiple criminal offences that may apply to 
the same botnet attack. Therefore, defining which legal provisions are applicable depends on the 
architecture of the botnet and the concrete circumstances of how it is created and used. Moreover, 
                                                   
131 See http://www.cert.nl/english  
132 See https://www.first.org/members/map#NL  
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criminal conducts performed by botnets can be classified under various separate criminal offences. 
Thus, determining how a real life attack fits the categories of the law requires a detailed examination 
by the judicial authorities. The following sections provide an overview of the substantive criminal 
provisions that could be used to criminalise botnet activity and related offences, focusing on 
criminal attacks against information systems, and of the main criminal investigation powers relevant 
for investigating botnets.  
 
Criminal Offences 
Bot-masters may incur several criminal offences when developing and deploying a botnet, including 
traditional crimes of fraud and forgery. For the purpose of this report, the analysis is restricted to 
cybercrime provisions in the narrow sense, i.e., offences against the confidentiality, integrity or 
availability of computers, computer networks, or computer data.  
Bot exploitation is a hacking offence under Dutch criminal law, described as the intentional 
and unlawful intrusion into a computerized device or a part thereof.133 Hacking is punished with 
imprisonment of up to two years for the basic offence of unlawful access, and up to four years in 
its qualified forms (copying data or hacking onwards from the hacked computer), as stipulated by 
Art. 138ab of the Dutch Criminal Code (Wetboek van Strafrecht, hereinafter DCC).134 Moreover, 
creating a bot also amounts to data interference as defined in Art. 350a, para. 1 of the Dutch 
Criminal Code,135 as infecting a computer with malware is an intentional and unlawful form of 
                                                   
133 See Hoge Raad [Dutch Supreme Court] 22 February 2011, ECLI:NL:PHR:2011:BN9287, which qualifies 
infection with a virus is a form of hacking.  
134 Evert F Stamhuis, ‘Criminal Law on Cyber Crime in The Netherlands’ (Preparatory Colloquium, 28-30 November 
2012, Verona (Italy), Section I - Information Society and Penal Law). Available at 
http://www.penal.org/sites/default/files/files/RV-11.pdf   
Art. 138ab DCC 
(1) A person who intentionally and unlawfully intrudes into an automated device or part thereof is guilty of computer 
intrusion and liable to a term of imprisonment of not more than one year or a fine of the fourth category. Intrusion 
includes access: 
a. by breaching a security device, 
b. by a technical operation, 
c. with the help of false signals or a false key, or 
d. by assuming a false capacity. 
(2) Computer intrusion is punishable by a term of imprisonment of not more than four years or a fine of the fourth 
category, where the offender subsequently, for his own use or for that of another, copies, taps or records the data 
stored, processed or transferred in the automated device in which he has intruded. 
(3) Computer intrusion committed through a public telecommunication facility is punishable by a term of 
imprisonment of not more than four years or a fine of the fourth category, where the offender subsequently 
a. uses processing capacity of an automated device with the purpose of obtaining unlawful benefit for himself or for 
another person; 
b. through the automated device into which he has intruded gains access to the automated device of a third person. 
135 Stamhuis 2012. 
Art. 350a DCC 
(1) A person who intentionally and unlawfully alters, erases, renders useless or inaccessible data stored, processed 
or transferred by means of an automated device or by telecommunication, or adds other data thereto, is liable to a 
term of imprisonment of not more than two years or a fine of the fourth category. 
(2) A person who commits the offence specified in section 1 after having unlawfully intruded, through a public 
telecommunication facility, into an automated device, and there causes serious damage with respect to such data, 
is liable to a term of imprisonment of not more than four years or a fine of the fourth category. 
(3) A person who intentionally and unlawfully provides or disseminates data designated to cause damage in an 
automated device, is liable to a term of imprisonment of not more than four years or a fine of the fifth category. 
(4) A person who commits the act specified in section 3 with the object of limiting the damage resulting from such 
data is not criminally liable. 
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altering data in, or adding data to, a computer. It can also be qualified under Art. 350, para. 3 DCC 
as a form of making available or disseminating data intended to inflict damage in a computer 
system, an offence that is punishable with imprisonment for maximum four years. Art. 350a, para 
3 DCC applies to distribution of malware such as worms, trojans and viruses.136 
In the context of botnets, dissemination and exploitation of a bot are the first stages of the 
overall development of the malicious network, corroborating the idea of hacking as a gateway to 
other crimes.137 If not disrupted before completion of the recruitment phase, the botnet will progress 
to execute the planned attack or become available for sale. In both cases, the idea is to generate 
a gain to the botmaster. If the botnet is deployed to commit a DDoS attack, the offender will commit 
the offence of Art. 138b of the Dutch Criminal Code,138 which penalises with imprisonment not 
exceeding two years whoever intentionally and unlawfully obstructs access to or use of an 
automated work by offering or sending data to it. For DDoS attacks on computers with a public 
function (e.g. government websites), the provision on computer sabotage of Art. 161sexies DCC 
applies, punishable with a maximum of six years’ imprisonment if provisioning of services is 
disturbed. This provision has even been applied to the infection of a substantial number of end-
user computers with malware (the Toxbot virus), as the Supreme Court argued that this also 
threatened the delivery of services by making it impossible for end-users to safely use Internet 
banking services.139 This interpretation has been criticised in the literature, as it seems more 
appropriate to restrict the application of the provision on computer sabotage to attacks on service 
providers’ computers, not attacks on end-user computers.140 Finally, if the bot includes a keylogger 
function (recording and secretly sending keystrokes to the botnet operator), this qualifies as a form 
of illegal interception (Art. 139c DCC).  
 
Investigatory powers 
The task of the Dutch police, as clarified in the Police Act, is to enforce the legal order, and assist 
those who need help (Art. 3 Police Act 2012). After being notified of a criminal offence, the police 
start a pre-trial investigation, with the purpose of gathering information about the offence and the 
suspect.141 For investigating botnets, they can use all the main powers included in the Cybercrime 
                                                   
136 Bert-Jaap Koops, ‘Cybercrime Legislation in the Netherlands’ (2010) 14.3 Electronic Journal of Comparative 
Law. 
137 Rutger Leukfeldt, Sander Veenstra, and Wouter Stol, ‘High Volume Cyber Crime and the Organization of the 
Police: The results of two empirical studies in the Netherlands’ (2013) 7 International Journal of Cyber Criminology 
1, p. 2. Retrieved from http://www.cybercrimejournal.com/Leukfeldtetal2013janijcc.pdf  
138 Stamhuis 2012. 
Art. 138b DCC - A person who intentionally and unlawfully obstructs the access to or the use of an automated 
device by offering or sending data to that device is liable to a term of imprisonment of not more than one year or a 
fine of the fourth category. 
139 Hoge Raad [Dutch Supreme Court] 22 February 2011, ECLI:NL:PHR:2011:BN9287.  
140 Jan-Jaap Oerlemans and Bert-Jaap Koops, ‘De Hoge Raad bewijst een slechte dienst in high-tech-crimezaak 
over botnets’ (2011) 86 Nederlands Juristenblad 1181.  
141 Peter JP Tak, ‘The Dutch criminal justice system: organisation and operation’ (Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek- 




Convention.142 These investigation powers can be used—although subject to certain conditions, 
depending on the particular power—for investigating all cybercrimes, including botnet infection and 
botnet exploitation.  
The production order (Art. 18 Cybercrime Convention) is implemented in two sets of 
powers, one for subscriber data of users of communications services (art. 126n, 126na Dutch 
Criminal Procedure Code (Wetboek van Strafvordering)) and one for other types of data (art. 126nc 
et seq. DCPC). Particularly relevant for botnet investigations is the power to order production of 
identifying data (Art. 126na DCPC), granting police the right to request the provider of a 
communications service to deliver identifying data such as name, address, postal code, birth date, 
etc., concerning a user of that service. This power can be used without authorisation from the Public 
Prosecutor or investigative judge.  
Search and seizure of stored computer data (Art. 19 Cybercrime Convention) is 
implemented in the regular provisions on search and seizure (Articles 95 et seq. DCPC) and in 
specific powers to search and copy computer data (Articles 125i et seq. DCPC). This includes the 
power to conduct network search, enabling the police to search computers connected to devices 
on the place of the search, insofar as the people living/working in the searched location have lawful 
access to those systems.143 For data protected by security mechanisms, Art. 125k offers police the 
power to order to someone other than the suspect the undoing of a security measure (Article 125k, 
para. 1), and to order the decryption of data (Article 125k, para. 2 DCCP). Search and seizure is, 
however, less suitable for investigating botnets, at least not in the earlier stages of the investigation, 
as the location of (computers of) the suspect—and thus the place to be searched—will usually not 
be known.  
For real-time collection of traffic data (Art. 20 Cybercrime Convention), the police can order 
production of traffic data (art. 126n DCPC), which allows determining the paths of botnet traffic, 
potentially indicating the source of an infection or commands from the botnet operator. This power 
requires authorisation from the Public Prosecutor (and in the future, possibly from the investigative 
judge, in light of the developments in the regulation of data retention144). Art. 126m DCPC regulates 
interception of content data (Art. 21 Cybercrime Convention), covering the interception of both 
public and non-public communications services. Interception is only allowed when the offence at 
issue has seriously breached the legal order (‘ernstige inbreuk op de rechtsorde’), and it requires 
a court order.  
Overall, the investigatory powers can be used to resolve concrete offences, but they are 
also usable for the purpose of proactive investigation of organized crime (i.e., without evidence that 
a specific crime has been committed; it suffices that there are grounds to believe that crimes are 
                                                   
142 For an overview of investigatory powers applicable to cybercrime investigations, see Tijs Kooijmans and Paul 
Mevis, ‘ICT in the Context of Criminal Procedure: The Netherlands’ (Preparatory Colloquium, 24-27 September 
2013, Antalya (Turkey), Section III: Information Society and Penal Law); Koops 2010. 
143 Kooijmans and Mevis 2013, p. 9. 
144 Cf. Rechtbank [District Court] Den Haag 11 March 2015, ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2015:2498, at §3.11.  
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being planned in an organized context),145 which can be relevant for the purpose of fighting criminal 
organisations exploiting botnets. 
 
Computercriminaliteit III 
The currently-available version of the CC III Bill, as released by the government in May 2013 for 
public consultation, aims to update investigation powers in light of current challenges of fighting 
cybercrime. Therefore, the CC III targets what they consider to be hampering issues for law 
enforcement. The memorandum recognises three obstacles to cybercrime investigation, namely, 
encryption of data, use of wireless networks and cloud computing. Two specific sets of proposed 
investigation powers are important in discussing botnet mitigation, namely the power to hack into 
computers (particularly through, but not limited to, infecting a target computer with a Trojan that 
enables remote control over various computer functions of the hacked computer) and the power 
for notice and takedown that can be used to disable access to data. Hacking powers (proposed 
Art. 125ja DCPC) would give police a legitimate ground to investigate suspicious networks or 
servers, collect information about the botnet, and, for instance, alter the operation of the malicious 
infrastructure. The power to disable access to data (proposed Art. 125p) deserves particular 
attention; in the context of botnet mitigation, this power might be used to order providers of 
communications services (such as access providers) to take down a command-and-control (C&C) 
server, or, perhaps, to block network traffic coming from infected computers. The power could thus 
help control contamination of new devices, and possibly takedown botnet C&C servers.  
A noteworthy controversy associated with CC III is the possibility, suggested in the draft 
Explanatory Memorandum, of extraterritorial application of hacking powers by the police. Via CC 
III, Dutch police would have the prerogative of making use of hacking powers beyond Dutch 
territory, if the location of the hacked computer is unknown. Here the understanding of prescriptive 
jurisdiction appears to have been expanded to legitimise cross-border investigations insofar as 
Dutch criminal law is applicable to the offense. The memorandum argues that for the detection of 
serious cross-border cybercrimes, the use of investigative powers is essential, even when that 
means gaining access to networks located outside Dutch territory. It is not clear to what extent CC 
III would effectively allow Dutch police to conduct cross-border network investigations, even in the 
absence of international cooperation agreements with foreign states, but the draft memorandum 
claims the new provisions are in consonance with ‘the current limits of Dutch law and international 
law’. The argument could benefit from further clarifying how CC III will achieve harmony with 
international law.146 Possibly, the explanation and interpretation will be adapted in the version of 
the Bill that is to be submitted to Parliament. 
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Mitigation efforts  
Dutch authorities have been prominently active in international efforts against botnets. International 
consortia involving Dutch law enforcement were responsible for disrupting ZeroAccess,147 
GameOver Zeus & Cryptolocker,148 Ramnit,149 and, recently, Beebone (AAEH),150 benefiting a 
large number of users worldwide. There have also been national efforts involving Dutch 
stakeholders; out of these national efforts, two particular botnet disruptions have been selected 
based on the availability of materials related to the investigations: Pobelka and Bredolab.   
A type of Citadel Trojan active since 2012, Pobelka emerged on the radar of the National 
Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism (NCTV) and its partners, including the Public 
Prosecutor and the Police. In September 2012, SurfRight discovered the control server of the 
attackers behind Pobelka. After expert analysis of Digital Investigations on the modus operandi of 
the botnet, and in cooperation with Dutch police, a takedown notice dismantled Pobelka operations 
in the country. The data found in the server revealed that the same organisation behind Pobelka 
was also responsible for other important cybercrime attacks victimising the country, such as the 
Dorifel virus.151 After investigation and analysis of the collected data, the findings of NCTV 
concluded that the botnet especially targeted Dutch and German users, aimed at manipulating 
Internet banking data. A critical aspect of Pobelka, explained by the Minister of Security and 
Justice152 included the infection computers located in a wide variety of entities, which included 
business, critical infrastructures and government itself. The Pobelka case was particularly relevant 
for victimising specific nations, but also for showing how botnets targeting financial transactions 
can steal a great deal of other sensitive information. In the case of Pobelka, theft of sensitive data 
affected business and government, posing an alarming threat to society.153 
First seen in mid-2009,154 the Bredolab botnet worked as a breed of pay-per-install 
malware: infected bots were sold and made available for purchasers to install their chosen 
malware.155 A fast-growing botnet, Bredolab allegedly reached 30 million victims by October 2010. 
In 2010, the hosting provider LeaseWeb was made aware of Bredolab infections in their networks, 
and notified the Dutch National High Tech Crime Unit (NHTCU) of the Dutch police.156 The police 
analysis started from the net-flow data shared by LeaseWeb and was later extended by the use of 







152 Brief Tweede Kamer Onderzoek Pobelka. Retrieved from 
https://www.ncsc.nl/binaries/content/documents/ncsc-nl/actueel/nieuwsberichten/analyse-dataset-pobelka-botnet-
afgerond/1/BriefTweede%2BKamer%2BOnderzoek%2BPobelka.pdf 
153 Cybersecurity Assessment Netherlands 2013, p. 8. 
154 David Dittrich, ‘So you want to take over a botnet...’ (Applied Physics Laboratory, University of Washington). 
Retrieved from https://www.usenix.org/system/files/conference/leet12/leet12-final23.pdf  
155 Brian Prince, ‘Bredolab Down but Far from Out After Botnet Takedown’ (eWeek 28 October 2010). Retrieved 
from http://www.eweek.com/c/a/Security/Bredolab-Down-But-Far-From-Out-After-Botnet-Takedown-160657/  
156  D de Graaf, AF Shosha and P Gladyshev, ‘Bredolab: shopping in the cybercrime underworld’ (International 
Conference on Digital Forensics and Cyber Crime 2012), p. 5. 
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wiretaps on 11 LeaseWeb servers to monitor the communication between servers and bots.157 On 
October 25, 2010, the NHTCU infiltrated the botnet, taking control over the backend panel of one 
of the command and control (C&C) servers and discontinued all malicious activity.158 Bredolab’s 
disruption was in fact the object of the Tolling Project, which involved a consortium of several 
partners, namely NHTCU, LeaseWeb, the Public Prosecutor, GOVCERT.NL, Fox-IT (a major ICT 
security company), and the National Forensics Institute (NFI). The project had three actions points 
on Bredolab: 1. Arresting the offenders; 2. Stopping the communications between bots and C&Cs 
and 3. Warning infected victims of their contamination. Overall, the three objectives were attained. 
Nevertheless, the developments associated with the three action lines raised important legal 
considerations around jurisdictional competence of the Netherlands, interference with computer 
data and communications by the police, and hacking powers of law enforcement. 
To complete action line 3, the NHTCU developed a warning program to inform victims of 
the infection in the form of a pop-up message appearing on infected computers’ screens. After 
several days, the NHTCU terminated all communications between affected bots and the server.159 
The NHTCU and the Public Prosecutor justified the intrusion based on public interest and security. 
However, police use of the botnet infrastructure to push notifications and interrupt communications 
raised questions over the legality of these actions. The question was raised whether law 
enforcement was authorised to access end-user computers by using the illegal (as being part of 
the botnet) connection between the C&C server and infected computers and, if they were, to what 
extent these powers were balanced against fundamental rights. As noted by Koning,160 by using 
decryption keys to penetrate the servers and secretly monitoring communications for about ten 
weeks, the NHTCU had at its disposal a large and valuable set of data, amounting to serious 
interference in the privacy of the suspect. The overall situation also infringed the fundamental rights 
to privacy and data protection of the victims, who were located in many different jurisdictions 
beyond the Netherlands. These events gave rise to heated legal discussions, reflected in the 
proposed Computercriminaliteit III Bill (see above). 
Multistakeholder initiatives 
One additional element of the NCSS 2 is worth noting: the focus on partnerships. The strategy of 
the Dutch government demonstrates important changes in the approach adopted since the first 
edition of the document, in 2011. According to the Dutch NCSS 2, the model currently pursued in 
the country fosters public-private participation networks for improving cybersecurity, instead of the 
traditional public-private partnership model. Additionally, it presents further clarity on the roles and 
responsibilities cyber security, and the political will to make the Netherlands a vanguard nation in 
strengthening investigation and prosecution of crimes, updating the current legal framework.  
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There is a clear interest of the Netherlands to strengthen and expand international 
partnerships at the State level, for instance at the Council of Europe and at Europol (EC3). Another 
example is ISAC®, which refers to the Information Sharing and Analysis Centers.161 Following the 
example set by the United States, ISAC is an initiative to develop a knowledge network on integral 
safety, security, critical infrastructure, safe cities, organizational security and social security. ISAC 
also works at the European level and one example of ISAC Europe’s collaborative work is in the 
area of ‘resilience engineering, which tries to enhance the ability of organizations to create 
processes that are robust yet flexible, to monitor and revise risk models, and to use resources 
proactively in the face of disruptions or ongoing production and economic pressures. To accomplish 
this task, ISAC Europe works together with The Hague Centre for Resilience and Societal Security, 
the Centre for Security, Safety and Justice, and Delft University of Technology.162 
Together with a high-level approach, the Netherlands is fostering private-public 
participation. It is not clear what exactly the NCSS 2 means by the term, since the strategy provides 
no further guidance on the matter. It seems to indicate that, instead of public-private partnerships, 
the idea is for the private sector to play a leading role in cybersecurity beyond individualized 
activities. It will be interesting to see if there is in fact a change in policy and perspective on the 
hierarchy between private and public sector in this regard, or if the distinction is merely semantics. 
In any case, multiple anti-botnet initiatives are currently active in The Netherlands; this section 
provides a brief overview of the best-known initiatives. 
 
AbuseHUB 
AbuseHUB is an initiative of the Abuse Information Exchange platform, a partnership between 
Dutch ISPs and non-ISPs for improving cybersecurity.163 AbuseHUB works as a clearinghouse for 
collecting, analysing and correlating large amounts of abuse data linked to infected devices. The 
network is a joint effort of nine ISPs, the .nl registrar (SIDN) and the national research and education 
network operator (SURFnet). The purpose of the initiative is to improve the levels of botnet 
mitigation in the group, by sharing critical information on attacks and infections. After the centralized 
analysis of infection data, information is redistributed to members, who are then notified of 
infections affecting their users and customers. AbuseHUB members can, in turn, notify end-users 
about infections involving their network and the spotted machine.  
A recent report on the results of AbuseHUB in the country showed that, over time, the 
proportion of the infected population in AbuseHUB members is decreasing.164 The study, 
conducted by Delft University of Technology, looked at global and national data sets, from January 
2011 to December 2014. Among other findings, it concluded that infections in AbuseHUB member 
networks are diminishing faster than in non-members, which are mainly composed of smaller 
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broadband providers and hosting providers, and that these organizations can benefit from joining 
AbuseHUB to improve botnet mitigation. 
 
PPS botnet  
The PPS botnet is an initiative of the Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs to stimulate self-regulation 
and cooperation in the field of botnets. Thus, a working group was created as part of the public-
private program Digiveilig. Based on research conducted by Delft University of Technology, which 
exposed that most ISPs did not have complete understanding of the amount of infections affecting 
their networks, the working group started as cooperation between private partners. As a result, the 
working group brought together ISPs to work together towards sharing and using information on 
botnet infections and other internet abuse by centrally collecting, analysing and correlating 
information from various national and international sources. This initial effort led to the creation of 
the current Abuse Information Exchange.  
After Abuse Information Exchange became operational, the working group continued to try 
to broaden the scope of anti-botnet activities and to extend the cooperation between Economic 
Affairs and the private sector (Abuse Information Exchange) to the whole chain of partners active 
in this field. The working group decided to join forces with a parallel botnet working group under 
the chair of the Ministry of Security and Justice, which involved the police, law enforcement, 
telecom authorities, the National Cyber Security Centre and the Ministry of Security and Justice 
and the Ministry of Economic Affairs.  
 
BotLeg project 
The BotLeg project (2014-2018) is a common effort led by Tilburg University, Abuse Information 
Exchange, NHTCU, SIDN, SURFnet and LeaseWeb, and funded by the Dutch Organisation for 
Scientific Research NWO. In this project, Tilburg University and partners investigate the legal 
issues surrounding public-private partnerships against botnets in The Netherlands and abroad. 
Anti-botnet PPPs are expanding and multiplying, but fundamental legal questions are left open, 
and operations seem to operate in a grey zone. Moreover, the traditional powers and procedures 
used to investigate crime are often inadequate to the cybercrime reality, according to the project 
group. The BotLeg project investigates the legal limits and possibilities for public-private anti-botnet 
operations, aiming to raise awareness among stakeholders and enhance legal certainty on the 
legitimacy of botnet countermeasures. It focuses on two key sectors (telecommunications/Internet 
and higher education), for which it will develop guidelines and sectoral codes of conduct. The 
project aims to contribute to clarifying and establishing the boundaries of anti-botnet operations, 
with the main goal of stimulating lawful and legitimate botnet fighting. It will work to establish what 
the law should allow for, in light of the current social demands and in order to balance legislation 
against cybercrime reality. The findings of BotLeg are expected to contribute to a wider 





Nationale anti-DDoS Wasstraat (NaWas) 
The Nationale Anti-DDoS Wasstraat (NaWas) is a private initiative that offers on-demand services 
against DDoS attacks, with a focus on medium-sized companies and small Internet operators, such 
as VoIP providers, for whom the operation costs of security mechanisms against DDoS attacks are 
too costly or out of reach. NaWas operates as centrally located anti-DDoS facilities, verifying and 
filtering malicious traffic, and forwarding clean traffic back to the Internet company or operator part 
to the initiative by working together with NL-IX and AMS-IX. NaWas offers small and medium size 
business the opportunity of protecting themselves against DDoS attacks in a fast and timely 
manner, without incurring in the costs that larger security infrastructure and technology would 
normally require.   
 
Trusted Networks Initiative (TNI) 
The Trusted Networks Initiative (TNI) is a multistakeholder partnership led by The Hague Security 
Delta and involves critical-website operators and relevant stakeholders, including ING, Rabobak, 
SURFnet, SIDN, E-Zorg, Logius, Ordina, among others. The purpose of the initiative is to build a 
global trust concept on how to website-operators may react to large-scale or persistent distributed 
denial of service (DDoS) that are resilient to traditional techniques against DDoS attacks. The 
initiative offers partners tools for risk mitigation control and timely response against DDoS threats 
via Trusted Routing service, which is facilitated by a dedicated and secure VLAN that enables 
continue exchanging of mutual traffic between Trusted Networks. 
3.3.5 United Kingdom 
In 2010, the UK National Security Council considered ‘hostile attacks upon the UK cyber space by 
other states and large scale cybercrime’ as one of the highest national security risks, in light of their 
likelihood and potential impact.165 Yet, the National Cybercrime Strategy of the UK, launched in the 
same year, does not provide clear guidelines on the country’s policy against botnets, only 
mentioning the issue in its glossary.166 The document describes the country’s plan for fighting 
cybercrime, which includes using traditional methods for increasing awareness, improving 
international cooperation, strengthening legislation and technical capabilities, and cooperating with 
the private sector. As a follow-up to the UK National Cyber Security Strategy, important agencies 
were created to strengthen the institutional fight against cybercrime. Among the most relevant 
results of the strategy is the creation of the UK National Cyber Crime Unit (NCCU), within the 
National Crime Agency (NCA). Although not making clear reference to botnets, the NCA lists 
cybercrime among the higher threats to British society, highlighting the risk of DDoS attacks against 
businesses.167 
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The UK National Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT-UK), launched in 2014, is part of 
the action included under the UK National Cyber Security Strategy. The mandate of CERT-UK, as 
defined in the cyber security strategy, includes four main responsibilities, namely acting as the 
national cyber-security incident management institution, supporting national critical infrastructure 
business, promoting awareness among different sectors of society, business and public sector, and 
providing a single international contact point for collaboration with other national CERTs. CERT-
UK works with partners from industry and government, promoting exercises, information exchange, 
and connecting to other CERTs to improve national response to cyber threats. 
The activities of the NCA and the NCCU against GameOver Zeus and Cryptolocker 
contributed to the involvement of CERT-UK in the information-sharing campaign that promoted 
awareness and disinfection of compromised machines in the UK.168 In its first annual report, CERT-
UK stated botnets were by far the highest abuse type of cyber threat, spreading malware among 
citizens and organisations.169 In the 2014-2015, CERT-UK reported Zeus and its variations, 
ZeroAccess and Conficker as the three most widespread malware in the UK – botnets infecting 
millions of computers.170 
Applicable framework 
Criminal offences 
The first version of the UK Computer Misuse Act (CMA)171 dates from 1990, following a legislative 
response to R v Gold & Schifreen (1988) because the existing legislation was incapable of 
responding to computer target crimes.172 There are three offences described in the Computer 
Misuse Act: unauthorised access to computer material, unauthorised access with intent to commit 
or facilitate commission of further offences, and unauthorised modification of computer material. In 
short, Sections 1, 2 and 3 of the Computer Misuse Act, respectively, criminalise: hacking activities, 
the commission of hacking activities with the purpose of committing further crimes and 
unauthorised acts that intend to, or are recklessness to, impair the operation of computers, prevent 
of hinder access to any program or data held in a computer, or impair the operation of any such 
program or the reliability of any such data.173 The sections provide a detailed description of the 
various actions that fall within the scope of the act. For instance, in the case R v. Lennon (2006) 
the court expressed its view that Section 3 of the Computer Criminal Act was applicable to DDoS 
attacks. For the purpose of this report it suffices to say that Sections 1 to 3 of the CMA are sufficient 
to cover both hacking offences performed by botnets as well as any attacks that impair access to 
data.   
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The investigatory powers provided under the Computer Misuse Act differentiate between England 
and Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland, making it difficult to draft an overview of the possible 
investigatory powers granted to law enforcement authorities. Discipline of investigatory powers in 
relation to crimes regulated under the Computer Misuse Act is covered in the same instrument. 
Despite being a part to the Cybercrime Convention, the implementation of the instrument into 
national law was promoted in a less evident manner. As a result, it is not possible to match specific 
investigatory powers covered by the Cybercrime Convention to provisions enacted by the national 
legislator.  
Art. 18 of the Cybercrime Convention, the production order, is regulated in Schedule 1 of 
the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984. Under certain conditions, a judge can authorise a 
production order for information stored in electronic form (sections 1-5 of Schedule 1). Art. 19 of 
the Cybercrime Convention on search and seizure of stored computer data is covered by Sections 
10 and 14 of the CMA. Section 10 of the CMA provides that Section 1(1) (hacking activities) have 
effect without prejudice to the operation of any enactment in relation to powers of inspection 
(examination in the case of Scotland), search and seizure. Moreover, Section 14(1) specifies that 
a warrant authorizing a search can be issued by District Judge (magistrates’ courts) to enter and 
search the premises, using reasonable force if necessary, when an offence under section 1 has 
been or is in the imminence of being committed in any premises, or when evidence shows such an 
offence has been or is about to be committed. The powers of Section 14(1) do not authorize a 
search for privileged, excluded and special procedure material, as regulated in Section 9(2) of the 
Police and Criminal Evidence Act of 1984. The warrant authorizes the seizure of articles that can 
be reasonably believed to contain evidence that an offence under Section 1 has been or is about 
to be committed. For the purpose of search warrants, premises are considered land, buildings, 
movable structures, vehicles, vessels, aircraft and hovercraft.174 Further guidance on the 
application to Northern Ireland is provided under Section 16. Art. 20 and 21 of the Cybercrime 
Convention, which refer to real-time collection of traffic data and interception of content data, are 
extensively regulated in Part I of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (RIPA).  
 
Mitigation efforts  
The UK has been involved in multiple operations organised in cooperation with Europol. Recently, 
the UK National Cybercrime Agency (NCA), as informed in their website, has arguably led the 
efforts that disrupted the Ramnit botnet. The Agency’s National Cyber Crime Unit (NCCU) worked 
with law enforcement from the Netherlands, Italy and Germany, under the coordination of J-CAT 
(EC3), to takedown the malicious infrastructure. One of the servers connected to Ramnit was 
reported to be hosted in the county of Hampshire and to infect the computers of 33.000 UK citizens. 
                                                   
174 Section 14 of the Computer Misuse Act does not extend to Scotland, according to para. (6) of the provision.  
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After the event, the NCA alerted users about the widespread infection, offering special and free 
cleaning tools for removing the infection and fixing vulnerabilities.  
Multistakeholder initiatives 
Launched in 2013, the Cyber-security Information Sharing Partnership (CiSP) counts more than 
950 organisations and 2500 individuals who have signed up to receive data.175 The Cyber-security 
Information Sharing Partnership (CiSP) is a joint private and public sector initiative in the UK to 
share information about attacks.176 The purpose of CiSP is to increase situational awareness and 
timely information that can help parties improve their prevention and reaction to cyber threats. The 
information gathered in the platform is further analysed by a team composed of experts from 
industry and government. After analysis, the information is categorised and distributed to partners 
via various sources, such as alerts and summaries. The CiSP platform is part of the CERT-UK, 
benefiting from the information collected by the latter, where they receive customised feeds based 
on the range of their network, in an allegedly secure and confidential environment. Thanks to its 
integration within the CERT-UK, CiSP partners were given advanced notice of takedown operations 
against Gameover Zeus botnet. 
 
3.4 Conclusion  
This chapter describes current efforts taken against botnets in the five case study countries. It 
examines national cybersecurity strategies, CERTs, multi-stakeholder efforts and legislation 
relevant to countering botnets in national territory and abroad. As far as national cybersecurity 
strategies are concerned, the documents reflect the high-level goals and principles of each country 
in the field of cybersecurity. Because national cybersecurity strategies tend to be abstract in nature, 
no significant reference to botnets could be identified and in many cases it is still necessary to 
clarify the legitimate grounds for – and limits of – enabling counter-measures against botnets.  
Each examined country has in place a national CERT with the mandate to oversee the 
dissemination of threats on national territory. While the procedures followed by CERTs are to a 
large extent harmonised, the practical value of their operations in regard to botnets varies largely. 
In addition, many CERTs distribute relevant information within circles of trust, and since such 
information is often undisclosed to a larger audience, it is not possible to evaluate the impact and 
the influence of national CERTs countering botnets beyond of what is made publicly available 
online. Multi-stakeholder mitigation efforts also seem to vary, while all countries have demonstrated 
participation in international cooperative efforts against botnets. Initiatives supported by public 
authorities were easier to identify than sectoral and inter-sectoral efforts. A large part of the 
international cooperation activities against botnets revealed a connection with EUROPOL (EC3) 
                                                   





and the FBI efforts in fighting botnets, demonstrating the important role played by both institutions 
and a significant level of international cooperation.  
Legislation was the most harmonised element of this analysis, given that all countries have 
ratified the Cybercrime Convention. Nevertheless, since the Convention acts as a minimum 
catalogue of offences and investigation powers, there are differences between countries, with some 
having wider, broader substantive criminal law, intended to encompass various forms of crime. The 
legislation of the Netherlands, Estonia and Germany tries to cover a multitude of cybercrime, 
whereas the U.K. and Canada provide a more flexible scope of criminalisation. This difference 
could be related to the differences between civil law and common law traditions. In terms of 
investigatory powers, the same difference becomes clear, as civil law countries show a greater 
emphasis on the statutory limits of the use of invasive measures. With respect to the legal aspects 
of botnet mitigation, at the moment ISPs are currently quite limited in the types of action they can 
take. There are attempts to formalize an increased role for ISPs, but this is currently taking the form 
of ISPs themselves changing their Terms of Use. 
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4. Case 2: Protection of Vital Infrastructures 
4.1 Introduction 
A vital infrastructure can be defined as follows: “A product or service is vital when it either: 
provides an essential contribution to society in maintaining a defined minimum quality level of (1) 
national and international law & order, (2) public safety, (3) economy, (4) public health, (5) 
ecological environment; or when loss or disruption impacts citizens or government administration 
at a national scale or endangers the minimum quality level.”177  
Recital 4 of the Council Directive 2013/40/EU states, “There are a number of critical 
infrastructures in the Union, the disruption or destruction of which would have a significant cross-
border impact. Critical infrastructures could be understood to be an asset, system or part thereof 
located in Member States, which is essential for the maintenance of vital societal functions, health, 
safety, security, economic or social well-being of people, such as power plants, transport 
networks or government networks, and the disruption or destruction of which would have a 
significant impact in a Member State as a result of the failure to maintain those functions.”178  
The proposed NIS Directive179 (explanatory memorandum, p.1) refers more specifically to 
the role of networks: “…critical infrastructures, such as energy, transport, and key providers of 
information society services (e-commerce platforms, social networks, etc.), as well as public 
administrations.” “The current regulatory framework requires only telecommunication companies 
to adopt risk management steps and to report serious NIS incidents. However, many other sectors 
rely on ICT as an enabler and should therefore be concerned about NIS as well. A number of 
specific infrastructure and service providers are particularly vulnerable, due to their high 
dependence on correctly functioning network and information systems. These sectors play an 
essential role in providing key support services for our economy and society, and the security of 
their systems is of particular importance to the functioning of the Internal Market. These sectors 
include banking, stock exchanges, energy generation, transmission and distribution, transport 
(air, rail, maritime), health, Internet services and public administrations.”180 
National vital infrastructures, thus, generally include any combination of the following (with 
slight variations per country): energy (electricity, gas and oil), telecommunications and ICT (fixed 
and mobile telephony, radio, broadcasting and Internet), drinking water, food (supply and safety), 
health (emergency and other hospital care, medicine and vaccines), financial sector (payments 
and financial transaction government), management of surface water (quality and quantity), public 
order and safety, public administration (diplomacy, disclosure of information by the government, 
armed forces and decision making), transport (airports, harbours and waterways, main roads and 
                                                   
177 EAM Luijf, HH Burger and MHA Klaver, ‘Critical Infrastructure Protection in the Netherlands: A Quick Scan’ 
(EICAR conference Best Paper, 2013). 
178 Council Directive 2013/40/EU of 12 August 2013 on attacks against information systems and replacing Council 
Framework Decision 2005/222/JHA [2013] OJ L218/8. 
179 Proposal for a Council Directive 2013/0027 concerning measures to ensure a high common level of network 
and information security across the Union [2013] COM (2013) 48 final. 
180 Ibid, p. 4. 
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railways), chemical and nuclear industry (transportation, storage, production and processing of 
materials).181 
This chapter uses a case study of the energy sector to examine how vital infrastructures are 
protected in the selected countries. High profile cases, such as the Dutch Supervisory Control And 
Data Acquisition (SCADA) incidents,182 power outages183 and the Canadian Telvent incident184 
reflect the importance of good cybersecurity in relation to the energy networks.  Each country case 
study provides a stakeholder analysis that briefly outlines:  
1) Who and how - Which actors are responsible for taking which actions? What is the 
organisational and institutional arrangement? What is the remit of actors to act?  
2) What and why - What does the content of the regulation aim to achieve? How are vital 
infrastructures defined, and which conditions apply for infrastructures to be deemed 
‘vital’? 
3) Where - In which places is the challenge being addressed in practice, e.g. sectors, 
(self)-regulatory arrangements, illustrative cases? 
These aspects, taken together, address the following question: How is continuity of electricity 
provisioning, particularly the protection against cyber-attacks in the context of the transition 
towards smart grids, organized? The cases are discussed in the following order: Canada, Estonia, 
Germany, the Netherlands and the UK. In each country description, we give an overview of 
relevant actors and national legislation. Overarching European legislation that applies to Estonia, 
Germany, the Netherlands and the UK is discussed after the case studies. 
4.2 Case Study Countries 
Each case begins with a short introduction, followed by an outline of relevant actors and overview 
of applicable legislation. In examining the regulatory framework for each case, we distinguish 
between regulation of prevention, regulation of incident management and regulation of repression 
(although there is occasional overlap). Prevention refers to measures taken to eliminate or limit the 
consequences of an incident, but typically these measures are taken ex ante, i.e. in absence of 
any concrete incident. Incident management relates to the measures that are taken in response to 
a concrete incident in order to eliminate or limit the effects of the incident. Repression comprises 
the entirety of measures taken to identify and bring to justice perpetrators of attacks. As understood 
here, this category does not relate to the enforcement of regulation that addresses prevention or 
                                                   
181 NS van der Meulen and AR Lodder, ‘Cybersecurity’ in S van der Hof, AR Lodder, and GJ Zwenne, Recht en 
Computer (Kluwer 2014), pp. 301-318.  
182 The SCADA system can be used to control e.g. sluices and swimming pools from a distance via the Internet. It 
is intended to be used for maintenance, but insufficient security allows seizure of control of the system. In 2012, 
the Volkskrant reported a security incident in relation to a public swimming pool. See: 
http://www.volkskrant.nl/recensies/blunder-subtropisch-zwembad-besturingssysteem-stond-wekenlang-
open~a3190060/   
183 There was a major power outage in the north of the Netherlands in March, 2015. See, e.g., 
http://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2015/03/27/dit-zijn-de-gevolgen-van-de-grote-stroomstoring-in-noord-holland/  
184 Alexandra Posadzki, ‘Cyber Security in Canada's Private Sector A 'Significant' Problem: Government Records’ 




incident management (for example enforcement of reporting duties resting on vital infrastructure 
providers). 
4.2.1 Canada 
At a general level, cybercrime recently received attention in Canadian policy circles. The Royal 
Canadian Mounted Police published a document on cyber incidents in Canada. In ‘Cybercrime: an 
overview of incidents and issues in Canada’, the RCMP reports on cybercrime, focussing on 
aspects of the cybercrime environment that affect Canada’s public organizations, businesses and 
citizens in real and harmful ways.185 It describes Canada’s digital landscape and covers a broad 
range of cyber incidents. Relevant policy documents include the Cyber Security Strategy of 2010 
(NCS 2010),186 the ‘Action Plan 2010-2015 for Canada’s Cyber Security Strategy’ (APCS 2010),187 
the ‘National Strategy for Critical Infrastructure’ of 2009 (NSCI 2009),188 and the ‘Action Plan for 
Critical Infrastructure 2014-2017’ (APCI 2014).189 The latter two have a broader approach than 
cybersecurity only. Also relevant is the ‘Policy on Government Security’ of 2009, administered by 
the Treasury Board Secretariat.  
An important aspect of governance in Canada is the division of authority and responsibility 
between the national/federal government and the provincial governments and territories. With 
respect to the energy sector, this division is not always clear-cut: “Section 92A of the Constitution 
Act, 1867 assigned to the provincial governments the exclusive authority to make laws in relation 
to non-renewable resources and electrical energy, while Section 125 prevented the federal 
government from taxing any provincial government lands or property. On the other hand, the federal 
government has the power to make treaties with foreign countries. This has important implications 
for treaties involving energy production, like the Kyoto Protocol, which the Canadian government 
signed in 2002. Although the federal government had the authority to sign the treaty, it may require 
the cooperation of the provincial governments to enforce it.”190 Any effort to understand governance 
in general and cybersecurity governance of vital infrastructures in particular must start with 
understanding this division of responsibilities. 
In this section we therefore outline relevant actors in the governance of Canada’s energy 
sector at both the national and provincial levels, as well as relevant laws – again distinguishing 
between regulation of prevention, regulation of incident management and regulation of repression. 
Relevant Actors 
The following actors are relevant to the governance of energy infrastructures: 
                                                   
185 http://www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca/pubs/cc-report-rapport-cc-eng.htm  
186 Available at: https://www.enisa.europa.eu/activities/Resilience-and-CIIP/national-cyber-security-strategies-
ncsss/canadaNCSS.pdf  
187 Available at: http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/rsrcs/pblctns/ctn-pln-cbr-scrt/ctn-pln-cbr-scrt-eng.pdf  
188 Available at: http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/rsrcs/pblctns/srtg-crtcl-nfrstrctr/srtg-crtcl-nfrstrctr-eng.pdf  
189 Available at: http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/rsrcs/pblctns/pln-crtcl-nfrstrctr-2014-17/pln-crtcl-nfrstrctr-2014-
17-eng.pdf  
190 Wikipedia. Available at: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Energy_policy_of_Canada  
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 Public Safety Canada (PSC) is the federal department/agency for public safety and  
emergency preparedness. It provides central coordination to address risks within the 
Government and across Canada.191 Public Safety Canada also leads public awareness and 
outreach activities to inform Canadians of the potential risks they face and the actions they 
can take to protect themselves and their families in cyberspace.192 
 Canadian Cyber Incident Response Centre monitors and provides 
mitigation advice on cyber threats and coordinates the national response to 
any cybersecurity incident. It falls under the responsibility of Public Safety 
Canada. 
 Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada advises on the international dimension of 
cybersecurity and work to develop a cybersecurity foreign policy that will help strengthen 
coherence in the Government’s engagement abroad on cybersecurity. 
 The Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces works with 
allies to develop the policy and legal framework for military aspects of cyber 
security, complementing international outreach efforts of Foreign Affairs 
and International Trade Canada. 
 Treasury Board Secretariat administers the Policy on Government Security, which sets out 
safeguards to assure the delivery of Government services to Canadians. 
 Communications Security Establishment Canada detects and discovers threats, provides 
foreign intelligence and cyber security services, and responds to cyber threats and attacks 
against Government networks and information technology systems. 
 Canadian Security Intelligence Service analyses and investigates domestic and international 
threats to the security of Canada. 
 The Royal Canadian Mounted Police investigates, as per the Royal Canadian Mounted 
Police Act, suspected domestic and international criminal acts against Canadian networks 
and the critical information infrastructure. 
 Natural Resources Canada is a sector-specific federal department/agency that is responsible 
for the national-level sector network ‘Energy and utilities’, one of the ten vital infrastructures 
discerned in the NSCI.193   
 The National Cross Sector Forum is established under the NSCI 2009 to promote 
collaboration across sector networks, address interdependencies, and promote information 
sharing across sectors.194 
 Provinces and territories provide a range of essential services for which delivery is dependent 
on the safe and secure operation of their cyber systems.195 
                                                   
191 National Cybersecurity Strategy 2010, p.9-10. 
192 The first half of this sketch of actors is taken from NCS 2010, p.10. 
193 Government of Canada, ‘Action Plan for Critical Infrastructures (APCI)’ (2014), p.3. 
194 Idem. 
195 NCS 2010, p.11. 
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 Critical infrastructure owners and operators bear the primary responsibility for protecting their 
assets and services.196  
 Individual Canadians have a responsibility to be prepared for a disruption of vital 
infrastructures and to ensure that they and their families are ready to cope for at least the 
first 72 hours of an emergency.197 
Regulatory Framework 
Regulation of Prevention 
The NSCI 2009 identifies three strategic objectives for enhancing the resilience of critical 
infrastructure in Canada: building partnerships, sharing and protecting information and 
implementing an all-hazards risk management approach. Public Safety Canada has the task of 
coordinating implementation of Canada’s Cyber Security Strategy and all efforts to secure vital 
cybersecurity systems. In 2010, the NCS announced that joint public/private sector initiatives to 
identify and share best practices for addressing threats to the systems of vital infrastructures would 
be developed.198 PSC has realised this by formalizing ‘partnerships to engage critical infrastructure 
sectors and government agencies at all levels through the National Cross-Sector Forum as well as 
the development of a cross-sector agreement for improved information sharing’.199  
Provincial governments are responsible for oversight of electric reliability standards.200 
Thereto, they have recognized the North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) as the 
Electricity Reliability Organization responsible for developing mandatory and enforceable reliability 
standards. ‘These reliability standards address issues relevant to the operation of existing, new, 
and modified bulk-power facilities, including critical infrastructure protection (CIP). CIP standards 
cover critical cyber asset identification, security management controls, personnel and training, 
electronic security, physical security, systems security, incident reporting and response planning, 
and recovery plans. CIP version 5, the most recent set of standards, was approved in 2013.’201 
 
Regulation of Incident Management 
The Emergency Management Framework for Canada defines a collaborative approach to 
emergency management and establishes a federal, provincial and territorial partnership for 
enhancing the public safety of Canadians. The Framework identifies principles of cooperation (i.e. 
responsibility, comprehensiveness, partnerships, coherency of action, risk-based, all-hazards, 
resilience, clear communications, and continuous improvement) and it recognizes that emergency 
                                                   
196 Government of Canada, ‘National Strategy for Critical Infrastructure (NSCI)’ (2009), p.2. 
http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/rsrcs/pblctns/srtg-crtcl-nfrstrctr/srtg-crtcl-nfrstrctr-eng.pdf.   
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198 NCS 2010, p.12. 
199 Bipartisan Policy Center, ‘Cybersecurity and the North American Electric Grid: New Policy Approaches to 
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Cybersecurity Initiative’ (2014), p. 30 (hereinafter BPC 2014). 
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management is comprised of interdependent risk-based functions: prevention, mitigation, 
preparedness, response and recovery.202 
"Cyber incident management in Canada is a collaborative and voluntary activity" and 
"CCIRC cannot compel any organization to take action on its network, and organizations can 
choose not to report incidents or seek assistance."203 The Canadian Cyber Incident Response 
Centre does not have the authority to force companies to comply with its recommendations. 
According to an academic researcher, the government cannot force companies to report incidents 
or heed the CCIRC's warnings; Rather, each individual company has the discretion to determine 
how much to spend on cyber security. "Their assessments about risks and the level of security 
needed to protect their assets may well differ from what we, as a society, feel is appropriate".204 
The National Strategy recognizes that the first response in an emergency will almost always 
be by local owners and operators, the municipality or at the provincial/territorial level. The federal 
government fulfils national leadership responsibilities relating to emergency management, 
respecting existing federal, provincial and territorial jurisdiction and legislation. The federal 
government is also responsible for providing assistance to provinces/territories if the 
province/territory has requested the assistance.205 
The documentation accompanying the 2015 Federal budget, published in April 2015, 
states:206 “The Government is taking action to protect the vital cyber systems that Canadians rely 
on daily and that are critical to national security. Following consultations, new legislation will require 
operators of vital cyber systems to implement cyber security plans, meet robust security outcomes 
for their systems and report cyber security incidents to the Government of Canada.”207 The name 
of the new legislation will be ‘Protection of Canada’s Vital Cyber Systems Act’. More information 
on the new legislation is not available at the moment of writing. The government is working on the 
legislation ‘quietly’. 
 
Regulation of Repression 
In its 2010 National Cyberscurity Strategy, the Government announced that it would ‘soon introduce 
legislation to modernize law enforcement’s investigative powers, and ensure that technological 
innovations are not used to evade lawful interceptions of communications supporting criminal 
activity’.208 For more information about this legislation on lawful access, the reader is referred to 
the corresponding section in the ‘Identity Infrastructure’ case in Chapter 5. 
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The Royal Canadian Mounted Police will be given the resources required to establish a 
centralized Integrated Cyber Crime Fusion Centre. This team will increase the ability of the Royal 
Canadian Mounted Police to respond, using a risk-based analysis approach, to requests from the 
Canadian Cyber Incident Response Centre regarding cyber-attacks against Government or 
Canada’s critical infrastructure.209 
4.2.2 Estonia 
In Estonia, a vital service is defined as a service that is essential for the maintenance of the society, 
and the health, safety, security, economic or social well-being of people. The Emergency Act 
introduces 43 such vital services,210 with a functioning electricity supply being prominent in that list. 
As defined in article 2(a) of the Directive 2008/114/EC211, critical infrastructure (CI) is an asset, 
system or part thereof, which is essential to the maintenance of vital societal functions, and the 
health, safety, security, economic or social well-being of people, and whose disruption or 
destruction would have a significant impact in a Member State as a result of the failure to maintain 
those functions. The critical information infrastructure (CII) comprises of information and 
communications systems for which the maintenance, reliability and safety are essential for the 
proper functioning of a country. As such, the CII is a part of the CI. 
The Estonian energy market opened in 1 January 2013. This meant that consumers could 
choose from different sellers and different price options. The energy provisioning system of Estonia 
differentiates the suppliers of electricity, electricity distribution network undertakings and sellers. At 
the moment, there are 12 sellers on the market.212 According to the Estonian Competition Authority, 
there are 34 distribution network undertakings.213 Additionally, Elering AS, a state-owned public 
limited company, manages the Estonian electricity system.214 There is one major supplier – Narva 
Elektrijaamad (90% of the production volume), as well as four cogeneration plants and several 
smaller alternative energy suppliers.215 
Estonia has been moving towards smart grid since 2012, when the largest electricity 
distribution undertaking (Elektrilevi216) initiated the move toward smart electricity meters that enable 
remote meter reading. As a result of a 94 million euro investment,217 Elektrilevi is to equip every 
                                                   
209 NCS 2010, p. 13. 
210 See section 34 of the Emergency Act. Also, see <https://www.ria.ee/CIIP/> accessed 29 July 2015.  
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household with a smart meter by the start of 2017. This means replacing approximately 630,000 
meters.218 
Relevant Actors 
In addition to the actors mentioned in the introduction, the following actors are relevant to the 
governance of energy infrastructures in Estonia: 
 The Ministry of Economic Affairs and Communications (MEAC) is tasked with protecting the 
general CI. MEAC is also responsible for the continuous functioning of electricity supply.219  
 The Information Systems’ Authority (ISA) is a sub-department of MEAC responsible for 
protecting the CII. At ISA, the protection of CII is handled by a specific unit – the Department 
of Critical Information Infrastructure Protection (the Department). 
 The Department of Critical Infrastructure Protection is engaged in the protection of critical 
information systems at a strategic, rather than operational, level.220 The Department: i) 
collects and maintains information on CII; ii) carries out risk assessments on CII; iii) draws 
up security measures for the protection of CII; and iv) exercises supervision for the proper 
functioning of CII security measures.221 Thus, ISA sets the rules how to protect vital services 
and exercises supervision on the implementation of the measures. 
Regulatory Framework 
Regulation of Prevention 
Emergency Act and Law Enforcement Act 
The Emergency Act222, the main source of law on CI, delineates the obligations of vital service 
providers (VSPs). According to subsection 37(3) of the Emergency Act, the provider of a vital 
service is obliged to: i) prepare a risk assessment of the continuous operation of the vital service 
(risk assessment of continuous operation); ii) prepare a plan for ensuring the continuous operation 
of the vital service (continuous operation plan); iii) notify ISA of an event significantly disturbing the 
continuous operation of the vital service or of an impending risk of the occurrence of such an event 
and iv) upon request, provide information concerning the provision of the vital service to ISA.223 
Subsection 38 of the Emergency Act outlines the necessary components of the risk assessment of 
continuous operation: 
 Risk Assessment of Continuous Operation: The document must include the following: i) the 
list of risks causing a partial or complete interruption in the provision of a vital service; ii) the 
probability of a partial or complete interruption in the provision of a vital service; and iii) the 
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possible consequences of a partial or complete interruption in the provision of a vital 
service.224 The risk analysis is confidential and information contained therein may not be 
disclosed. The topicality of the risk analysis should be assessed once every two years and 
necessary amendments should be made.225 
 Continuous Operation Plan: describes necessary measures for: i) preventing a partial or 
complete interruption in the provision of a vital service; ii) mitigating the consequences of a 
partial or complete interruption in the provision of a vital service; and iii) restoring the 
continuous operation of a vital service in case of a partial or complete interruption in the 
provision of the vital service. This also constitutes confidential information that may not be 
disclosed.226 The need to update the continuous operation plan must be assessed at least 
once every two years.227 
In addition to the obligation to draw up the documents described above, the VSPs must immediately 
notify MEAC (or ISA) of an event that significant disturbs the continuous operation of the vital 
service or of an impending risk of such and (upon request) provide information concerning the 
provision of the vital service.228 
On the basis of the Risk Assessment of Continuous Operation, the VSPs assess whether 
and to what extent the information systems affect the functioning of the vital service. In the field of 
electricity supply, the dependence is presumably very large. Therefore, the VSPs229 are obliged to 
implement adequate security measures with respect to the information systems used for the 
provision of the vital service and the related information assets.230 According to the regulation 
“Security Measures for Vital Service Information Systems and related Information Assets”231, the 
adequate security measures include: limiting access to the critical information systems to 
authorised personnel only; creating secure authentication procedures for entitled personnel; 
assuring the creation of an audit trail; drafting reports of security incidents and preserving copies 
of documents and data that are vital to the provision of the vital service. The latter must be stored 
in rooms protected against electromagnetic radiation. The regulation urges the VSPs to implement 
either the ISO/IEC 27001:2006 security standard or ISKE (see below). 
Although, the Emergency Act defines the borders and obligations for providers of vital 
services, the protection of CI and CII can be seen as a cooperative effort between private equity 
VSPs and the state. Since July 1, 2014, when the Law Enforcement Act entered into force, MEAC 
and ISA have specific supervisory responsibilities and the right to issue fines to VSPs that do not 
                                                   
224 Subsection 38(1)(1) to 38(1)(3) of the Emergency Act. 
225 Subsection 38(4) of the Emergency Act. The Minister of Interior has also drafted guidelines for the drafting of 
the risk analysis – Regulation of the Ministry of Interior of 8 June 2010, number 16. Accessible: 
https://www.riigiteataja.ee/akt/13326405.  
226 Subsection 39(3) of the Emergency Act. 
227 Ibid, subsection 39(4).  
228 Subsections 37(3)(1) to 37(3)(4) of the Emergency Act. 
229 There are five VSPs in the sphere of electricity provisioning that have to follow these obligations according to 
the official of the Department of Critical Information Infrastructure Protection. 
230 Subsection 40(1) of the Emergency Act. 
231 Regulation of the Government of the Republic of Estonia number 43 of 14 March 2013. See 
<https://www.riigiteataja.ee/akt/120032013007> accessed 29 July 2015. 
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fulfil their obligations under the Emergency Act232. According to the interviewed officials of ISA, this 
change in the Law Enforcement Act has significantly disciplined the VSPs233. Although it represents 
a shift from cooperation-based communication to sanction-based communication between the 
VSPs and the state, it is a necessary tool due to the dependence of vital services more generally 
and electricity supply in particular. As of 22 April 2015, no fines had been issued.234 
 
ISKE 
ISKE was established by Government Regulation in 2008235 (ISKE Regulation). It is a three-level 
IT baseline security system analogous to ISO 27000 security standards and is developed and 
updated by ISA236. It is a required security measure for government and state agencies and is a 
recommended standard for VSPs.237 According to ISKE Regulation, chief processor of a database 
must conduct an audit, dependent on the security level of the database, every two to four years.238 
 
Regulation of Incident Management 
On the operational level, CERT-EE is the responsible body managing the cyber incidents. 
According to the “Emergency Plan in case of a Large Scale Cyber-Attack”239 (the Plan), a cyber-
attack is deemed to be of “large scale” if it is directed against the information systems of the VSP. 
According to the Plan, the VSP under attack must notify CERT-EE of the occurrence and apply its 
Continuous Operation Plan to find a resolution and mitigate or restore the functioning of the vital 
service. The VSP may request the help of Estonian Defence League’s Cyber Unit240 to mitigate the 
consequences of the large scale cyber-attack. 
 
Regulation of Repression 
The Penal Code241 sets out three provisions criminalising the damaging or hindering of the 
functioning of the vital services. Subsection 206(2)(3) of the Penal Code stipulates that the illegal 
alteration, deletion, damaging or blocking of data in computer systems of a vital sector is punishable 
with up to five years’ imprisonment.242 Subsection 207(2)(3) of the Penal Code stipulates that if the 
illegal interference with or hindering of the functioning of computer systems by way of uploading, 
                                                   
232 Section 51 of the Emergency Act. The maximum sanction for failing to draft the Risk Assessment and/or 
Operation Plan, notify MEAC (or ISA) of a disturbing event or failure to provide documents to MEAC is EUR 
6,400. 
233 Interview with U. Sutermäe and M. Vasar (Tallinn, 22 April 2015). 
234 Ibid. 
235 Regulation of the Government of the Republic of Estonia number 252 of 20 December 2007. See 
˂https://www.riigiteataja.ee/akt/13125331?leiaKehtiv˃ accessed 27 May 2015.  
236 It must be noted that the preparation and development of ISKE is based on a German information security 
standard – IT Baseline Protection Manual (IT-Grundschutz) which has been adapted to suit the Estonian situation. 
See ˂https://www.ria.ee/iske-en/˃ accessed 23 May 2015. 
237 Interview with Urmo Sutermäe (Tallinn, 22 April 2015). 
238 See ˂https://www.ria.ee/iske-audit/˃ accessed 24 May 2015.  
239 Regulation of the Government of the Republic of Estonia number 372 of 25 August 2011. See 
˂https://www.ria.ee/public/Kuberturvalisus/ulatusliku_kuberrunnaku_hadaolukorra_lahendamise_plaan.pdf˃ 
accessed 3 June 2015. 
240 Estonian Defence League’s Cyber Unit ˂http://www.kaitseliit.ee/en/cyber-unit˃ accessed 28 May 2015.  
241 See ˂https://www.riigiteataja.ee/en/eli/519032015003/consolide˃ accessed 28 May 2015. 




transmitting, deleting, damaging, altering or blocking of data was committed against a computer 
system of a vital sector or the provision of public services is interfered or hindered thereby, the act 
is punishable with up to five years’ imprisonment.243 Subsection 406(1) stipulates that knowingly 
damaging or destroying a structure or device of the energy, communication, signalling, water supply 
or sewer system, traffic control or other vital public utilities system, if causing danger to human life 
or health or hindering the proper functioning of a vital public utilities system is an act punishable 
with up to three years’ imprisonment.244 If the act causes interference with, or interruption of, the 
functioning of a vital public utilities system, the act is punishable with up to five years’ 
imprisonment.245,246 
4.2.3 Germany 
Ensuring the protection of the German business and industry infrastructure is a central issue of the 
country's security policy.247 Infrastructure is considered "critical" whenever it is of major importance 
to the functioning of modern societies and any failure or degradation would result in sustained 
disruptions in the overall system (German CIP Strategy 2009). An important criterion for this 
assessment is criticality as a relative measure of the importance of a given infrastructure in terms 
of the impact of its disruption or functional failure on the security of supply, i.e. providing society 
with important goods and services. Such criticality may be of a systemic or symbolic nature or 
include both elements. An infrastructure will, in particular, be of systemic criticality whenever - due 
to its structural, functional and technical position within the overall system of infrastructure sectors 
- it is highly relevant as regards interdependencies; electricity is an example of this (German CIP 
Strategy 2009). According to the IT Emergency and Crisis Exercises in Critical Infrastructures 
(2008), the following areas constitute critical infrastructures: Transport and traffic; Energy 
(electricity, nuclear power plants, mineral oil, gas); Hazardous substances; Information technology 
and telecommunications; Finance, banking and insurance; Supply systems and Public authorities, 
government and the judiciary (government institutions). The UP KRITIS Public-Private Partnership 
for Critical Infrastructure Protection sees the following sectors (see Figure 1) as a part of critical 
infrastructure:248 
 
                                                   
243 In its non-aggravating form, the maximum penalty of committing a crime that fulfils the necessary elements of 
a criminal offence under sections 206 and 207 is three years’ imprisonment.  
244 Subsection 406(1) of the Penal Code. 
245 Subsection 406(2) of the Penal Code. 
246 If the same act is committed by a legal person, the maximum amount of pecuniary punishment under the 
Penal Code is EUR 16,000,000. See subsection 44(8) of the Penal Code. 
247 National Strategy for Critical Infrastructure Protection – German CIP Strategy 2009; Cybersecurity Strategy for 
Germany, 2011. 




The German CIP Strategy is guided by the principle of joint action by the state, society, and 
business/industry. The state co-operates in partnership with other public and private actors in 
developing analyses and protection concepts. Either primarily as a moderator or - if required - by 
rulemaking, the state regulates the measures for safeguarding and securing the overall system and 
the system procedural flows. A look at the ownership structure of the critical infrastructure industry 
in Germany shows that, as a rule, the various infrastructures are not state-owned facilities but that 
the majority of them are operated and controlled by private enterprises – part of which were 
privatized only recently. Increasingly, the same applies to the many and various public 
infrastructure services provided at the local government level, which are being delivered more and 
more by private-sector enterprises. As a result of this tendency towards private ownership, the 
responsibility for the security, reliability and availability of such infrastructure is seen as falling on 
the shoulders of the private sector or, at least, is seen as a shared responsibility of the private 
sector and the state. As is stated in the German CIP Strategy of 2009, the state (and public 
authorities) primarily sees itself responsible for making provisions and – “at the most” – 
safeguarding and controlling the supply of goods and services in times of crisis when regular market 
mechanisms no longer function. The implementation of infrastructure protection measures for now 





In Germany critical infrastructure protection is a task performed jointly by public and private actors. 
The following are the most relevant actors involved in the governance of critical infrastructures 
protection:  
 The Federal Ministry of the Interior (Federal MOI) is responsible for internal security in Germany 
and provides inter-departmental co-ordination of the central national-level CIP measures. 
Authorities within the MOI’s that develop threat assessments, analyses and protection concepts 
are the BBK, BSI, BKA and THW (each of these abbreviations is subsequently explained). 
 The Federal Office of Civil Protection and Disaster Assistance (Bundesamt für 
Bevölkerungsschutz und Katastrophenhilfe, BBK) performs the tasks of civil protection and 
disaster relief. It develops preventive measures and policies to protect the population in 
emergencies and is responsible for diverse projects focusing on the protection of critical 
infrastructures. 
 The Federal Office for Information Security (Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der 
Informationstechnik, BSI) is the central IT security service provider of the German Federal 
Government and is therefore responsible for the protection of critical information infrastructures 
at the federal level. The proposed IT Security Act would strengthen the (already central) role of 
the BSI in regard to critical infrastructure protection.  
 The Federal Criminal Police Office (Bundeskriminalamt, BKA) works together with the other 
agencies and includes the Cybercrime Centre.  
 Agency for Technical Assistance (Bundesanstalt Technisches Hilfswerk, THW): With its 
specialized sections infrastructure, electric power, lighting, water damage / pumps, drinking 
water and leadership and communication, the THW provides emergency technical assistance 
to maintain critical infrastructure. 
 The Federal Network Agency (Federal Network Agency for Electricity, Gas, 
Telecommunications, Post and Railway – Bundesnetzagentur, BnetzA) is Germany's 
regulatory authority for the electricity, gas, telecommunications, postal and rail markets. Since 
2011, it has also taken on responsibility for implementing the Grid Expansion Acceleration Act 
(NABEG).  
 The National Cyber Security Council and National Cyber Defence Centre. 
 UP KRITIS249 is a public-private co-operation between operators of critical infrastructures (CIP), 
their associations and the relevant state bodies. It is one example of a voluntary action in 
Germany. The aim of the cooperation is to maintain the supply of critical infrastructure services 
in Germany. The ultimate objective of the CIP is to maintain the supply of services of critical 
infrastructures in Germany. The office is located at the BSI.  
                                                   
249 A study on the identification of critical processes and their IT dependencies was conducted by UP KRITIS in 




 CERTs: CERT-Bund (Computer Emergency Response Team for federal agencies) is the 
central point of contact for preventive and reactive measures regarding security-related 
computer incidents and falls under the authority of the Federal Ministry of the Interior.  (See 
also Chapter 3) 
 Providers of critical infrastructures are the companies and organisations who own these 
infrastructures and whose primary concern is to ensure their secure operation. These include, 
for example, energy suppliers or transport companies. 
 Federal States (Bundesländer) - The 16 individual states within Germany are responsible for 
the civil protection within their own state. Thereby, diverse connections are also established 
with the respective local Critical Infrastructures. 
Regulatory Framework 
Regulation of Prevention 
The Energy Industry Act250  
The EIA regulates the provision of energy and power supply companies on a general level, thus, 
not limited to cybersecurity incidents and attacks. Privately organized power supply companies are 
under the legal obligation to operate a secure, reliable and high-performance supply network. 
Compliance with the (statutory) requirements is controlled by the industry’s associations on the 
basis of the Energy Industry Act and, on the government side, by the Federal Network Agency 
(Bundesnetzagentur - BNetzA), especially by means of technical checks and monitoring reports. 
The EIA regulates the “Security and Reliability of Energy Supply” in part 6 – sections 49-53b.  
Section 49 sets the requirements for power plants and states that power plants shall be 
constructed and operated to guarantee technical safety; they must comply with the technical rules 
of the technical-scientific association (Verband der Elektrotechnik, Elektronik und 
Informationstechnik). Section 49 also states that the Federal Network Agency (die 
Bundesnetzagentur) sets out the principles and procedures for the introduction of technical safety 
rules, while respecting the principles of the DIN (Deutsches Institut für Normung e. V. – the German 
agency for standardisation). The Federal Ministry of Economy and Energy (Bundesministerium für 
Wirtschaft und Energie) is authorized to guarantee the technical security of the technical and 
operational flexibility of energy systems (power plants, but also e.g. charging stations) through 
regulation of, in particular: 
 the requirements of technical security of these systems, its construction and operation; 
 the administrative procedures for ensuring the requirements above: (a) where to report 
establishment/modification of such facilities, (b) documents that need to be presented, (c) 
setting periods between the tests and the commencement of operation of such facilities 
(operation may only begin after certain periods following the tests); 
                                                   




 checks and inspections of power plants to be carried out by officially recognised experts 
and rules of procedure to determine such experts; 
 the establishment of administrative powers, particularly the power to prohibit construction 
and operation of power plants, if the project does not meet prescribed requirements; 
 the information that the competent authority may require from power plant operators. 
 
The competent authority on a state level can ensure compliance with technical security 
requirements in individual cases. The operator of the power plant can request the authority 
competent under state law for information on required technical and economic conditions. The 
persons authorized by the competent authority under state law with the supervision are entitled to 
enter business premises and facilities of power plant operators in order to carry out audits and view 
business and operational documents. Section 50 regulates securing energy supplies and states 
that the Federal Ministry of Economy and Energy is authorised to secure energy supply by 
regulating: 
 the obligations of power companies and producers of electricity with the capacity of at least 
100 megawatts to constantly have supplies of petroleum, coal or other fossil fuels in stock 
which are necessary to meet their required production of electricity for the next 30 days; 
and 
 the exemptions from such obligations. 
Section 51 regulates monitoring the security of supply: 
 the Federal Ministry of Economy and Energy carries out the monitoring of security of supply 
in the field of grid-bound supply of electricity; 
 the monitoring referred to in paragraph 1 must specify the relationship between supply and 
demand in the domestic market, the expected future demand and available supplies, and 
related planning and building of additional capacity, the quality and level of network 
maintenance, an analysis of network defects as well as measures to cover peak demand 
and to deal with shortfalls of one or more suppliers. 
 
Civil Protection and Disaster Assistance Law251  
Section 18 regulates the cooperation of Federal and State governments, stating that the Federal 
government with the cooperation of the German Federal States (Länder) creates a nationwide risk 
analysis for civil protection. The Federal Ministry of the Interior is responsible for the notification of 
the results of such a risk analysis (from 2010 onwards) to the German Parliament. The Federal 
government also advises and supports the Länder in regard to their responsibilities in protecting 
critical infrastructure. In consultation with the Länder, the Federal government develops standards 
and frameworks for civil protection, which serve as recommendations for the federal states 
regarding their tasks in the area of civil protection, provided that an effective cooperation of the 
                                                   
251 Zivilschutz- und Katastrophenhilfegesetz; ZSKG. 
 
 77 
authorities responsible for civil protection, in particular in the case of natural disaster and serious 
accidents, takes place.252 
 
The Safety Assessment Act (1994) and Regulation of the Ministry of the Interior for the Material 
and Organisational Protection of Classified Information (2006)  
Pursuant to the Safety Assessment Act 1994253 the Regulation for the Material and Organisational 
Protection of Classified Information 2006 maps various security practices to assigned classification 
levels. These levels are set out in Paragraph 4 of the act and are assigned according to the level 
of risk involved in disclosing the classified information.254  
 
IT Security Act (2015)255 
An interesting, recent development in regard to protection of critical infrastructure is the newly 
adopted IT Security Act, which had its first hearing before the German Parliament in March 2015 
and came into force in July 2015. The IT Security Act is part of the Federal Government's "Digital 
Agenda 2014-2017" and stipulates a binding minimum with respect to IT security standards for 
critical infrastructures. The IT security law is one of the first concrete results in implementing the 
Digital Agenda of the Federal Government. The draft Act debated in Parliament in March was 
strongly criticised as leading to modest provisions concerning the requirements for IT security of 
critical infrastructures.  
The draft law defined requirements for the IT security of critical infrastructures, that is, those 
systems that provide critical services, such as electricity. The proposed Act required operators of 
critical infrastructures to meet minimum standards for IT security and to report significant IT security 
incidents to the BSI, which would analyse the information and make the results available to 
operators of critical infrastructures to help them improve their protection. To improve IT security on 
the Internet, the proposed law also contained stricter requirements for providers of 
telecommunications and telemedia services (especially website operators), which would have to 
offer state-of-the-art security. Telecommunications companies would also have to warn their 
customers if they noticed that a customer’s connection was being misused. The law would give a 
                                                   
252 Art. 18 – Zusammenarbeit von Bund und Ländern: 
(1) Der Bund erstellt im Zusammenwirken mit den Ländern eine bundesweite Risikoanalyse für den Zivilschutz. 
Das Bundesministerium des Innern unterrichtet den Deutschen Bundestag über die Ergebnisse der Risikoanalyse 
nach Satz 1 ab 2010 jährlich. Im Jahr ihrer Fertigstellung unterrichtet es den Deutschen Bundestag darüber 
hinaus über die von der Schutzkommission erstellten Gefahrenberichte. 
(2) Der Bund berät und unterstützt die Länder im Rahmen seiner Zuständigkeiten beim Schutz kritischer 
Infrastrukturen. 
(3) Im Benehmen mit den Ländern entwickelt der Bund Standards und Rahmenkonzepte für den Zivilschutz, die 
den Ländern zugleich als Empfehlungen für ihre Aufgaben im Bereich des Katastrophenschutzes dienen, sofern 
diese für ein effektives gesamtstaatliches Zusammenwirken der für den Katastrophenschutz zuständigen 
Behörden auch bei Naturkatastrophen und besonders schweren Unglücksfällen erforderlich sind. 
253 www.gesetze-im-internet.de/bundesrecht/s_g/gesamt.pdf. 
254 http://cybersecurity.bsa.org/assets/PDFs/country_reports/cs_germany.pdf. 
255 Gesetz zur Erhöhung der Sicherheit informationstechnischer Systeme IT-Sicherheitsgesetz. Description of the 
Act is based on the Draft Act that was debated in Parliament in March 2015; 
http://www.bakermckenzie.com/files/Publication/0a9affcd-4af1-48b1-af03-
2622352c61b4/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/a5982c90-8b61-4119-8752-





greater role to the BSI and emphasize its increased significance as central agency for IT security 
by expanding its advisory function. In order to make the security of IT products more transparent 
for customers, the BSI would be authorized to test the security of IT products and systems currently 
on the market and publish the results as needed. The proposed Act would also expand the authority 
of the Federal Criminal Police Office to investigate computer-related crime, in particular hacker 
attacks on federal IT systems.  
The adopted Act, however, requires only that: 
 operators of critical infrastructures ensure the provision of its major IT services required by 
IT to the prior art and appropriate - unless other special arrangements are in place - to 
make this safety check at least every two years; 
 operators report to BSI significant IT security incidents; 
 the obligation to report significant IT security incidents initially applies only to the operators 
of nuclear power plants and telecommunications companies; mandatory reporting of 
significant IT security incidents for other critical infrastructure operators will apply only after 
the adoption of the ordinance (Rechtsverordnung), which will determine which companies 
are subject to the provisions of the Act; the ordinance is currently being prepared by the 
Ministry of the Interior (the ordinance will specify the law and determine which companies 
will, in the legal sense, belong to the critical infrastructure). 
A separate ordinance with specific rules for critical infrastructure was not planned by the draft Act. 
The request for a clearer definition of critical infrastructure by several industry associations was 
taken into account, leading to the preparation of a governmental ordinance.  
Pursuant to the IT Security Act, the Act on the Federal Office for Information Security 
(Gesetz über das Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, 2009) was also amended 
(in July 2015) to broaden its scope to include critical infrastructures. The actual scope of 
installations and facilities covered, however, will be determined in the ordinance being prepared. 
The ordinance will establish measurable criteria, such as the market share of the supply of a 
particular region with a certain power, determining critical infrastructure in a legal sense. Other 
criticism, such as the increased role and power of the BSI – becoming a central office in regard to 
critical infrastructure protection (falling under the Federal Ministry of the Interior), which has been 
associated (the BSI) with the development of the “State Trojan”, malware used by German law 
enforcement, have been disregarded. Nevertheless, if the BSI is to become the central office 
regarding CIP, among other matters checking the security of IT products and services, the 
independence of the BSI needs to be assured. 
 
Regulation of Incident Management 
EIA (2005) 
Section 52 regulates the announcements of disruptions in supply and states that power plant 
operators are obliged to annually report to the BnetzA all supply disruptions that occurred in the 
last calendar year in their network. They must report the time and duration, extent and cause of the 
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supply disruption and set out measures to avoid future supply disruptions. Facilities with national 
impact have immediate reporting duties. Section 53b regulates the overall system registry 
(regulatory power) and states that in order to guarantee the security of supply and safe operation 
of energy systems the Federal Ministry of Economy and Energy can regulate: 
 the establishment of a directory by the Federal Network Agency containing e.g. plants for 
production and storage of electricity; 
 the design of the system registry, in particular: (a) the information to be transmitted (location 
of the plant, energy sources used, capacity of the plant, technical characteristics of the 
plant, information about remote control capability of the system, information about the 
power grid to which the plant is connected), (b) who to communicate the information to, (c) 
requirements for the data transmission deadlines and the type, format and the scope of 
data transmitted, (d) comparison with data from other registers, (e) performance of duties 
of the asset register; 
 reporting duties of the operator regarding installations requiring approval by the competent 
licensing authority; 
 the nature and extent of the disclosure of data to network operators and third parties; 
 the scope of data to be published in compliance with the data protection requirements. 
 
IT Security Act (2015)256 
The draft Act envisioned strengthened IT security obligations of telecommunications and telemedia 
companies as well as operators of critical infrastructures. According to the Act as it was adopted, 
these obligations, at least before the special ordinance defining critical infrastructure and 
obligations more specifically is adopted, apply only to operators of nuclear power plants and 
telecommunications companies. In addition to already applicable obligations:  
 providers of publicly available telecommunications services and operators of public 
telecommunication networks are obligated to notify the Federal Network Agency, without 
undue delay, of serious security incidents of which they become aware of and which may 
lead to unlawful access to user systems or disrupts its availability (this is in addition to 
existing notification obligations in cases of a personal data breach or security breach); 
 providers of publicly available telecommunication services are obligated to notify users of 
known disruptions caused by the users' data processing systems and to provide users with 
information on appropriate, effective and accessible technical measures to detect and 
remedy such disruptions; 
 telemedia service providers are obligated to provide secure authorization methods for 
personalized telemedia services and, where technically feasible and reasonable, take 
measures to ensure that unlawful access to data processing and telecommunication 
system is prevented; 
                                                   
256 Gesetz zur Erhöhung der Sicherheit informationstechnischer Systeme IT-Sicherheitsgesetz. 
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 telecommunications and telemedia providers shall be entitled to use their customers' data 
to protect their customers and to resolve disruptions. 
Similar obligations apply to operators of nuclear power plants.  
 
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (2009)257 
Germany does not have a national incident management structure in place for responding to 
cybersecurity incidents. The Act on the Federal Office for Information Security 2009 gives the BSI 
the authority to act as the national authority for information security. The act does not outline a 
general incident management structure, nor specific practices related to cybersecurity.258 The Act 
requires federal authorities to report cybersecurity incidents to the Federal Office of Information 
Security upon detection. An amendment to the Act came into force in July 2015, strengthening the 
mandatory reporting requirements covering telecommunication service providers and entities 
engaged with critical infrastructure. Sub-section a) and b) were added to section 8 in regard to 
critical infrastructure. 
Section 8a Security of Information Technology Critical Infrastructure indicates that 
operators of critical infrastructures are required, no later than two years after the entry into force of 
the Ordinance pursuant to § 10 paragraph 1, to apply appropriate organizational and technical 
measures to avoid disruption of the availability, integrity, authenticity and confidentiality of their 
essential information technology critical infrastructure systems, components or processes of their 
functioning. The state of the art of the technology should be taken into account. Organisational and 
technical measures are appropriate when the costs for applicants are not disproportionate to the 
consequences of a failure or deterioration of the affected critical infrastructure.  
Operators of critical infrastructure and their inter-branch organizations can propose 
industry-specific safety standards to ensure the requirements of paragraph 1. The Federal Office 
firmly tests whether these proposals are appropriate for ensuring the requirements of paragraph 1. 
The test is conducted in consultation with the Federal Office for Civil Protection and Disaster 
Assistance, the relevant supervisory authority of the Federation or the other competent supervisory 
authority. The operators of critical infrastructure should appropriately demonstrate compliance with 
the requirements in accordance with paragraph 1at least once every two years. This can be done 
by security audits, inspections or certifications. The operator shall report to the Federal Office a list 
of audits carried out, examinations or certifications including the safety deficiencies uncovered by 
them.  
In regard to the security deficiencies the Federal Office may demand: the transmission of 
the entire audit, examination or certification results and the removal of safety deficiencies in 
consultation with the relevant supervisory authority of the Federation or in consultation with the 
other competent authority. In regard to the design of the procedure of security audits, examinations 
and certifications and the requirements for the manner of execution, based on the acquired 
                                                   




evidence, the Office may set technical and organizational requirements after consultation with the 
representatives of the operator and trade associations concerned. 
Section 8b regulates the tasks of the Central Office for Security in Information Technology 
Critical Infrastructures, which the Federal Office for Information Security as the reporting office for 
operators of critical infrastructures in matters of Security in Information Technology. More specific 
obligations for the providers and the Federal Office will be regulated in the ordinance. 
 
Regulation of Repression 
The German Criminal Code259 regulates the interference with and prevention of provision of certain 
critical infrastructure services, such as electricity, in section 316b (disruption of the provision of 
telecommunication services is, however, regulated in section 317). 
 
Section 316b – Disruption of public services 
(1) Whosoever prevents or interferes with the operation of enterprises or facilities which 
serve the public provision of postal service or public transport; a facility which serves the 
public provision of water, light, heat or power or an enterprise which serves the vital needs 
of the population; or an installation or a facility serving public order and safety by destroying, 
damaging, removing, altering or rendering unusable an object used in its operation or taps 
electrical power intended for its operation shall be liable to imprisonment not exceeding five 
years or a fine. 
(2) The attempt shall be punishable. 
(3) In especially serious cases the penalty shall be imprisonment from six months to ten 
years. An especially serious case typically occurs if by the offence the offender disrupts the 
provision of vital goods to the population, in particular water, light, heat or power.260  
 
Section 317 – Disruption of telecommunications facilities 
(1) Whosoever prevents or endangers the operation of a telecommunications facility which 
serves public purposes by destroying, damaging, removing, altering or rendering unusable 
an object which serves its operation, or taps electrical power intended for its operation shall 
be liable to imprisonment not exceeding five years or a fine. 
(2) The attempt shall be punishable. 
(3) Whosoever commits the offence negligently shall be liable to imprisonment not 
exceeding one year or a fine.261  
 
                                                   
259 Strafgesetzbuch (StGB). 





4.2.4 The Netherlands 
Under the 1998 Dutch Electricity Act (DEA), the Ministry of Economic Affairs is responsible for 
drafting an energy report at least every four years (article 2(1) DEA). After the report is finalized, it 
is communicated to Parliament and then published (in the ‘Staatscourant’, the official gazette for 
informing the public about legislative decisions, since 2009 this is published via internet at 
http://officielebekendmakingen.nl).262 The Authority for Consumers and Markets (ACM) is the 
regulatory authority for the energy sector and is responsible for the implementation and supervision 
of the act (articles 5-9 DEA); it also develops Energy Codes (see section 4.1.3). The ACM advises 
the Minister of Economic Affairs on the designation of network operators, licenses for suppliers to 
small consumers, tariffs and tariff structures of transmission- and system services, and delivery 
rates263 and determines the conditions for the free market, including free access to the electricity 
network under equal conditions.264 Every two years, the ACM assesses whether network operators 
sufficiently and efficiently provide the total needs of transport.265 The ACM works together with 
institutions from other EU Member States that are responsible for electricity regulation based on 
their national laws, and with ‘The Agency’ as meant by article 1(1) of Regulation 713/2009, which 
is an agency for the cooperation amongst energy regulators. The ACM also works together with 
the national actors outlined in the next section. 
In 2013, the Dutch government presented the Dutch “National Cyber Security Strategy 
2”.266 It distinguishes five strategic goals: 1. the Netherlands is resilient against cyber attacks and 
protects its vital interests in the cyber domain. 2. The Netherlands deals with cyber criminality. 3. 
The Netherlands invests in secure and privacy-protecting ICT products and services. 4. The 
Netherlands forges coalitions for freedom, security and peace in the cyber domain and 5. The 
Netherlands has at its disposal sufficient cyber security knowledge and experience and invests in 
ICT-innovation in order to achieve its cyber security goals. The government regularly reports to the 
parliament about the progress made with the implementation of the strategy. The last progress 
letter dates from December 2014.267 About the energy sector, this report mentions that Tennet and 
Shell have started collaboration for charting vulnerabilities, dependencies and counter measures 
in the chain of energy provisioning. Furthermore, it announces that the Computer Crime III bill will 
be introduced in parliament in the first half of 2015.268 
Relevant Actors  
In addition to the Ministry of Economic Affairs and ACM, the following actors are relevant to the 
governance of energy infrastructures: 
                                                   
262 The Minister of Security and Justice also played an active role during recent power outages in the North of the 
Netherlands. 
263 https://www.acm.nl/nl/onderwerpen/energie/elektricitieit/  
264 Idem. 
265 Idem. 
266 Available here: https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten/rapporten/2013/10/28/nationale-cyber-security-
strategie-2  
267 Available here: https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten/kamerstukken/2014/12/19/tk-voortgangsbrief-
realisatie-werkprogramma-nationale-cyber-security-strategie-2  
268 In May 2015, a public consultation was started. See https://www.internetconsultatie.nl/computercriminaliteit  
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 The Provincial Council is responsible for the construction or expansion of a production plant 
for the generation of renewable electricity (art. 9e (1) DEA); this falls within the scope of the 
Spatial Planning Act (Wet ruimtelijke ordening). 
 The Provincial Executive coordinates the preparation and publication of decisions concerning 
the construction or expansion of a production plant as meant in art. 9e DEA. 
 An electricity producer is an organizational unit that deals with the generation of electricity (art. 
1(1) g DEA). Large producers in the Netherlands are: NUON, Essent, Elektrabel, Intergen, 
Delta, Eneco and EON.269 An electricity supplier is an organizational unit that deals with the 
supply of electricity (to the consumers). According to article 9h(1) DEA, a producer who 
produces electricity with a direct line to consumers, reports to the ACM once opening that 
direct line. 
 The network operator (grid) is concerned with the physical transport of electricity and must 
ensure the safety and reliability of the networks and the transport of electricity on those 
networks in the most effective manner (art. 16(1)(b) DEA). The network operator must also 
build, renew and extend the nets and develops an emergency plan every five years that must 
be approved by the Minister of Economic Affairs.270 The network operator keeps record of 
quality indicators for electricity transmission (art. 19a DEA) and ensures that interruptions in 
the electricity transport are easily reported, recorded and made public (art. 19e DEA). TenneT 
is the administrator/operator of the Dutch national grid.271 Regional network operators 
administrate the high voltage distribution nets and the low voltage net/grid.  
 Program Managers buy the electrical power from the suppliers and have an obligation to 
deliver. Each party that has one or more connections to a network is responsible (as a Program 
Manager) for that connection. Program Managers indicate how much electricity they expect to 
supply to the grid and the expected take away/withdrawal from the network. The sum of all 
expected supplies and withdrawals is called an Energy Program; these are published to 
TenneT daily. The ones responsible for the measurement must measure the actual production 
or actual consumption every day. The summed measurements must be passed to TenneT, 
who will settle the difference between what is submitted and what has been measured. If a 
Program Manager does not adhere to the Energy Program that results in an imbalance which 
has financial consequences.272 
 Metering companies measure actual consumption in accordance with the Metering Code 
(Meetcode). Each party connected to the grid is responsible for timely and proper measuring 
of its electricity exchange with the grid, as well as timely and proper disclosure of this 
information to its network operator. The affiliate is free to perform this measurement itself, 
                                                   
269 Useful website: http://www.energie-nederland.nl/aangesloten-energiebedrijven/  
270 The Minister may issue a direction in the context of protection of networks against possible external influences 
(art. 16da). 




provided it is recognized as responsible for metering by TenneT. Affiliates may also outsource 
their measuring responsibility to a third party who has been recognized as metering 
responsible. The tasks include placing meters, maintenance and meter-by-meter readings. 
 Representative organizations mediate some interactions between different actors. Two key 
representative organizations are Netbeheer Nederland, the branch organization of network 
operators (http://www.netbeheernederland.nl/) and NEDU/EDSN, the vereniging Nederlandse 
Energie Data Uitwisseling/Energy Data Services Netherlands (http://www.edsn.nl/). These 
organizations are important because they can also submit a proposal to the ACM to change 
the aforementioned Energy Codes. 
Regulatory Framework 
Regulation of Prevention 
The Dutch Electricity Act (DEA) 1998  
The net manager – entity entrusted with the physical transport of electricity – must guarantee the 
safety and reliability of the transport nets for electricity in the most efficient way possible (art. 16(1) 
sub b DEA). The net manager must protect its nets against possible external forces (art. 16(1) sub 
q DEA). The net manager draws up a calamities plan at least once in every five years and sends 
this plan for approval to the Minister of Economic Affairs (art. 16d(1) DEA).   
A concept for a new electricity and gas bill has been drawn up and laid open for an Internet 
consultation.273 Relevant obligations from the DEA return in this bill, inter alia the obligation to 
protect against external forces returns (art. 5.4(2) Electricity and Gas Bill). In the concept 
Explanatory Memorandum, a cyber-attack is explicitly mentioned as an example of an external 
force.274  
 
The Dutch Independent Net Management Act275  
This Act stipulates that net-managers may not belong to the same concern as producers of, traders 
in and retailers of electricity. This unbundling is mainly inspired by economic considerations and 
the implications for security do not appear to have played an appreciable role. Nonetheless, the 
unbundling of previously integrated firms may lead to security responsibilities becoming distributed 
over multiple parties, which (theoretically, at least) may lead to a greater need for coordination in 
the field of security. Apart from this concern, unbundling may also have an advantage in security 
terms. It may be easier to contain problems (to one part of the network) and some parts of the 
network may temporarily take over the function of other parts that are stricken down as a 
consequence of a security breach.   
 
 
                                                   
273 ‘Concept Wetsvoorstel Stroom’ 
http://www.vemw.nl/~/media/VEMW/Downloads/Public/Homepage%20homeslider/MvT%20Wetsvoorstel%20STR
OOM%20versie%202.ashx  
274 Concept Explanatory memorandum, p. 80, available at: 
http://www.vemw.nl/~/media/VEMW/Downloads/Public/Homepage%20homeslider/MvT%20Wetsvoorstel%20STR
OOM%20versie%202.ashx  
275 Wet onafhankelijk Netbeheer. 
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ACM Energy Codes 
As mentioned above, the ACM sets the so-called Energy Codes. These are regulations that contain 
rules that hold between net managers and users of the gas- or electricity net. Producers of energy 
are for example users of the net.  One of the electricity codes is the cooperation regulation. Its tenth 
article, entitled ‘Calamities (terrorist attacks, natural disasters, war etc)’ states that it is every Net 
Manager’s responsibility to have a calamity plan. If and to the extent necessary net managers will 
exchange their individual plans, discuss them and attune them to each other. If necessary, all net 
managers involved will draw up common plans.  
 
Regulation of Incident Management 
Dutch Concept Bill on Cyber Security Data Processing and Reporting of Incidents 276 
In early 2015, the Dutch government published a concept bill on the reporting of cybersecurity 
incidents and an invitation to any interested party to make its views known in the accompanying 
Internet consultation. According to the published bill, the duty to report incidents rests on certain 
providers of products or services that are pointed out in a Ministerial Decree. The Ministerial Decree 
will point out parties in the following sectors: electricity, gas, drinking water, telecommunication, 
government (including see and river water management) and transport (such as the main ports, 
Rotterdam and Schiphol). Concretely, it will concern vital providers, such as energy network 
managers, drinking water companies, telecom companies, managers of waterworks or banks.  
An incident must be reported to the Minister of Security and Justice. Any incident report will 
be processed by the Nationaal Cyber Security Centrum (NCSC), which functions under 
responsibility of the Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid (NCTV). A report 
enables NCSC to offer support to the affected provider and to warn other providers. The ultimate 
goal is to make an assessment of the risk of societal disruption and to prevent such disruption, or 
at least to minimize it as much as is possible. The affected organizations are not obliged to report 
each ICT-incident to the NCSC. The duty to report only applies to incidents where the availability 
or reliability of the pertinent product or service is or can be interrupted to a serious extent. With this 
bill, the Dutch government anticipates the adoption of the proposal for a Council Directive 
2013/0027 concerning measures to ensure a high common level of network and information 
security across the Union, which regulates incident reporting and the handling of the reported data 
as well.    
 
The Dutch Electricity Act (DEA) 
The Minister of Economic Affairs can instruct the net manager with respect to the protection of 
the nets against external forces (art. 16da DEA). The net manager facilitates easier reporting, 
registering and publishing with regard to interruptions in the transportation of electricity (art. 19e 
DEA). A concept for a new electricity and gas bill has been drawn up and made available for 
                                                   
276 http://www.Internetconsultatie.nl/cybersecurity  
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Internet consultation.277 Relevant provisions from the DEA return in this bill, inter alia the Minister’s 
power to give instructions relating to protection against external forces returns (art. 10.5 Electricity 
and Gas Bill). In the concept Explanatory Memorandum, a new technical development in cyber 
criminality is explicitly mentioned as an example of a concrete threat that may lead the Minister 
to give an instruction.278 
 
Regulation of Repression 
Articles 161bis, 161ter, and 351bis Dutch Criminal Code concern crimes that disrupt electricity 
provision. 
 
Art. 161bis: He who intentionally destroys, damages, makes unusable or causes disruption 
in the progress or functioning of any electricity work or who frustrates any safety measure 
taken with respect to such work, shall be punished (1) with imprisonment of at most one 
year or a fine of the fifth category if as a consequence of it, impediment or complication of 
electricity delivery for the common good arises, (2) with imprisonment of at most six years 
or a fine of the fifth category if as a consequence of it, common danger to goods must be 
feared, (3) with imprisonment of at most nine years or a fine of the fifth category if as a 
consequence of it, lethal danger to another must be feared (3) with imprisonment of at most 
fifteen years or a fine of the fifth category if as a consequence of it, lethal danger to another 
must be feared and the act has caused somebody’s death. 
 
Art. 161ter: He who is to blame that any electricity work is destroyed, damaged, made 
unusable or that disruption in the progress or functioning of it is caused or that any safety 
measure taken with respect to such a work is frustrated, shall be punished (1) with 
imprisonment of at most six months or a fine of the fourth category if as a consequence of 
it impediment or complication of electricity delivery for the common good arises, or if as a 
consequence of it, common danger to goods must be feared, (2) with imprisonment of at 
most one year or a fine of the fourth category if as a consequence of it, lethal danger to 
another arises (3) with imprisonment of at most two years or a fine of the fourth category if 
the act has caused somebody’s death. 
 
Art. 351: He who intentionally and without right destroys, damages, makes unusable, 
causes to be out of order or lost, railway or electricity works, automated works or works for 
telecommunication, dams, works for drainage, gas or water lines or sewage, for as far as 
these works are used for the common good, or goods or works for the defense of the 
country, will be punished with imprisonment of at most three years or a fine of the fourth 
category.  
 
Art. 351bis: He who is to blame that any good or work meant in the previous article is 
destroyed, damaged, made unusable or caused to be out of order or lost will be punished 
with imprisonment of at most one month or a fine of the second category. 
                                                   
277 ‘Concept Wetsvoorstel Stroom’ 
http://www.vemw.nl/~/media/VEMW/Downloads/Public/Homepage%20homeslider/MvT%20Wetsvoorstel%20STR
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Moreover, the general provisions on data interference (art. 350a DCC) and system interference 
(particularly botnet attacks, art. 138b DCC) include an aggravated circumstance if the crime is 
targeted at computers belonging to vital infrastructures, with a maximum punishment of five years’ 
imprisonment or fine of the fourth category (art. 138b(3), 350a(2) DCC). 
Because these crimes express the vital importance that electricity provision has for 
society, they are formulated in a technology-neutral way with respect to the means that a 
perpetrator uses in rendering an electricity work unusable or causing impediments to its 
functioning. Therefore, they are usable if the crime is committed by way of a cyber-attack. The 
maximum punishment appears to be rather low, especially it the effect is merely an interruption 
in electricity provision. This has effects on the investigatory powers that can be used to track down 
the perpetrators, since the most relevant investigation powers can only be used for crimes that 
have a maximum punishment of at least four years (art 67 Dutch Code of Criminal Procedure). 
However, art. 351 is also explicitly mentioned in art. 67 Code of Criminal Procedure, and thus 
allows the relevant investigation powers to be used, so that cyberattacks on electricity works can 
investigated under art. 351. Moreover, if the attack resulted in common danger to goods (not 
necessarily actually damaging goods, but providing a considerable risk that goods with a public 
function would be damaged), also investigation under art. 161bis(2) is possible. 
4.2.5 United Kingdom 
Following the privatization and the public/private partnership agreements that concerned the water, 
energy (gas and electricity) and telecommunications sectors in the 1980s and 1990s, a large part 
of the UK National Infrastructures (CNI) – including the electrical grid – is privately owned and 
operated. Public authorities set both the framework within which CNI asset owners deliver their 
services and the protection measures and security controls they have to implement. 
CNI are increasingly interconnected and reliant on ICT in their functioning.279 Modern 
industrial control systems (ICSs) and SCADA systems are generally connected to the Internet and 
based on open standards and architectures, and therefore subject to the potential vulnerabilities 
that the access to the Net entails.280 Moreover, critical infrastructures are highly interconnected and 
interdependent: for instance, an energy supplier’s product could be transmitted through an 
infrastructure owned by another subject and then delivered to its users. The consequences of a 
successful cyber attack targeting an ICS deployed in the context of a CNI are serious, and the UK’s 
policies appear to recognize this issue. 
In 2008, the Government published the first National Risk Register for Civil Emergencies 
(NRR), fulfilling a promise from that year’s National Security Strategy.281 The document, which is 
                                                   
279 See Paul Cornish et al., ‘Cyber Security And The UK Critical Infrastructure’ (Chatham House Report, 2011), p. 
1. 
280 For a brief overview of recent cyberattacks targeting SCADA systems see Andrew Nicholson et al., ‘SCADA 
security in the light of Cyber-Warfare’, (2012) 31 Computers & Security, 418. See also Stewart Baker et al, ‘In the 
crossfire: Critical infrastructure in the age of cyber war’ (McAfee 2009); and Stewart Baker et al., ‘In the Dark: 
Crucial Industries Confront Cyber Attacks’ (McAfee 2011). 
281 Cabinet Office, ‘National Risk Register’ (2008), p. 3. 
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regularly updated,282 assesses the likelihood and potential impact (i.e. the risk level) of a negative 
and unwarranted event, potentially involving a significant part of, or the whole nation. The NRR’s 
approach is to a large extent holistic; it takes into account quite a large array of natural events, 
accidents and malicious attacks. Regarding electricity-related issues, the 2008 NRR states, “There 
are comprehensive plans in place for handling both a complete national outage and regional 
outages. In the event of a national outage (which has never occurred), and provided there had 
been no damage to the system, the objective would be to restore supplies throughout Great Britain 
within three days.”283 It also specifies that – in case of intentional and malicious attack on critical 
infrastructures – there are “longstanding and regularly activated major incident plans and structures 
are in place across government.”284 It also notably adds, “Planning for the impacts of attacks on 
critical infrastructure is in many cases the same as for accidents or technical failure.”285 The 2010 
NRR and the 2012 update, as well as the 2013 NRR, do not contain any significant changes, but 
the 2015 document indicates that the NRR raised the risk level of a critical power outage following 
government research.286 All nine industry sectors are interested in specific programs and general 
incident response procedures. 
Relevant actors 
The following actors are relevant to the governance of energy infrastructures: 
 Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure (CPNI) is specifically tasked with providing 
advice, guidance and best practices to national infrastructure287 stakeholders on protective 
security measures. The CPNI was formed in 2007 with the merger of the National Infrastructure 
Security Co-ordination Centre (NISCC) and the National Security Advice Centre (NSAC).288 
(NISCC provided advice to companies and other bodies involved in the CNI operations, while 
NSAC was a unit within MI5 that provided advice on security matters.) CPNI provides 
operational guidance on information security, physical security and personnel security, and 
focuses on protecting the UK national infrastructure from espionage, terrorism and other 
security threats. 
 National Cyber Security Programme, OCSIA and CSOC The first UK Cyber Security Strategy 
(2009 CSS) was launched in June 2009,289 paving the way for the creation of the Office of 
Cyber Security and Information Assurance (OCSIA), a group within the Cabinet Office 
responsible for the UK cybersecurity policy implementation and the Cyber Security Operations 
Centre (CSOC), a multi-agency body tasked with national incident response coordination.  
                                                   
282 In 2010, 2013, 2013 and 2015. 
283 Cabinet Office, ‘National Risk Register’ (2008), p. 21. 
284 Cabinet Office, ‘National Risk Register’ (2008), p. 26. 
285 Ibid. 
286 Cabinet Office, ‘National Risk Register’ (2015), p. 15. 
287 The UK national infrastructure is categorized according to 9 categories: communications, emergency services, 
energy, financial services, food, government, health, transport, and water. Each of those categories is then 
divided into sub-categories. Each category has a governmental lead, some sharing the same one. 
288 Andrew Wood, ‘Resilience of the Critical National Infrastructure’ (Ogres Working Paper 2008), p. 4. 
289 OCS and CSOC, ‘Cyber Security Strategy of the United Kingdom – safety, security and resilience in cyber 
space’, (Cabinet Office, June 2009). 
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 The Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) is a British intelligence and security 
organisation responsible for providing signals intelligence and information to the British 
government and armed forces. 
o CESG,290 formerly called Communications-Electronics Security Group, is now 
known as the National Technical Authority for Information Assurance and situated 
within GCHQ., It provides information security advice, information assurance and 
other services (e.g. certifications, independent reviews, training etc.) to 
government, defence and CNI stakeholders. It plays a key role in proactively 
securing UK CNI from cyber attacks. 
 Computer Emergency Response Teams (CERTs) also play a key role in protecting networked 
CNI. They are present at both the national (i.e. CERT-UK291) and sectoral or regional levels. 
The government has its own CERT (GovCertUK292) and private bodies – such as CNI 
operators, which in the UK are mostly private parties – are also actively encouraged to form 
their own. The responsibilities of CERT-UK include: national cybersecurity incident 
management, support to critical national infrastructure companies when handling incidents, 
promoting cybersecurity situational awareness across industry, academia and the public sector 
and providing the single international point of contact for co-ordination and collaboration with 
other national CERTs.293 CERT-UK also leads the Cyber-security Information Sharing 
Partnership (CiSP294), a platform where public and private stakeholders can share information 
and analysis regarding threats and vulnerabilities between. 
 Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC), formed in 2008, is a ministerial 
department responsible for energy policies in the UK and the leading department for the energy 
infrastructure sector. Its responsibilities295 include energy security – ensuring UK businesses 
and households have secure supplies of energy296 and managing the UK’s energy legacy 
safely, securely and cost effectively.297 The DECC works with 9 agencies and public bodies: 
Ofgem (the Office of Gas and Electricity Markets), Oil and Gas Authority, Civil Nuclear Police 
Authority, Coal Authority, Committee on climate change, Nuclear Decommissioning Authority, 
Committee on Radioactive Waste Management, Fuel Poverty Advisory Group and the Nuclear 
Liabilities Financing Assurance Board.  
 The Civil Contingencies Secretariat (CCS) is a governmental office within the Cabinet Office 
tasked with fostering the UK’s contingency management and response capabilities, providing 
                                                   
290 CESG, https://www.cesg.gov.uk/, last access May 2015. 
291 CERT-UK, https://www.cert.gov.uk/, last access May 2015.  
See also Cabinet Office and The Rt Hon Lord Maude, ‘UK launches first national CERT’ (2014), 
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-launches-first-national-cert, last access May 2015. 
292 CESG, https://www.cesg.gov.uk/PolicyGuidance/GovCertUK/Pages/index.aspx, last access May 2015. 
293 CERT-UK, https://www.cert.gov.uk/what-we-do/, last access May 2015. 
294 CERT-UK, https://www.cert.gov.uk/cisp/, last access May 2015. 
295 DECC, ‘About Us’, https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/department-of-energy-climate-change/about, 





leadership, insight and guidance to other bodies. The CCS is involved in the production of the 
NRA and the NRR, is responsible for emergency planning and response, and leads policing 
activities directed towards CNIs.298 
Regulatory Framework 
In the UK there is no single piece of legislation governing the protection of CNI from cyber attacks. 
There is, however, specific regulation aimed at disciplining CNI-related contingencies, albeit 
fragmented between sectors. In the event of a sufficiently serious electricity supply emergency, 
both industry299 and government300 are tasked with managing the incident and its consequences. 
Several laws that potentially apply at some stage of a cyberattack targeting a CNI tasked with the 
production, transmission or distribution of electrical energy are described below.  
Due to the nature of this quick-scan report, and to the fragmented nature of UK criminal 
legislation, some more general provisions that are likely to be applicable in the event of a cyber 
attack targeting an electricity-related CNI (such as the ones contained in the Criminal Law Act 1977 
(c.45)) are not examined. The legislation that covers the UK public bodies’ Intelligence, counter-
terrorism and investigatory powers, for instance, is undoubtedly to be considered when assessing 
the national capacity to prevent, stop and repress a cyber attack targeting a CNI. In particular, it is 
worth mentioning the Security Service Act301 and the Intelligence Services Act302, which provide a 
statutory basis for the UK’s intelligence agencies, and the Regulation of Investigatory Powers 
Act,303 which regulates the intelligence’s investigative powers, along with those of other relevant 
public bodies. Moreover, the Counter-Terrorism Act304 is likely to be applicable, as well; especially 
when the cyber attack targeting a UK CNI has physical effects.  
 
Regulation of Prevention 
Energy Act 1976 
The powers foreseen in the Energy Act 1976305 (EA76 henceforth) enable the Secretary of State 
for DECC to control the production, supply, acquisition and use of energy (electrical one included) 
in case of an “there exists or is imminent in the United Kingdom an actual or threatened emergency 
affecting fuel or electricity supplies which makes it necessary in Her Majesty’s opinion that the 
government should temporarily have at its disposal exceptional powers for controlling the sources 
                                                   
298 See University of Cambridge, Centre for Science and Policy, ‘Civil Contingencies Secretariat (CCS), Cabinet 
Office’, http://www.csap.cam.ac.uk/organisations/civil-contingencies-secretariat/, last access May 2015. 
299 “The gas and electricity companies are responsible for the practical and operational management of an incident 
in order to ensure that the situation is contained, managed safely and supply effectively restored. The companies 
have well established plans and procedures in place to achieve this, which can range from the management of a 
moderate supply deficit to the management of a major loss of gas supplies impacting on domestic consumers or 
restoration of electricity supplies from a national shut down”: DECC, ‘National Emergency Plan – Downstream Gas 
& Electricity’, (Version 15, November 2014), p. 7. 
300 The Department of Energy & Climate Change (DECC) being the UK Competent Authority and Lead Government 
Department in case of electricity-related emergencies. 
301 Security Service Act 1989 (c 5). 
302 Intelligence Services Act 1994 (c. 13). 
303 Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (c.23). 
304 Counter-Terrorism Act 2008 (c. 28). 
305 The Energy Act 1976 (c. 76). 
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and availability of energy.”306 The aforementioned exceptional powers,307 which are crucial in 
managing and preventing the potential effects of a cyber attack targeting UK electricity-related 
CNIs, are granted by an Order in Council ex section 3 EA76. In particular, the Secretary of State 
can regulate or prohibit the production, supply, acquisition or use of electricity, but only where it 
seems desirable in order to conserve energy.308 The Secretary of State, when an aforementioned 
Order in Council ex section 3 is in place, can also give directions to any subject involved in the 
production, supply, or usage of electricity. 
 
Electricity Act 1989 
The Electricity Act 1989 (EA89) enacted the final privatisation instances of the UK’s electricity 
market, established a licensing program, and gave birth to the Office of Electricity Regulation 
(OFFER), now known as the Office of Gas and Electricity Markets (OFGEM).  
In preventing the potential damages deriving from a successful cyber attack targeting the 
UK, the licensing conditions imposed to undertakings performing electricity production, 
transmission and distribution activities is important. The EA89 confers the Secretary of State the 
capacity to issue broad Directions to both power stations and transmission operators. The Fuel 
Security Code309 in particular provides an administrative structure in which to frame the Secretary 
of State’s directions, which include, for instance, setting an appropriate level of energy stock and 
making provisions for operators on how to use such stock. The Electricity Supply Emergency Code 
(ESEC) is another document likely to matter, in that it describes how the UK Government might 
deal with an electricity supply emergency as envisaged in the EA89 or in the Energy Act 1976. It 
also sets out the actions, which companies in the electricity industry should plan to take and which 
may be needed or required in order to deal with such an emergency.  
 
Regulation of Incident Management 
Civil Contingencies and the CCA 2004 
As mentioned, the hypothetical case used as a lens to scan the UK’s approach towards CNI cyber 
security outlines a major attack targeting electricity production and transmission facilities. 
Identifying the source of the CNI failure and, most likely, attributing it to a specific malicious threat 
actor, rather than to technical failure or negligence, could initially be difficult. In any case, the 
emergency deriving from a successful cyber attack targeting the UK’s electrical grid or the related 
CNI would be dealt with as a civil contingency, disciplined by the Civil Contingencies Act 2004310 
(CCA) and by its related regulations and governmental guidance, which will be briefly outlined 
below. The CCA constitutes the UK’s general framework for emergency planning, management 
and response, both from local and from a national level – defense issues, however, are excluded 
                                                   
306 EA76, section 3.1 (b). 
307 i.e. the ones granted by sections 1 and 2 of the EA76. 
308 EA76, section 1. 
309 Department for Business, Enterprise & Regulatory Reform, ‘The Fuel Security Code’ (2007). The Fuel Security 
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from the scope of the act. The CCA mandates the cooperation of a range of public bodies, as well 
as of a number of private actors, utility companies included. Due to the extent of the powers 
conferred by the act and to their exceptional character, the CCA’s provisions are to be considered 
as having a residual nature. 
The CCA is composed by three parts: the first one dedicated to “Local arrangements for 
Civil Protection”, which provides “a framework that governs the planning and preparation for a wide 
range of post-cold war potential emergencies, including terrorist incidents, cyber-attacks and 
natural hazards such as flooding or extreme weather311”; the second one to the government’s 
extraordinary “Emergency Powers”, and the last one to a number of general provisions. The CCA 
is completed by two schedules, the first identifying the subjects bound to respond to the 
contingency and the second one the amendments and repeals enacted by the CCA. Part 1, Section 
1 and Part 2, Section 19 define an “emergency” as either: 
a. An event or situation which threatens serious damage to human welfare in a place in the 
United Kingdom;  
b. An event or situation which threatens serious damage to the environment of a place in the 
United Kingdom;   
c. War, or terrorism, which threatens serious damage to the security of the United Kingdom.  
“Damage to human welfare”, in the context of the CCA, as Section 1 and 19’s subsections 2 state, 
means only damage involving “loss of human life, human illness or injury, homelessness, damage 
to property, disruption of a supply of money, food, water, energy or fuel, disruption of a system of 
communication, disruption of facilities for transport, or disruption of services relating to health”. The 
energy disruption following a successful cyber attack on UK’s electrical infrastructure would 
therefore be considered in the scope of the CCA. Notably, a Minister of the Crown312 may order 
that a specified event is to be treated as falling (or not falling) within any of paragraphs defining the 
concept of emergency or those specifying what “damage to human welfare” is. 
The first schedule of the CCA identifies the subjects bound to respond to an emergency, 
framing them in two separate categories, Category 1 and Category 2 responders: the first 
category313 comprises emergency and health services, as well as local authorities, while the 
second314 comprises an array of entities that are likely to play a major role in case of specific 
emergencies (including for instance, persons holding an electricity transmission, distribution or 
interconnection license). Category 1 respondents bear the primary responsibility for emergency 
planning and response. Section 2 of the CCA specifies that both categories of respondents have a 
duty to assess possible future emergencies, to plan ahead and to produce the relevant advice, 
publishing their assessment and plans if useful to prevent the emergency, to reduce, control or 
mitigate the damages or to enable others to undertake the necessary actions. A Minister of the 
                                                   
311 Rebecca Moosavian ‘Keep Calm and Carry On: informing the public under the Civil Contingencies Act 
2004’, (2014) 18 The International Journal of Human Rights 178. 
312 Or, if Scotland is involved, the Scottish Ministers. 
313 CCA, Schedule 1, part 1. Category 1 responders are the ‘front line’, the subjects primarily tasked to respond to 
emergencies. 
314 CCA, Schedule 1, part 2. 
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Crown, in relation to a person or body listed in Part 1 of Schedule 1, or the Scottish Ministers, in 
relation to a person or body listed in Part 2 of Schedule 1, may issue guidance315 or regulate the 
extent and the manner of the duty to assess, plan and advise foreseen in the first subsection of 
Section 2. It is also foreseen that a public body shall have the duty to provide advice and assistance 
to the public.316 
Section 5 states that a Minister of the Crown may order a Category 1 respondent to perform 
a broad range317 of functions in order to prevent the occurrence of an emergency, reduce, control 
or mitigate the effects of an emergency, or take other action in connection with an emergency. The 
provision applies to Scottish Ministers, as well; albeit with some additional limitations.318 Where 
there is an urgent need to make provision of a kind that could be made by an order or by regulations 
under section 5(1) or 6(1), but there is insufficient time for the order or regulations to be made, the 
Minister is allowed make those provision by direction, instead of by order or regulation, thus having 
the possibility to deal with extreme urgencies.319 
Information sharing and disclosure play also a prominent role in Part 1 of the CCA. On one 
hand, Section 6 allows a Minister (either of the Crown or a Scottish one) to require or permit a 
Category 1 respondent to disclose information on request to another respondent, be it of Category 
1 or 2. On the other, Section 9 allows a Minister to require a Category 1 respondent to provide 
information about action taken or to explain why the person or body has not taken the action 
required. 
Part 2 of the CCA is about government emergency powers. Section 20(1) states that “Her 
Majesty may by Order in Council make emergency regulations”; in case this is not possible without 
serious delay, Section 20(2) allows those emergency regulations to be taken by a Minister of the 
Crown. In any case, the emergency regulations shall be made by statutory instrument320 can be 
taken only if the following conditions are satisfied321: 
1. An emergency has occurred, is occurring or is about to occur; 
2. It is necessary to make provision for the purpose of preventing, controlling or mitigating an 
aspect or effect of the emergency; 
3. The need for the emergency provision is urgent.  
Section 22 of the CCA, dealing with the (broad) scope of the emergency regulations, states that 
they “may make any provision which the person making the regulations is satisfied is appropriate 
for the purpose of preventing, controlling or mitigating an aspect or effect of the emergency in 
respect of which the regulations are made”. The section clarifies and exemplifies the ample range 
of powers regulations that can be taken in case of emergency. Emergency regulations are subject 
to statutory limitations,322 expire 30 days after the date on which they are made (or earlier time if 
                                                   
315 See inter alia CAA, Section 3. 
316 See CCA, Section 4. 
317 See CCA, Section 5(4). 
318 See CCA, Section 5(5). 
319 See CCA, Sections 7 and 8. 
320 See CCA, Section 30. 
321 See CCA, Section 21(2)(3)(4). 
322 See CCA, Section 23. 
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specified in the regulations)323 and are subject to parliamentary scrutiny.324 Moreover, if a devolved 
administration is interested in a proposed emergency regulation, a senior minister must be 
consulted.325 Coordination is ensured by the appointment of an Emergency Coordinator for each 
part of the UK other than England by a senior Minister of the Crown, and of a Regional Nominated 
Coordinator for each region interested, whose role is facilitating coordination between the actors 
involved.326 
The CCA displays the integration of two different organisational structures, a C&C model 
and a more decentralized configuration.327 The provisions that can be traced back to the former 
structure create a hierarchical construction with a clear leadership and ‘chain of command’. The 
second approach permeates the provisions that establish a more flexible and horizontal structure 
between the actors. Those two structures are closely intertwined: “(a)lthough planning occurs at a 
local level, this is overseen by central government; all responders are accountable to ministers for 
their emergency planning activities, and must take account of central government guidance in their 
planning [...] Central government will also become involved where an incident escalates.”328 
Authority is vested in a single body that provides a strong lead during the contingency: the 
command structure is linear, which can be important during emergencies. The CCA’s provisions 
relating to cooperation and information exchange on the one hand and the respect for the autonomy 
of decentralized administration on the other, show the utility and importance of integrating the 
command and control system set up by the Act with a decentralized organizational structure. The 
latter adapts better to the nature of information in the ICT society: data is intangible and can be 
communicated in real time by and to a multiplicity of different subjects. It seems natural, therefore, 
in case of an emergency, where communication and coordination are of the utmost importance, 
resorting to a decentralized structure, as the CCA appears to do. 
 
Regulation of Repression 
Computer Misuse Act 1990 
The UK’s legislation appears to be already partly equipped to tackle the offences identified in the 
Directive 2013/40/EU on attacks against information systems. The Computer Misuse Act, in 
particular, can be used to address most of the offences foreseen by the Directive 2013/40/EU. A 
cyber attack targeting an electricity-provisioning CNI would arguably be a civil contingency, to be 
prevented if possible, and to be managed when – or if – it occurs. The CMA, concerned mostly with 
the integrity and availability aspects of the notion of security, introduced a number of (then) new 
offences deriving from the misuse of a computer. Notably, the CMA does not define the notion of 
‘computer’, which contributes to making the act technologically neutral, able to cover future 
                                                   
323 See CCA, Section 26. 
324 See CCA, Sections 27 and 28. 
325 See CCA, Section 29. 
326 See CCA, Section 24. 
327 See Moosavian 2014, Ibid. 
328 See Moosavian 2014, Ibid, p. 179. 
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technological developments, as well.329 The act has been of course amended over the years, but 
the very fact that a piece of legislation drafted before the advent of the modern Internet as we know 
it has not been repealed yet testifies the longevity that such a legislative technique is able to grant. 
The first section of the CMA introduced the offence of unauthorized access to computer 
material, of which a person is guilty if: 
a. he causes a computer to perform any function with intent to secure access to any program 
or data held in any computer, or to enable any such access to be secured;   
b. the access he intends to secure, or to enable to be secured, is unauthorized; and   
c. he knows at the time when he causes the computer to perform the function that that is the 
case.   
Section 1 disciplines the ‘basic’ hacking offence, unauthorized access, which could be meant to be 
unauthorized access to any kind of computerized system – from a personal computer to an ICS to 
a networked SCADA system. Moreover, the section covers both remote hacking and unauthorized 
physical access like the one that can be performed by a malicious insider, e.g. an employee unduly 
accessing the system. 
The CMA’s second section is particularly relevant in the hypothetical cyber attack targeting 
UK electricity provisioning CNIs. Titled “unauthorised access with intent to commit or facilitate 
commission of further offences,” section 2 sanctions that a person is guilty of an offence if s/he 
commits the offence of unauthorized access with the intent to commit an offence to which section 
2 applies330 or to facilitate the commission of such an offence (whether alone or with another 
person). Notably, a person may be guilty of an offence under section 2 of the CMA even when the 
facts demonstrate that the commission of the further offence is impossible. 
Section 3 punishes “Unauthorised acts with intent to impair,331 or with recklessness as to 
impairing, operation of computer, etc.,” sanctioning that a person is guilty of such an offence if s/he 
knowingly332 or recklessly333 does any unauthorized act in relation to a computer with the intention: 
a. to impair the operation of any computer;  
b. to prevent or hinder access to any program or data held in any computer;  
c. to impair the operation of any such program or the reliability of any such data;  
d. to enable any of the above to be done. 
Section 3 appears to use interesting language, especially after the Police and Justice Act 2006 
turned the offence of unauthorized modification into unauthorized impairment, thus shifting the 
focus from endpoint security (e.g. computers, ICS, SCADA systems, Programmable logic 
                                                   
329 Michael Highfield, ‘The Computer Misuse Act 1990: Understanding and Applying the Law’ (2000) 5 Information 
Security Technical Report, p. 53. 
330 Which are the offences “for which the sentence is fixed by law or for which a person who has attained the age 
of twenty-one years (eighteen in relation to England and Wales) and has no previous convictions may be 
sentenced to imprisonment for a term of five years (or, in England and Wales, might be so sentenced but for the 
restrictions imposed by section 33 of the M1 Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980)”: see CMA, section 2(4). 
331 E.g. through a DDoS attack. 
332 See CMA, section 3(2). 
333 See CMA, section 3(3). 
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controllers, etc.) to the whole network, whenever attacking any point of the latter has an 
unauthorized impairing effect towards the user’s computer. More questionable appears to be the 
choice of criminalizing reckless (even if unintentional) impairment, which could turn out to “muddy 
the interpretative waters and lead to some questionable attempts at prosecution.”334 
Section 3A, inserted by the Police and Justice Act of 2006 (c. 48) criminalizes making, 
adapting, supplying or offering to supply any article, if it is intended to be used to commit (or to 
assist in the commission of) an offence under sections 1 or 3 as sketched above.335 It is also an 
offence to do so while merely believing it likely for the article’s user to commit (or to assist in the 
commission of) an offence under sections 1 or 3.336 Moreover, a person is also guilty of an offence 
“if he obtains any article with a view to its being supplied for use to commit, or to assist in the 
commission of, an offence under section 1 or 3337”. 
The amendments to which the CMA has been subjected over the years testify to its nature: 
a piece of legislation drafted following a perceived regulatory gap, whose technological neutrality – 
arguably a positive trait when regulating technology, if properly engineered – has been repeatedly 
challenged. The pre-2006 version of section 3, for instance, had to have its wording changed338 
from “modification” to “impairment” by the Police and Justice Act 2006 in order to address 
technological issues such as the emergence of DDoS attacks.339 The CMA’s structure and history 
suggests that, while technological neutrality can be a positive trait in this kind of regulation, 
concretely applying it in practice can be tricky. Moreover, a restrictive interpretation of the wording 
of the act could rule out its applicability in instances where it would be natural to apply it (e.g. DDoS 
attacks pre-2006 amendments), while an extensive interpretation could end up criminalizing 
legitimate activities.  
4.3 Overarching European Legislation 
In addition to the country-specific legislation, one EU directive and one proposed directive are 
relevant with respect to protection of vital infrastructures: Council Directive 2013/40/EU (August 
2013) on attacks against information systems and Proposed Directive 2013/0027 on network and 
information security.  
                                                   
334 Neil MacEwan, ‘The Computer Misuse Act 1990: lessons from its past and predictions for its future’ (2008) 12 
Criminal Law Review 955. http://usir.salford.ac.uk/15815/7/MacEwan_Crim_LR.pdf, p. 5 in online version.  
335 See CMA, section 3A(1). 
336 See CMA, section 3A(2). 
337 See CMA, section 3A(3). 
338 “There have been three attempts to introduce amendment Bills to update the CMA 1990. These attempts were 
a response to public and industry concern around denial-of-service attacks, lobbying by the All-Party Parliamentary 
Internet Group (APIG) and the UK’s obligations as a signatory to the COE Convention on Cybercrime5. These Bills 
generally failed for lack of Parliamentary time, but legislative change was finally enforced via the Police and Justice 
Act 2006”: Stefan Fafinski, ‘The security ramifications of the Police and Justice Act 2006’ (2007) 2 Network Security, 
p. 9. 
339 See John Worthy and Martin Fanning, ‘Denial-of-Service: Plugging the legal loopholes?’ (2007) 23 Computer 
Law & Security Review 194. 
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4.3.1 Council Directive 2013/40/EU of 12 August 2013 on attacks against 
information systems 
Directive 2013/40/EU on attacks against information systems,340 which replaces the Council’s 
Framework Decision 2005/222/JHA, was drafted partially in consideration of potential cyber 
attacks targeting national CNIs. As the Directive notes, “There is evidence of a tendency towards 
increasingly dangerous and recurrent large-scale attacks conducted against information systems 
which can often be critical to Member States”.341 “The objectives of this Directive are to 
approximate the criminal law of the Member States in the area of attacks against information 
systems by establishing minimum rules concerning the definition of criminal offences and the 
relevant sanctions and to improve cooperation between competent authorities, including the 
police and other specialised law enforcement services of the Member States, as well as the 
competent specialised Union agencies and bodies, such as Eurojust, Europol and its European 
Cyber Crime Centre, and the European Network and Information Security Agency (ENISA).”342 
This directive inter alia ensures that all Member States have criminalized a number of general 
computer crimes, such as illegal access to information systems or illegal system interference.  
Furthermore, it “has become apparent from the need to increase the critical infrastructure 
protection capability in the Union that the measures against cyber attacks should be complemented 
by stringent criminal penalties reflecting the gravity of such attacks.”343 Hence, the Directive aims 
to establish a minimum set of rules defining criminal offences and sanctions in the area of attacks 
against information systems and facilitating their prevention, as well as to improve cooperation 
between the relevant authorities344. In particular, articles 3 through 8 of the Directive identify a 
number of offences (namely: Illegal access to information systems, illegal system interference, 
illegal data interference, illegal interception, making available tools designed or adapted primarily 
to commit the aforementioned offences and inciting, aiding and abetting the commission of one of 
those aforementioned offences) that are to be implemented by member states in order to ensure 
an adequate level of protection and security of information systems. 
Two other articles of the Directive are also relevant in addressing the possibility of a 
cyberattack targeting a CNI. Cooperation and information exchange between member states is 
fostered by the Directive’s Article 13, “Exchange of information”, according to which “Member 
States shall ensure that they have an operational national point of contact and that they make use 
of the existing network of operational points of contact available 24 hours a day and seven days a 
week. Member States shall also ensure that they have procedures in place so that for urgent 
requests for assistance, the competent authority can indicate, within eight hours of receipt, at least 
whether the request will be answered, and the form and estimated time of such an answer”. Article 
                                                   
340 Council Directive 2013/40/EU of 12 August 2013 on attacks against information systems and replacing Council 
Framework Decision 2005/222/JHA [2013] OJ L218/8. 
341 Directive 2013/40/EU, Recital 5. 
342 Recital 1 of the directive. 
343 Directive 2013/40/EU, Recital 4. 
344 Directive 2013/40/EU, Art. 1. 
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14, titled “Monitoring and statistics”, mandates that Member States must have a system for 
recording, producing and providing statistical data regarding the offences foreseen in the Directive.  
4.3.2 Proposed Directive 2013/0027 on network and information security345 
The main relevant provisions of the NIS Directive, which is not yet in force, are the following. 
‘Responsibilities in ensuring NIS lie to a great extent on public administrations and market 
operators. A culture of risk management, involving risk assessment and the implementation of 
security measures appropriate to the risks faced should be promoted and developed through 
appropriate regulatory requirements and voluntary industry practices.’346 ‘Member States shall 
ensure that public administrations and market operators take appropriate technical and 
organisational measures to manage the risks posed to the security of the networks and information 
systems which they control and use in their operations. Having regard to the state of the art, these 
measures shall guarantee a level of security appropriate to the risk presented. In particular, 
measures shall be taken to prevent and minimise the impact of incidents affecting their network 
and information system on the core services they provide and thus ensure the continuity of the 
services underpinned by those networks and information systems.’347 ‘To ensure convergent 
implementation of Article 14(1), Member States shall encourage the use of standards and/or 
specifications relevant to networks and information security.’348349 
The concept ‘network operator’ in this directive encompasses operators of critical 
infrastructures that are essential for the maintenance of vital economic and societal activities in 
the fields of energy, transport, banking, stock exchanges and health (art.3(8)). The proposed 
Directive creates a cooperation mechanism between Member States in order to ensure a 
coordinated and efficient handling of and response to risks and incidents affecting network and 
information systems. The directive requires all Member States to have a national "competent 
authority" on the security of network and information systems (art.6(1)). The competent authority 
receives notifications of incidents from public administrations and market operators and is granted 
implementation and enforcement powers, viz. to: investigate noncompliance by market operators 
and public administrations, to require them to provide information and to undergo a security audit, 
and to issue binding instructions (art. 6(4) & 15). Each Member State must set up a CERT 
responsible for handling incidents and risks according to a well-defined process (art.7(1)). 
 
                                                   
345 Proposal for a Council Directive 2013/0027 concerning measures to ensure a high common level of network 
and information security across the Union [2013] COM (2013) 48 final: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52013PC0048&from=EN  
346 Recital 22. 
347 Art. 14(1). 
348 Art. 16(1). 
349 A relevant standard: ISO/IEC TR 27019:2013 Information technology – security techniques – information 
security management guidelines based on ISO/IEC 27002 for process control systems specific to the energy 
utility industry, see Annex 1.  
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4.4 Conclusion  
This chapter examines the governance of cybersecurity with regard to vital infrastructures. It 
describes relevant actors and regulatory measures for the energy sector to gain better 
understanding of how vital infrastructures are protected in the selected countries. Although we only 
focus on this aspect of vital infrastructures, the quick scan revealed that part of the problem across 
the board lies in the broad definition of what constitutes a vital infrastructure. Canada, for instance, 
lists ten different infrastructures that fall in the category critical (or vital), and Germany has a 
similarly broad approach to defining critical infrastructures. The combination of numerous policy 
documents containing generally vague recommendations, with a large, and growing, number of 
actors that are somehow related to the governance of vital infrastructures, make the field hard to 
oversee – not only for research purposes, but also, critically, for governance purposes.   
This leads to a second problem that the countries share – they all struggle (to a greater or 
lesser degree) with how to coordinate across different types of actors and resolve tensions that 
arise with respect to sharing responsibility between public and private parties. This was especially 
evident in Canada, where investments in cybersecurity measures are borne by operators. The 
benefit that private investment in cybersecurity brings is to a large extent a social benefit; in other 
words, an externality for the operator. Whereas, in Estonia, coordination is achieved through the 
preventive measures that spearhead the regulation of CI and CII protection, in other countries this 
was more difficult to achieve. The case of Germany, especially, shows that there are still few 
obligations for actors regarding prevention, reporting and other action for critical infrastructure 
operators, yet attempts to impose stricter measures for responsible parties (including emphasizing 
the BSI’s central role in cybersecurity issues and expanding the Federal Criminal Police Office’s 
authority to investigate computer-related crime) met serious resistance from industry. CNI 
protection in the UK is a joint effort between the relevant national and corporate stakeholders; the 
public and the private sectors appear to be interdependent and work together in order to ensure 
the safety of the CNI. After liberalization of the Dutch energy market, new market players emerged, 
leading to an unbundling of functions, with oversight being distributed over multiple institutions. The 
Dutch network is also more intensely connected to foreign networks, which has led to a greater 
need for cross-border coordination.  
This chapter highlights not only the importance of consideration for economic factors, but also 
the need for coordination in the governance of cybersecurity: the choice of new measures to take 
touches upon the general interest and therefore legitimises certain government involvement in 
stipulating the responsibilities of private actors. In the cases discussed here, two types of 
institutionalization can be discerned: institutionalization in the energy domain and 
institutionalization in the cybersecurity domain. This seems to play more strongly in some areas 
(incidents) than others (repression), whereby there may not be enough awareness of cyber security 
threats. We also see in these cases how the notion of governance-as-process takes shape in 
practice; public and private actors search together for the proper constellation of measures, 
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especially as markets change and new actors join. The role of the state with regard to governance 
of many of these interactions takes on the form of providing a framework of rules within the 
boundaries of which private actors are allowed to act, with some (Estonia) being more strict than 
others (Germany). Public actors in the UK interact closely with the private sector, providing 
guidance, best practices and collaboration, rather than regulation. Generally speaking, in the 
prevention stage, more parties need to make calamity plans that are well-attuned to one another. 
In the incident stage, more complex information streams are needed, to inform both the field and 
government institutions (both internally and abroad). Cybersecurity-specific institutionalization may 
help raise major players’ awareness of potential security risks, but should be approached carefully, 
as they could also potentially create too much red tape. 
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5. Case 3: Protection of Identity Infrastructures 
5.1 Introduction 
In the offline world, we are familiar with the idea that identities are provided by the state. At birth 
our identity is established through registration at the municipal registry. The state acknowledges 
the newborn by registering its first name(s) in association with the surnames of the parents. The 
state also issues identifiers such as an identification or social security number, not only at birth, but 
also later in life. Individuals in many countries are obliged to carry state-provided identity documents 
to be able to identify and authenticate their identity claims. State issued identity documents are 
powerful because they are accepted throughout society, both in the public and private sector as 
proper identity tokens.  
 But these are not the only identification documents that we acquire over our lifetime. More 
and more, companies and institutions use their own internal identification methods. Examples of 
such non-state provided identifiers include: banking cards to withdraw money from ones account, 
key cards to enter corporate buildings, student cards to prove eligibility to complete exams and the 
combination of user account names + passwords for online transactions. In some cases these 
“internal identification methods” are linked to use in other contexts: for example, a student-card can 
be used to get a discount at the local bookstore and bank cards, credit cards, library passes, 
frequent flyer passes, loyalty cards, etc, represent partial identities in everyday life. The 
trustworthiness of these identities may vary significantly.  
 The identity management landscape revolves around the core processes in the IAA model: 
identification, authentication and authorisation. Identity management can be seen as access control 
to resources. In the identification process, a person requesting access to resources will present an 
identity claim: I am root. This claim may be true or false. In order to asses the validity of a claim, 
authentication will take place: is this really root? This can be done in different ways. There are four 
general methods for authenticating claims: 
1. What you know – e.g., the password or phrase;  
2. What you do -- e.g., how one signs one's name or speaks;  
3. What you are -- e.g., one's face or other biometric attributes such as fingerprints;  
4. What you have -- e.g., a token such as a key or a certificate such as a driver's license.  
The certainty the recipient requires to have regarding the validity of the claim determines what can 
be used to authenticate the claim. In everyday life, we often use auditory (voice) or visual (looks) 
recognition to authenticate the people we know. If more certainty is required, (state issued) identity 
documents may be necessary. The final step in obtaining access to resources is authorisation: is 
this person supposed to be able to access the resource. An individual X who is successfully 
authenticated as being X is not necessarily authorised to access a given area. In other words, 
authorisation ascertains which resources a person may use given that he has proven 
(authentication) to be who he claims to be (identification). It should be noted, however, that 
authorisation does not necessarily have to follow identification: in various contexts, it may be 
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sufficient to establish whether someone is authorised to something (e.g., buy alcohol, enter a 
building) without having to know the identity of the person. 
 
The identity management landscape consists of a number of parties:350 
 Claimant: The claimant (citizen or consumer) is the entity that wants to use a certain 
service or access certain resources. The claimant may need to identify and/or 
authenticate him/herself for this purpose.  
 Relying party: The relying party is the entity that relies on the claim that the “claimant” 
is who s/he claims to be. Relying parties may be public entities, such as local 
governments or large national public services, in which case they are also called 
Government Service Providers (or GovSP). Private entities can also be relying parties; 
these are also known as Commercial Service Providers (ComSP).  
 Identity provider: The identity provider is the entity that can provide a claimant an 
identifier. The identity provider is a Registration Authority responsible for verifying the 
(real world) identity of the subscriber typically through the presentation of paper 
credentials and by records in databases. The RA, in turn, vouches for the identity of the 
subscriber to a CSP. 
 Attribute provider: An attribute provider can provide the claimant or a relying party 
(certified) attributes of the claimant. Attribute providers can be public entities (GovAP) 
or commercial entities (ComAP). In the Dutch public sector the GBA (Municipal 
Registry) is an attribute provider. In the private sector, for instance, banks could be 
attribute providers for bank account numbers. 
 Certificate/Credentials service provider: A certificate service provider (CSP) can provide 
other parties in the architecture with certificates that can be used for authentication, 
such as server certificates to GovSPs and ComSPs, authentication certificates and 
signature certificates to claimants. CSPs may also provide validation services for 
certificates by means of OCSP (Online Certificate Status Protocol) services and 
Certificate Revocation Lists.  
 Authentication service provider: An ASP is a party that can authenticate a claimant as 
being who she says to be.   
The IAA model introduces the notion of a process in identity management. Identification, 
authentication and authorization are part of a broader set of processes relating to the issuing of 
identities and the subsequent use of these identities in daily life, governance of which must be 
coordinated across the aforementioned parties. 
                                                   
350  We follow the IDABC terminology here (IDABC, 2007, p. 16-18). 
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This chapter examines how the identity infrastructure for citizen-government relations is 
organized in the selected countries.  
1) Who and how - Which actors are responsible for taking which actions? What is the 
organisational and institutional arrangement? What is the remit of actors to act?  
2) What and why - What does the content of the regulation aim to achieve? What is the 
definition of identity infrastructures? 
3) Where - In which places is the challenge being addressed in practice, e.g. sectors, 
(self)-regulatory arrangements, illustrative cases? 
These aspects, taken together, address the following question: how is secure authentication of 
citizens in the context of e-government, in particular electronic service delivery, organized? The 
cases are discussed in the following order: Canada, Estonia, Germany, the Netherlands and the 
UK. 
 
5.2 Case Study Countries 
Each case begins with a short introduction, followed by an outline of relevant actors and overview 
of applicable legislation. As in Chapter 4, in examining the regulatory framework for each case, we 
distinguish between regulation of prevention, regulation of incident management and regulation of 
repression (although there is occasional overlap).  
5.2.1 Canada 
According to a study by McMaster University351 1.7 million Canadians were victims of identity theft 
in 2008.352 In 2014, detailed tax information about well-known Canadians was leaked from the 
Canada Revenue Agency to CBC News.353 As is mentioned in Chapter 4, the Royal Canadian 
Mounted Police published a document on cybercrime that describes Canada’s digital landscape 
and focuses on aspects of the cybercrime environment that affect Canada’s public organizations, 
businesses and citizens in real and harmful ways.354 It covers a broad range of cyber incidents. 
Cyber incidents concerning identity infrastructure are also specifically mentioned by the Digital 
Identification and Authentication Council of Canada (DIACC). These include the ‘Heartbleed 
vulnerability’, the breaches at Target and Home Depot and breaches at government organizations 
such as Canada Revenue Agency and the National Research Council of Canada. The Target and 
Home Depot breaches concern hackers stealing large collections of card numbers and other pieces 
of customer data from these large retailers.355 Aside from these two documents, policy documents 
relevant to the governance of identity infrastructures include the Cyber Security Strategy of 2010 
                                                   
351 Susan Sproule and Norm Archer, ‘Measuring Identity Theft in Canada: 2008 Consumer Survey’ (McMaster 
University Working Paper, 2008). Available at: http://merc.mcmaster.ca/measuring-identity-theft-canada-2008-
consumer-survey/  
352 National Cybersecurity Strategy 2010, p.4. 
353 See http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/canada-revenue-agency-privacy-breach-leaks-prominent-canadians-tax-
details-1.2849336  
354 http://www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca/pubs/cc-report-rapport-cc-eng.htm  
355 See http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/09/09/us-usa-home-depot-databreach-idUSKBN0H327E20140909  
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(NCS 2010)356 and ‘Action Plan 2010-2015 for Canada’s Cyber Security Strategy’ (APCS 2010)357 
mentioned in Chapter 4, as well as the ‘Policy on Government Security’ of 2009, administered by 
the Treasury Board Secretariat.358 
In Canada, the jurisdiction of identity is ‘a responsibility separated between the federal, 
provincial and territorial governments. Digital identity is defined by the Government of Canada as: 
‘an identity developed in the online environment that can be accessed, used, stored, transferred or 
processed by means of electronic of computer devices or systems’.359 The traditional approach 
with respect to identity has been to work independently within each jurisdiction.’360 There are 
currently at least six independent initiatives towards electronic identity instruments, including:  
 The Canadian e-passport: a traditional paper passport with an added secure chip.361 
 BC Services Card: ‘a provincially issued smart services card’362 introduced in 2013 to 
facilitate access to provincial government services for residents of British Columbia.  
 The Electronic Identity Verification (EIV) initiated by the Ministry of Justice of British 
Columbia363 is a tool used to verify the identity of an individual and ensure the accuracy of 
personal information contained in the criminal record check form. 
 SecureKey Sign-In Partner Login for Government of Canada: this program minimizes the 
need for users to remember multiple passwords by allowing them to sign in using a 
username and password from another reliable system (organizations that have partnered 
with SecureKey for this purpose). The service acts as an information filter to ensure that 
the government services do not know which sign-in partner is used and that no sign-in 
partner knows which government service is being accessed.364 SecureKey Concierge 
allows citizens to use their bank credentials as identification on government services 
websites.365 
 ONe-key: a unique electronic credential (double-blind solution) that allows citizens to 
communicate securely with online Government services.366 
                                                   
356 Available at: https://www.enisa.europa.eu/activities/Resilience-and-CIIP/national-cyber-security-strategies-
ncsss/canadaNCSS.pdf  
357 Available at: http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/rsrcs/pblctns/ctn-pln-cbr-scrt/ctn-pln-cbr-scrt-eng.pdf  
358 Additional documents and initiatives about the identity infrastructure include: Canada Health Infoway, 
‘Federated Identity Management in Health Care White Paper’ (2014); Joint Councils of Federal, Provincial and 
Territorial Deputy Ministers’ Table on Service Delivery Collaboration, ‘Pan Canadian Identity Validation Standard’ 
(2014).  It standardizes identity validation requests and responses between federal, provincial, territorial and 
municipal government organizations (evolution of the National Routing System). The Identity Management 
Steering Committee, ‘Trusting Identities: Pan-Canadian Approach to Enabling better Services for Canadians’ 
(2011). Joint Councils of Federal, Provincial and Territorial Governments/Identity Management Steering 
Committee, ‘Pan Canadian Assurance Model’ (2010). Inter-Jurisdictional Identity Management and Authentication 
Task Force, ‘Pan-Canadian Strategy for Identity Management and Authentication’ (2007). 
359 Industry Canada, ‘Digital Policy Branch’, available at: https://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/ecic-
ceac.nsf/eng/gv00585.html  
360 Digital Identification and Authentication Council of Canada, ‘Building Canada’s Digital Identity Future’ (May 
2015), p.5. 
361 http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/department/media/multimedia/video/e-passport/e-passport.asp  
362 http://www2.gov.bc.ca/gov/topic.page?id=87EEAD6D19974459950AA7FF7F60AD54  
363 http://www.pssg.gov.bc.ca/criminal-records-review/eiv/index.htm  
364 DIACC, p. 12. 
365 http://securekeyconcierge.com/ 
366 DIACC, p. 49. 
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 Ontario Go-Secure: enables secure access to government applications for internal 
employees, extranet users and agents of the government.367 
From the perspective that, ‘Digital identity requires a pan-Canadian approach that is interoperable 
with different systems be they federal, provincial, territorial or private sector,’368 a Joint Council of 
Federal, Provincial and Territorial Governments is now working on a ‘Pan-Canadian Identity Trust 
Framework’. The DIACC proposed the ‘Federated Authentication and Brokered Authorization 
Model’ (2014-2015) as an approach for Canada’s digital identification ecosystem369 that involves 
four main actors (the individual, the relying party, the authoritative party and the core digital 
identification and authentication platform service). The model is built on seven universal 
requirements of a digital ecosystem and four specifically Canadian requirements.   
Universal requirements: 
1. Robust, secure, scalable 
2. Privacy protecting/privacy enhancing 
3. Inclusive and transparent 
4. Meets broad stakeholder needs 
5. Data minimization 





1. Built on open, standards-based protocols 
2. Interoperable with international standards 
3. Cost effective and open to competitive market forces 
4. Able to be independently assessed, audited and subject to enforcement 
 
However, this Federated Authentication and Brokered Authorization Model is currently just a 
proposal; it does not reflect the current situation in Canada. 
Relevant Actors 
The following actors are relevant to the governance of identity infrastructures in Canada370: 
 Public Safety Canada provides central coordination to address risks within the Government 
and across Canada. Public Safety Canada also leads public awareness and outreach 
activities to inform Canadians of the potential risks they face and the actions they can take 
to protect themselves and their families in cyberspace. 
o Canadian Cyber Incident Response Centre monitors and provides mitigation advice 
on cyber threats and coordinates the national response to any cybersecurity 
incident. It falls under the responsibility of Public Safety Canada. 
                                                   
367 DIACC, p. 49. 
368 Digital Identification and Authentication Council of Canada, ‘Building Canada’s Digital Identity Future’ (May 
2015), p.5. 
369 DIACC, p. 14 and 19-24. 
370 Reference information for information on those actors already named in Chapter 4 is located in that chapter.  
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 Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada advises on the international dimension of 
cybersecurity and work to develop a cybersecurity foreign policy that will help strengthen 
coherence in the Government’s engagement abroad on cybersecurity. 
 Treasury Board Secretariat administers the Policy on Government Security, which sets out 
safeguards to assure the delivery of Government services to Canadians. 
 Communications Security Establishment Canada detects and discovers threats, provides 
foreign intelligence and cyber security services, and responds to cyber threats and attacks 
against Government networks and information technology systems. 
 Canadian Security Intelligence Service analyses and investigates domestic and 
international threats to the security of Canada. 
 The Royal Canadian Mounted Police investigates, as per the Royal Canadian Mounted 
Police Act, suspected domestic and international criminal acts against Canadian networks 
and the critical information infrastructure. 
 The Digital Identification and Authentication Council of Canada (DIACC), a non-profit 
coalition of public and private sector leaders formed in 2012, is identifying the best avenue 
to developing a robust, secure, scalable and privacy-enhancing digital identification and 
authentication ecosystem that would suit the needs of all stakeholders. DIACC collaborates 
actively with two pan-Canadian Councils, the Public Sector Service Delivery Council 
(PSSDC)371 and Public Sector Chief Information Officer Council (PSCIOC).372 Reporting to 
these two councils is the Identity Management Sub Committee (IMSC).373 
 Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada. The Privacy Commissioner of Canada is 
an Officer of Parliament who reports directly to the House of Commons and the Senate and 
is an advocate for the privacy rights of Canadians. 374  
 Provinces and territories provide a range of essential services for which delivery is 
dependent on the safe and secure operation of their cyber systems. For example, they hold 
sensitive personal information in their electronic databases, including health records, 
marriage and driver licenses, and provincial tax return information.375 
 Critical infrastructure owners and operators bear the primary responsibility for protecting 
their assets and services.  
 Individual Canadians have a responsibility to be alert to threats of identity theft or fraud. 
The RCMP provides information to the public.376 
                                                   
371 http://www.iccs-isac.org/en/councils/pssdc/  
372 http://www.iccs-isac.org/en/councils/pscioc/  
373 http://www.iccs-isac.org/councils/joint-councils/identity-management-sub-committee/?lang=en  
374 https://www.priv.gc.ca/au-ans/index_e.asp 
375 NCS 2010, p.11. 




In the ‘National Strategy for Critical Infrastructure,’ the national government and the provinces 
distinguish ten critical infrastructures. Identity management is not identified as a separate critical 
infrastructure but is caught in the broader category of ‘Information and Communication 
Technology’. New regulatory initiatives relevant for the security of e-identities address a mix of 
identity specific and broader issues. 
 
Regulation of Prevention 
Standard on Identity and Credential Assurance (2013)377 
This standard is administered by the Treasury Board Secretariat. The objective of the standard is 
to ‘ensure that identity risk is managed consistently and collaboratively within the Government of 
Canada and with other jurisdictions and industry sectors.’ The standard gives rules for determining 
the identity and credential assurance levels required for the application at hand, selecting suitable 
controls and ensuring that the minimum requirements for establishing the selected identity 
assurance level are met. It further contains rules about federating identity, monitoring compliance 
(within the own organization), addressing gaps in performance and reporting. The Treasury Board 
of Canada Secretariat has the task of government–wide monitoring and reporting. 
Further regulation 
Other guidelines include: ‘Guidelines for Identification and Authentication’ (2006) by the Office of 
the Privacy Commissioner,378 Industry Canada’s ‘Canada’s Principles for Electronic Authentication’ 
(2004),379 and the Treasury Board Secretariat’s ‘Directive on Identity Management’ (2009).380 
The Guidelines for Identification and Authentication are applicable in the relation between 
individuals and organizations. The guidelines state principle-like guidelines, such as ‘only 
authenticate when necessary’, and ‘level of authentication commensurate with the risk’. Other 
guidelines are more practical, such as : responding to changing threats, regularly monitor threats, 
employee training, responsibility of individuals, changing authentication information (such as 
passwords), individual choice in identification and authentication options, easy to remember, 
difficult to guess (passwords), authentication should not be based on personal identity facts, 
reliance on verifiable tokens, safeguards for integrity of authentication processes, audit logs and 
responsibility for outsourcing. 
Canada’s Principles for Electronic Authentication (CPEA) ‘were developed by the 
Authentication Principles Working Group, convened by Industry Canada and with broad 
representation from industry, professional associations, consumer groups and various levels of 
government.’381 ‘The CPEA identify the functions and responsibilities of participants in 
authentication processes and provide a framework to assess and manage the risks that accompany 
                                                   
377 http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/pol/doc-eng.aspx?id=26776 
378 https://www.priv.gc.ca/information/guide/auth_061013_e.asp  
379 https://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/ecic-ceac.nsf/eng/h_gv00240.html  
380 http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/pol/doc-eng.aspx?id=16577  
381 CPEA, p.3. 
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these responsibilities. The Principles also identify security, privacy, disclosure and complaint 
handling matters that need to be taken into account at each stage of the design, development, 
implementation and assessment of an authentication process.’382 
The Directive on Identity Management (DIM) is applicable to governmental departments. Its 
objective is ‘to ensure effective identity management practices by outlining requirements to support 
departments in the establishment, use and validation of identity.’383   
 
Regulation of Incident Management 
Privacy Act 
‘Federal institutions subject to the Privacy Act are required to notify the Office of the Privacy 
Commissioner of Canada (OPC) and the Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat of all material 
privacy breaches and of the mitigation measures being implemented, if the breach involves 
sensitive personal information and could reasonably be expected to cause serious injury to the 
individual.’384 Reports of data breaches involving personal data are an important source of 
information about cyber security incidents. 
 
Amendments to the Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act  
The government has introduced a bill in parliament that strengthens the obligations concerning 
notification with regard to security breaches. It concerns bill S-4, amending the Personal 
Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act (PIPEDA). S-4 adds three new sections to 
PIPEDA: 10.1, 10.2 and 10.3, dealing with ‘Breaches of Security Safeguards’. An organization that 
has experienced a breach of security safeguards involving personal information under its control 
will be required to provide notification in three circumstances: 
 to the Privacy Commissioner, ‘if it is reasonable in the circumstances to believe that the 
breach creates a real risk of significant harm to an individual’; 
 to the individuals whose personal information is involved, ‘if it is reasonable in the 
circumstances to believe that the breach creates a real risk of significant harm to the 
individual’; and 
 to other organizations or government institutions, ‘if the notifying organization believes that 
the other organization or the government institution may be able to reduce the risk of harm 
that could result from the data breach or mitigate that harm’. 
To section 2(1) PIPEDA a definition of a ‘breach of security safeguards’ is added. It defines it as 
‘the loss of, unauthorized access to or unauthorized disclosure of personal information resulting 
from a breach of an organization’s security safeguards that are referred to in clause 4.7 of Schedule 





                                                   
382 CPEA, p.4 
383 Art. 5.1 DIM. 
384 https://www.priv.gc.ca/resource/pb-avp/pb-pa_e.asp See also art. 6.1.2 Directive on Privacy Practices.  
385 See https://www.priv.gc.ca/parl/2014/parl_sub_140604_sen_e.asp  
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Regulation of Repression 
In 2009, the criminal code was adapted to account for identity theft and identity fraud. In section 
402.1 an elaborate definition of identity information is given: 
402.1 For the purposes of sections 402.2 and 403, “identity information” means any 
information — including biological or physiological information — of a type that is commonly 
used alone or in combination with other information to identify or purport to identify an 
individual, including a fingerprint, voice print, retina image, iris image, DNA profile, name, 
address, date of birth, written signature, electronic signature, digital signature, user name, 
credit card number, debit card number, financial institution account number, passport 
number, Social Insurance Number, health insurance number, driver’s licence number or 
password. 
 
Section 402.2 about trafficking in identity information criminalises behaviour that in itself is not 
damaging, but can be seen as a preparation for such behaviour. 
402.2 (1) Everyone commits an offence who knowingly obtains or possesses another 
person’s identity information in circumstances giving rise to a reasonable inference that the 
information is intended to be used to commit an indictable offence that includes fraud, 
deceit or falsehood as an element of the offence. 
(2) Everyone commits an offence who transmits, makes available, distributes, sells or offers 
for sale another person’s identity information, or has it in their possession for any of those 
purposes, knowing that or being reckless as to whether the information will be used to 
commit an indictable offence that includes fraud, deceit or falsehood as an element of the 
offence.386  
 
The offences criminalised in section 402(2) can be punished with imprisonment up to 5 years.  
 
The actual identity fraud is criminalised in section 403: 
 
403. (1) Everyone commits an offence who fraudulently personates another person, living 
or dead, 
(a) with intent to gain advantage for themselves or another person; 
(b) with intent to obtain any property or an interest in any property; 
(c) with intent to cause disadvantage to the person being personated or another person; or 
(d) with intent to avoid arrest or prosecution or to obstruct, pervert or defeat the course of 
justice. 
(2) For the purposes of subsection (1), personating a person includes pretending to be the 
person or using the person’s identity information — whether by itself or in combination with 
identity information pertaining to any person — as if it pertains to the person using it. 
 
Such criminalization of these acts shows that identity theft and misuse is taken seriously in Canada. 
 
                                                   
386 Art. 402.2(3) For the purposes of subsections (1) and (2), an indictable offence referred to in either of those 
subsections includes an offence under any of the following sections: (a) section 57 (forgery of or uttering forged 
passport); (b) section 58 (fraudulent use of certificate of citizenship); (c) section 130 (personating peace officer); 
(d) section 131 (perjury); (e) section 342 (theft, forgery, etc., of credit card); 
(f) section 362 (false pretence or false statement); (g) section 366 (forgery); (h) section 368 (use, trafficking or 




In Estonia, the concept of e-government was created already at the end of 1990s387 and is based 
on the secure data exchange layer X-Road388 and digital IDs issued by the state.389 During the 
validation interview for this research, the head of the Department of Information Society Services 
Development at the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Communications (MEAC) pointed out three 
key decisions that could be described as key enablers of the development of government e-
services (e.g. e-tax board, e-voting, e-medicine etc.), the success and widespread use of the digital-
ID and m-ID and the launch of an e-resident’s390 digital ID in Estonia:391  
1. Issuing personal identification codes to every citizen. As a result, every citizen has a unique 
number that can be processed by information systems. Such a code is not deemed as 
sensitive personal data by the Estonian Data Protection Inspectorate.392  
2. Promoting digital procedures as equal to physical procedures, as well as the state’s 
obligation to communicate and offer both online and offline services. This enabled a swift 
move to a ‘paperless’ bureaucracy (of course, not all paper is gone, but the idea that digital 
procedures and signatures are as real as paper is now deeply rooted in the minds of 
Estonians).  
3. Implementing the “ask data once only” principle which means that the state asks the data 
subjects’ (including businesses) data only once and shares it with different state and 
government institutions, instead of every institution repeatedly requesting the same data.  
These three decisions, together with the X-Road, enabled the creation of the current Estonian ID 
architecture. The different services and channels of communication (see Case Example in the Text 
Box) are discussed below. 
Relevant Actors 
In Estonia, the following actors are relevant to the governance of identity infrastructures:  
                                                   
387 In 1998, the Parliament of Estonia (Riigikogu) adopted a document named the “Founding Principles of the 
Estonian Information Policy” (Eesti infopoliitika põhialused) which set out the principles of operation of the public 
sector. 
388 The X-road is the backbone of the government’s e-services – it is a data exchange layer linking different 
databases and state’s information systems. The X-Road enables securely exchanging data as well as to ensure 
people’s access to the data maintained and processed in state databases. Public and private sector enterprises 
and institutions can connect their information system with the X-Road. This enables them to use X-Road services 
in their own electronic environment or offer their e-services via the X-Road. Joining the X-Road enables institutions 
to save resources, since the data exchange layer already exists. See ˂https://www.ria.ee/x-road/˃ accessed 31 
May 2015. 
389 R Annus ‘E-residentsus’ (2014) 10 Juridica, p. 740 ˂http://juridica.ee/get_doc.php?id=2160˃ accessed 3 June 
2015. 
390 As of 1 December 2014, Estonia has opened its e-services to foreigners who wish to conduct business in 
Estonia or otherwise have a link to Estonia. An ‘e-resident’ may apply for a digital identity card (digi-ID) that 
enables digitally signing documents and using public and private IT solutions that require the highest level of 
authentication. The digi-ID does not enable authentication in the offline world. 
391 Interview with Janek Rozov (Tallinn, 8 May 2015). 
392 Guidelines on the use personal identification code (in Estonian) by the Estonian Data Protection Inspectorate 
˂http://www.aki.ee/sites/www.aki.ee/files/elfinder/article_files/Isikukoodi%20kasutamise%20juhend_0.pdf˃ 
accessed 3 June 2015. However, some restrictions still apply, e.g. the name and the personal identification code 
should not be used together if possible. 
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 The state undertakes to assure the existence and functioning of a public key infrastructure 
(PKI)393 by: (1) providing and ensuring functioning base software for the ID-card; (2) setting 
out the rules that determine the quality and trust requirements of the PKI services; and (3) 
handling the issuance of the means for secure electronic authentication and signing. The 
first point is an obligation of a sub-unit of MEAC, the Information Systems Authority (ISA). 
The third falls under the authority of the Police and Border Guard (PBG).  
 Certification Centre (CC)394 is a private party that ensures the reliability and integrity of the 
electronic infrastructure of the ID-card (further discussed below). 
 ISA is a sub-unit of MEAC that is responsible for ensuring ID-card software functioning (as 
mentioned in point one under the state’s responsibility for PKI).  
 
 
                                                   
393 See ˂https://www.ria.ee/en/?id=27307˃ accessed 3 June 2015. 
394 Certification Centre is currently the only certification authority in Estonia providing certificates for authentication 
and digital signing to the ID-card, digital-ID and mobile-ID. See ˂https://sk.ee/en/about/˃ accessed 4 June 2015. 
Case Example: The Digital ID Card and Communication between Citizens and the State 
 
The compulsory ID-card is a key for communicating with the state for both citizens and 
companies. Every ID-card owner has a personal e-mail address, issued by the Republic of 
Estonia. This address is intended to be an official channel of communication between the 
state and the person. The state can use this address to send a given individual official notices 
and personal information related to the person or situation. Other persons can also send 
messages to this address. 
 
For citizens, the website www.eesti.ee is the starting point of using the government’s e-
services. Eesti.ee comprises more than 300 e-services and enables filing different (pre-filled) 
applications, making inquiries in different databases, voting in the local or parliamentary 
elections, entering the e-Tax Board, entering the e-Land Register and entering the patient’s 
electronic health record portal digilugu.ee. Entering eesti.ee requires the codes of the ID-card 
and relevant software. Eesti.ee is not a large database itself; rather, it consists of distributed 
information systems under different Ministries and institutions. Distributed architecture is 
what makes it safe. Of course, eesti.ee enables changing personal data as well, e.g. change 
of place of residence and contact details. 
 
For businesses, the ID-card enables entering the e-Business Register, where it is possible 
to establish a company online without the need to go to a notary public or any other 
government office. The e-Business Register also allows entrepreneurs to submit electronic 
applications, documents and annual reports to the Commercial Register. 
 
Because the ID-card is considered to be the safest manner of authentication, it is also used 
by banks to enable customers to make secure payments and log into their web platforms with 
the digital-ID or the mobile-ID. Some banks enable transferring larger amounts of money 
when signing in with a digital-ID or a mobile-ID, as the state ID infrastructures provide higher 
security standards. 
 
As a counter-measure, eesti.ee also enables a citizen to see which institutions (e.g. Police 
or a bank) have made queries of his/her data. Thereby, the citizen – as a data subject – is 
given some control over his or her data in the state’s information systems.  
 
The overall use of e-government services by individuals was 51% in 2014, whereas the use 





The main sources of law are the Identity Documents Act and the Digital Signatures Act. As indicated 
below, together, these underlie the ID-card that enables both offline and online identification. 
 
Regulation of Prevention 
The main sources of law in this regard are the Identity Documents Act (IDA) and the Digital 
Signatures Act (DSA). According to IDA, the ID-card is a compulsory identity document of any 
Estonian citizen or citizen of the European Union residing permanently in Estonia on the basis of a 
valid right of residence.395 Issued since 2002, the ID-card enables both online and offline citizen 
identification.396 The ID-card is also a travel document within the European Union.397 Together with 
the physical ID-card, the owner of the ID-card receives certificates that enable identifying the owner 
of the ID-card in the online environment.398 The ID-card has two certificates: one for identifying the 
person and one for the digital signatures.399 In addition to the ID-card, authentication is possible 
via mobile-ID. The function is the same – two sets of certificates that enable identification of a 
person and the grant of digital signatures.400 
 
The DSA provides that a digital signature has the same legal consequences as a hand-written 
signature.401 The DSA is also the basic document for CC, as it contains provisions regarding the 
provision of certification services and time stamp services.402 In order to prevent abuse of a lost or 
stolen ID-card, the DAS obliges the CC to accept applications for the suspension of certificates 
twenty-four hours a day.403 
 
Regulation of Incident Management 
The Statute of ISA stipulates that ISA is the responsible body for handling cyber-incidents in 
Estonian networks.404 Internally, the task is delegated to the sub-unit CERT.405 The RFC 2350 
Description of CERT-EE stipulates that CERT-EE will provide assistance or advice with respect to 
the following aspects of incident management406: 
 Incident triage: investigating whether an incident indeed occurred and determining the 
extent of the incident; 
                                                   
395 See section 19 of the Identity Documents Act. 
396 See section 191 of the Identity Documents Act. 
397 See <http://www.id.ee/?lang=en&id=34395> accessed 27 July 2015. 
398 When receiving the ID-card, the person receives an envelope which includes three codes: PIN1 (identification; 
4 digits), PIN2 (digital signature; 5 digits) and PUK (8 digits). The PIN codes can be changed in the ID-card utility 
program (downloadable software that enables identification, encryption and signing documents digitally). If a person 
loses or forgets the PIN codes, new codes may be obtained from a service point of Police and Border Guard Board 
(for free) or a bank branch (for a fee). 
399 See ˂http://www.id.ee/index.php?id=30228˃. According to the Digital Signatures Act, a “digital signature” is a 
data unit, created using a system of technical and organisational means, which is used by a signatory to indicate 
his or her link to a document. 
400 See section 191 of the Identity Documents Act. 
401 See section 3 of the Digital Signatures Act. 
402 Subsection 3(1) of the Digital Signatures Act. 
403 Subsection 22(4) of the Digital Signatures Act. 
404 Subsection 8(3) of the Statute of ISA. 
405 Subsection 13(1) of the Statute of ISA. 
406 See <https://www.ria.ee/rfc-2350/> accessed 2 August 2015. 
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 Incident coordination: determining and contacting the involved organizations, facilitating 
contact with other parties (incl. law enforcement) asking for and/or composing reports and, 
when necessary, communication with the media;  
 Incident resolution: advising the involved organizations on appropriate measures, following 
up the incident solution process and collecting evidence and interpreting data. 
 
Regulation of Repression 
The Penal Code has criminalised the following acts regarding ID-cards: falsification, obtaining, 
using or granting permission to use a falsified ID-card and fraudulent use of an ID-card (see, 
respectively, sections 347, 348 and 349 of the Penal Code). 
5.2.3 Germany 
Secure and user friendly identity management is one of the goals of the German ICT Strategy407 
and of the German e-Government initiative.408 In Germany, the identity management strategy is 
based on (a) the switch from a paper-based identity card to an electronic identity card enabling 
citizens to authenticate themselves in e-government communication; (b) citizens portals certified to 
providing secure Email and identity verification services and (c) SAFE – the technical framework 
enabling the safe usage of digital identities across administrative borders.409 
This section focuses on the deployment of electronic identity cards in Germany and the eID 
infrastructure put in place to enable the electronic authentication function of the ID cards. Public 
authentication schemes based on identity cards were in place long before internet; governments 
and businesses trust government issued cards for the purposes of reliable authentication of 
citizens.410 These conventional identification processes are generally not applicable on the Internet, 
even though online processes and transactions often require that one knows who her 
communication partners are.411 In Germany, the trust in government issued cards has been 
extended to electronic identity cards with regard to fulfilling the same purpose in electronic 
communications. The new identity card (neuer Personalausweis) was advertised as the ‘most 
important card,’412 when it came into effect on 1 November 2010. This electronic and multi-
functional card serves as a travel document and proof of identity both in personal contact and 
electronically. For the latter purpose, the card is equipped with additional functions: (1) the 
electronic ID (eID) containing an identity record that authorized services can access with the 
permission of the card holder; (2) the ePass function reserved for government use; and (3) the 
optional qualified electronic signature function. Individuals can utilize these functions to positively 
                                                   
407 Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Technologie (2010), ICT Strategy of the German Federal Government: 
Digital Germany 2015, Munich: BMWi, p. 18. 
408 See: http://www.bmi.bund.de/DE/Themen/IT-Netzpolitik/E-Government/E-Government-Initiative/e-government-
initiative_node.html 
409 OECD (2011), National Strategies and Policies for Digital Identity Management in OECD Countries, OECD 
Digital Economy Papers, No. 177, OECD Publishing, p. 48. 
410 A Poller, U Waldmann, S Vowé, and S Türpe, ‘Electronic Identity Cards for User Authentication – Promise and 
Practice’ (2012), p. 47. 
411 G Hornung and A Roßnagel, ‘An ID card for the Internet – The new German ID card with “electronic proof of 
identity”’ (2010), p. 153. 
412 Poller et al. 2012, p. 47. 
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identify themselves online and issue binding declarations of will electronically in eGovernment and 
eBusiness services.413 Function (1) eID is the focus of this section.   
The introduction of the new identity card and related infrastructure has been justified by a 
need for a trustworthy and efficient identity management. This need is to be realized by a 
combination of a sovereign identity document with eID functionality for eBusiness and 
eGovernment that aims to provide users with a secure identity in the electronic world and afford 
them better protection against many types of cybercrime, such as phishing and identity theft.414 
The German eID deployment should also be understood in relation to Germany’s participation in 
the EU Stork project, which aims to establish a European eID Interoperability Platform that allows 
citizens to establish new e-relations across borders, just by presenting their national eID.415 
Proponents of the card envision that it can replace username and password, and at the 
same time allows services previously requiring the presence of the citizen to be provided 
electronically.416 The specific design rationale is driven by a number of goals: 
 Easier online authentication with more control and responsibility given to the citizen; 
 Reliable authentication and high quality data records available to the service providers; 
 Data reduction and data economy through designing the eID system according to the need-
to-know principle;417 
 No centralized databases of personal information; 
 Privacy enhancement through the support of pseudonyms and on-card data verification; 
 Protection against threats through protocol design; 
 User control – entering a PIN is a requirement to grant access to any data or function.418 
Services that might especially benefit from supporting eID are government services requiring 
identification of citizens, services allowing citizens to access personal information, companies 
required to record identities of their customers and operators of age-restricted services.419 
Relevant Actors  
The responsibility for the implementation and operation of the eID system is shared between the 
government and the private sector. Local administrative bodies register citizens and issue ID cards, 
Federal administrative agencies issue authorizations to service providers and oversee equipment 
certifications420 and private parties participate as service providers, deliver specific technical 
elements of the eID infrastructure or as users. The following are the most relevant actors involved 
in the governance of information infrastructures protection:  
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 Federal Office for Information Security (BSI: Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der 
Informationstechnik) is a key player in the operation of the eID. It is affiliated to the Federal 
Ministry of Interior under the guidance of the IT Group.421 It issues the technical guidelines 
for certification of all components of the eID system and operates the Country Verifying 
Certificate Authority (CVCA). This authority generates the German root certificates on a 
regular basis and the BSI is the owner of these root certificates for authorization certificates 
for electronic identification.422 The BSI is also in charge of developing security protocols 
and measures423. The BSI falls under the Federal Ministry of Interior (see Chapter 4). 
 Federal Office of Administration (BVA: Bundesverwaltungsamt) approves service providers 
that have a legitimate interest in using eID data and comply with all regulations. It also 
provides ID card revocation lists to eID servers.424 
 Technical Certification authorities contract with service providers and issue cryptographic 
authorization certificates to them for the respective eID servers.425  
 The Federal Print Office (Bundesdruckerei GmbH) is assigned the role of the ID card 
manufacturer by the Federal Ministry of Interior.426 
 Local agencies issue ID cards produced by the Bundesdruckerei to citizens. These ID card 
public authorities, appointed by the German Länder authorities, in accordance with § 7 
para. 1 PAuswG, are responsible for matters related to identity cards427 and are obliged to 
explain the eID process to the card holders, deliver the letter with the original PIN428 and 
handle revocation requests by the card holders.429 
 Service providers are either public offices or online retailers that require proof of identity of 
the identity card holder in order to carry out tasks of the public administration or for own 
business purposes,.430 Insofar as they are using contractors they have to do this in 
accordance with the Data Protection Act (see below) and that these contractors meet the 
technical and organizational requirements of the BSI.431  
 Local data protection authorities are responsible for service providers in Germany.432 
 eID servers may be operated either by the service providers themselves or by a contracted 
eID service provider. These servers perform communication with the client software and 
handle communications for requesting certificates.433 
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 Client software providers provide the software needed for communication between the 
citizen’s ID card (reader) and eID server AusweisApp is free software available for 
download on the portal of the Federal Ministry of Interior, which funded its development434 
by OpenLimit SignCubes AG commissioned by Siemens IT Solutions and Services GmhB. 
Other alternative software clients may also become available on the market. 
 Individual users are also critical to the secure operation of the eID infrastructure. They 
indicate whether or not they want to use the eID function435, are informed of the measures 
necessary to ensure its safety436 and are required to ensure that electronic identification is 
used in a safe environment. They are also required to re-set the original PIN437 and indicate 
the loss of ID card to the ID card authority.438 
Regulatory Framework 
In the E-Government Act – E-Government-Gesetz – the eID and the online Ausweis function were 
established as one of the instruments for safe e-government at the federal, state and local levels. 
The legal framework for identity documentation in general and for electronic proof of identity 
specifically is provided in the German ID Card Act - Gesetz über Personalausweise und den 
elektronischen Identitätsnachweis (PAuswG 2010). The corresponding sub-statutory regulation 
Verordnung über Personalausweise und den elektronischen Identitätsnachweis (PAuswV 2010) 
defines the security and data protection requirements of the eID infrastructure. This framework is 
complemented by almost 20 technical guidelines and profiles of protection prescribed by the 
Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) published in binding form in the Federal Gazette. This 
set of legislation aims to provide comprehensive coverage and regulation of all aspects of the e-ID 
infrastructure. Other laws, such as the Federal Data Protection Act (Bundesdatenschutzgesetz) or 
the BSI-act, are only relevant insofar as there are still gaps in the PAuswG and related sub-statutory 
regulation. 
Similar to the other country descriptions, this text is structured according to three 
categories: regulation of prevention, regulation of incident management and regulation of 
repression. As will become apparent, the first category has been the dominant driving force of the 
German regulatory approach, where incident prevention is achieved through the technological 
design of the e-ID infrastructure. 
 
Regulation of Prevention 
The protection of data, data security and preservation of informational self-determination are listed 
as particular priorities of the electronic ID infrastructure.439 Using the eID function is voluntary for 
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the card holder440 in a double sense: they can decide to switch it on and off, and they can decide 
upon using it in concrete individual cases.441 User data is only exchanged between the service 
provider and the holder of the identity document. Biometrically-relevant data are never transmitted 
via the internet and only sovereign authorities are authorized to access such sensitive 
information.442 
Since the German constitution does not allow the creation of a unique identification 
number,443 individuals are identified by a combination of attributes. The authorized eID servers can 
access the following data on the ID card on the basis of selective disclosure: family name, given 
name, artistic or religious name, doctoral degree, date and place of birth, address and community 
ID, date of expiry and revocation feature.444 The eID function also supports a privacy- enhancing 
mode where, instead of the specific age or place of residence, the card only responds yes/no to a 
verification request.445 An additional data protection friendly feature is the service and card specific 
code (pseudonym) which allows for the possibility of non-linkable logins (in the absence of other 
identifiers).446 
Before being able to access personal data stored on the ID card chip, institutions are legally 
required to possess an appropriate authorization, which depends upon a review by the government 
authorities of which data the service provider absolutely requires for her purposes and whether she 
is trustworthy. The authorization is technically implemented using authorization certificates, whose 
status is queried at terminal authorization. The ID card releases data to a service provider only 
upon displaying an authorization certificate447 that proves the identity of the service provider and 
shows which data it is authorized to read.448 The holder of the card may also restrict access to 
specific eID data fields via the client software. Therefore, the citizens are also able to authenticate 
the service provider and check its data requests, forming double-sided, mutual authentication 
required by law in Germany.449 The release of the data to the service provider is also conditioned 
by the entering of a six-digit PIN by the ID card holder. 450 Entering the PIN incorrectly three times 
deactivates the function and reactivation requires the Entsperrnummer (PUK).451 
Technically, the use of the ID card online is enabled by software called ‘AusweisApp’ 
(‘another alternative software solution’) which serves as the interface between the ID, the card 
reader and the eID server of the service provider.452 All of these eID components require 
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certification from the BSI.453 The software is provided free of charge on the web portal of the 
German Federal Ministry of the Interior.454 Basic card readers leave all control over the user 
interaction to the software, while advanced readers have their own keypad for entering the PIN. 
The PAuswG requires that the transmission of data is subject to state of the art measures 
ensuring data protection and data security.455 A number of security protocols and measures were 
developed under the leadership of the BSI in order to achieve the security objectives of protection 
of personal data, proof of the authenticity of the identity document and proof against forgery.456 The 
protocols ensure that data are released only with card holders’ consent, to an authorized service, 
within the authorization limits and through channels protected against eavesdropping.457 
 Password Authenticated Connection Establishment (PACE) establishes a shared session 
key and verifies a password in the process. 458 The 6-digit PIN is used during online 
authentication.459 
 Extended Access Control (EAC) comprises an array of protocols that are always executed 
in a specific order. The EAC protocols include Chip Authentication (CA), the purpose of 
which is to confirm that the chip is a real one and to establish a secure communication 
between the chip and the reader or between the chip and the service provider during online 
authentication, and Terminal Authentication (TA), which ensures that sensitive data can 
only be read by authorized persons.460 
 The purpose of Passive Authentication (PA) is to validate the authenticity and integrity of 
the data on the chip and whether the data in the identity document were written on the RF 
chip by the officially authorized ID manufacturer.461 
 Restricted identification (RI) cryptographically creates identifiers that are specific to the card 
and to the service and cannot be linked.462 
The BSI also operates the Country Verifying Certificate Authority (CVCA). This authority generates 
the German root certificates on a regular basis; the private keys of these certificates are used to 
sign the document verifier certificate of the document verifier instances (DV instances).463  
Simplifying the use of eID function in web application is achieved by the eID servers, which 
provide a simple interface encapsulating the complexity of the eID function. The eID server 
establishes communication with the AusweisApp and handles the communication for requesting 
terminal authorization certificates, CSCA certificates and revocation lists. The eID server operates 
as a logically independent server which can be used by multiple web applications. The data 
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transferred between the eID server and the application server via a public network must be 
encrypted and signed for transfer.464 
 
Regulation of Incident Management  
The regulators seem to rely strongly on the technological solutions of the eID infrastructures to 
prevent security incidents, whereby the management of security incidents does not appear to be 
extensively regulated. The only potential vulnerability of the eID infrastructure that is specifically 
addressed in legislation is loss of ID card by the user; the PAuswG specifies the steps that need to 
be taken in such a case. The card holder must report loss of the ID card to the ID card authority,465 
who immediately informs the administrator of revocation lists. The administrator provides current 
revocation lists to all service providers in the system. The card holder can also contact the 
administrator of revocation lists directly. 
Other potential security incidents or vulnerabilities of the eID infrastructure were pointed out 
by activists before its launch in 2010. One criticism related to the basic card readers (without their 
own keyboard) that were distributed for free by the government, which made them vulnerable to 
malicious software such as keyloggers that could record the PIN entered by the user. The BSI 
deflected this criticism by pointing out that even if a criminal obtained the PIN, it would be useless 
without physically having the ID card.466 The critics further claimed that even without possession of 
the card, the criminal could abuse an obtained PIN if the user left the ID card in the proximity of a 
card reader for longer than necessary. This concern was recognized by the BSI, but it pointed out 
that the attacker could still not obtain personal data due to its encrypted form and – even with such 
vulnerability – the new system is still more secure against attacks than an alternative system based 
on a username and password.467 Nevertheless, the use of the more expensive advanced card 
reader with a keypad is recommended.468 However, other groups questioned and successfully 
challenged the security of these more advanced card readers, as well.469 Similar concerns about 
the vulnerability of the PIN codes were raised in 2013.470 
Another potential vulnerability stems from the decision of the designers of the German eID 
infrastructure. To protect users’ privacy, a batch of ID cards always shares the private chip 
authentication key which makes them indistinguishable at the protocol level. If an attacker obtained 
this key in some way, it would allow him/her to forge new identities and the eID servers could not 
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recognize spoofed cards. While this could be solved by revocation of the compromised key, this 
would simultaneously render many cards unusable in eID.471 
Soon after the adoption of the eID infrastructure in November 2010, the client software for 
e-ID (AusweisApp) was withdrawn due to vulnerability in the automated update function. A new 
version of the software was provided less than two month later.472 However, during this research, 
we did not encounter report of a specific security incident where a vulnerability was abused.473 
 
Regulation of Repression  
Due to the strong reliance on the security of the e-ID technological design and the perceived lack 
of security incidents, repression is not specifically dealt with in the e-ID legislation. We can assume 
that a number of provisions of the Criminal Code (StGB – Strafgesetzbuch) would apply to possible 
actions of perpetrators against the e-ID infrastructure and its users: unlawfully obtaining data for 
oneself that were intended for someone else and were especially protected against unauthorised 
access (§202a StGB), unlawful interception of data not intended for oneself by technical means 
from a non-public data processing facility or from the electromagnetic broadcast of a data 
processing facility (§202b StGB), computer fraud defined as damaging property of another by 
influencing the result of a data processing operation through incorrect configuration of a program, 
use of incorrect or incomplete data, unauthorised use of data or another unauthorised influence on 
the course of the processing with the intention of obtaining unlawful material benefit (§263a StGB), 
forgery (§267 StGB) and forgery of data intended to provide proof for the purposes of deception in 
legal commerce (§269 StGB), tampering with official identity documents (§273 StGB), acquisition 
of false official identity documents (§276 StGB) and misuse of identity documents defined as using, 
for the purpose of deception in legal commerce, an identity document issued to another (§281 
StGB). 
It is noted in literature that the possibility of the cardholder to validate the identity of an 
interaction partner given by the authorisation certificate makes the prosecution and law 
enforcement easier (or at least possible) if a legal dispute arises.474 
 
5.2.4 The Netherlands 
In the Netherlands, electronic identities are issued via a number of routes. Citizens can make use 
of DigiD, businesses can make use of eRecognition (eHerkenning) and for machine-to-machine 
communication and between government agencies there is PKI-government (Public Key 
Infrastructure-government). There are also numerous organisation-specific solutions. In the (near) 
future, the three identity infrastructures (DigiD, eRecognition and PKI-Government) will be brought 
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together in the so-called e-ID infrastructure.475 Because various aspects of the e-ID redesign have 
yet to be clarified and are under development, it is not further discussed here.  
For the purposes of this report, the identity focus is on the three services of DigiD: 1) DigiD, 
which is the default service; 2) DigiD Machtigen, which gives one citizen the authority to act on 
behalf of another citizen and 3) DigiD Balie, which allows a citizen to obtain a DigiD by going to a 
physical desk, rather than online (which is the ‘normal’ procedure). DigiD services are available 
with three levels of security that are based on which authentication measures are used, namely: 
DigiD security level Basic (username and password), DigiD security level Medium (username, 
password, and SMS authentication), and DigiD security level High (qualified electronic signature) 
(art. 1(9) CD). The customer (i.e. organization that uses DigiD to identify citizens) is responsible for 
determining the desired Security level for its Customer services (webservices) (art. 5(1) CD). 
DigiD is an interesting case to consider, despite pending changes, because there have 
been several recent security incidents related to DigiD that reveal important insights for 
cybersecurity governance. In 2011, large-scale fraud with applications for child-care, rent and 
health insurance allowances was revealed.476 It appeared that the tax authorities allowed these 
applications to be signed with any DigiD (and not just with the applicant’s DigiD) because many 
people find it hard to comply with the formalities of these applications and this enabled them to ask 
a friend or relative to complete the application on their behalf. Fraudsters used a random DigiD to 
apply in someone else’s name and to change the number of the bank account to which the 
advances would be paid. After many complaints about fraud, the tax authorities brought about 
changes and now they check that the DigiD used to sign an application belongs to the applicant. 
 A second case occurred in September 2014, when a software company reported to the 
administrator of DigiD that there was vulnerability in its Content Management System (CMS). An 
investigation showed that in 12 municipalities, the connection between CMS and DigiD was set up 
in such that there was a risk of abuse. According to the software company, the vulnerability was 
rectified within 24 hours after discovery with the development and application of a patch for the 
affected municipalities. The software company informed the municipalities involved; as far as is 
known the vulnerability was not exploited.477  
Then, in October 2014, two people were arrested by the FIOD for fraud with DigiDs through 
which they robbed about €50,000. They used the usernames and passwords of others to access 
and adjust bank accounts and telephone numbers on government websites in order to steal (among 
others) social security benefits (AOW). Approximately 5,000 DigiDs were used without 
authorization and for approximately 180 DigiDs, coupled data were altered. Four others were 
                                                   
475 More information on the eID infrastructure can be found on <http://www.eid-stelsel.nl/> accessed 13 May 
2015. 
476 T Verkade, ‘Massafraude met belastingtoeslagen via DigiD’ NRC (19 September 2011). 
<http://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2011/09/19/massafraude-met-belastingtoeslagen-via-digid/> accessed 13 May 2015. 
477 Kamerstukken II, 2014-2015, Handelingen Aanhangselnummer 515, Gepubliceerd op 11 november 2014, 
Vragen van de leden Oosenbrug en Fokke (beiden PvdA) aan de Minister van Binnenlandse Zaken en 
Koninkrijksrelaties over een lek in DigiD (ingezonden 30 oktober 2014). Antwoord van Minister Plassterk 
(Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties) (ontvangen 10 november 2014). 
 
 122 
arrested for possibly functioning as ‘money mules’, persons who provide bank accounts for 
depositing money that has been obtained through fraud. The money was never on the bank 
accounts for long as it was immediately withdrawn in cash. In many cases, the relevant government 
body could intervene in time or reverse operations. The citizens concerned were informed 
immediately and the 5,000 compromised DigiDs removed. The approximately 70 suspicious bank 
accounts emerged from the investigation have been blocked by the banks. The damage was kept 
relatively limited because the government services detected the fraud quickly.  
The Dutch government encourages citizens through various campaigns to act carefully with 
their DigiD account and never asks for personal information via e-mail of telephone. According to 
the government, every possible action is taken to secure the use of DigiD and prevent phishing. In 
the following section, we identify the relevant actors that contribute to this effort.  
Relevant Actors 
This section describes the actors directly involved with DigiD: 
 The Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations is responsible for the policy on the DigiD 
facilities: DigiD, DigiD Machtigen and DigiD Balie. The Ministry commissioned Logius to 
manage these facilities and plays the role of owner. Logius outsourced the production of 
the facilities to the market.  
 The Ministry of Economic Affairs also commissions tasks to Logius regarding the network 
of eRecognition. 478 
 Logius479 is the service for digital government and an agency of the Ministry of the Interior 
and Kingdom Relations.480 Logius develops services and standards for the entire Dutch 
government and is responsible for the administration, development and application of these 
services481 and standards. Logius is advised by the Programme Council (Programmaraad), 
which is an advisory body consisting of Logius customers. Logius supports the Dutch 
Minister of Interior and Kingdom Relations with the management and control of the PKI-
overheid system.482 Logius is not only the administrator of the DigiD system; it is also the 
actor who issues DigiDs to citizens/users. 
 Reliant organisations: Many government institutions and agencies use DigiD to identify 
citizens and carry out various services and tasks. Examples include the Dutch provinces 
and municipalities; the Dutch Tax Authority (Belastingdienst); the IB-Group; the Dutch 
unemployment service (Uitvoeringsinstituut Werknemersverzekeringen, UWV) and the 
Social Insurance Institute (Sociale Verzekeringsbank, SVB). Conform the terminology of 
the contracts governing DigiD, these organizations are called ‘customers’. Via DigiD, these 
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organizations can obtain an individual citizen’s (ingezetenen) Social Security Number 
(SSN), and with the SSN as a key, additional information from the Key Registry Persons 
(Basisregistratie personen, BRP).483 They can also obtain information on persons living in 
other countries who are related to the Dutch government (niet-ingezetenen). People can 
check which organizations use their personal data and for what reasons on 
www.wiekrijgtmijngegevens.nl.484  
 Suppliers: Logius is the administrator but does not build the technical infrastructure itself. 
This is outsourced to commercial companies. In this report, they are called the suppliers. 
 The State Audit Service (Auditdienst Rijk, ADR) is the government service involved in the 
oversight of Logius and the suppliers. 
 End-users: An end-user is defined as natural person who is registered in the Municipal 
Records System (Gemeentelijke Basisadministratie Personen, GBA), who has a social 
security number or another number issued by government and who has applied for a DigiD 
(art. 1.5 Terms and Conditions of Use DigiD). As citizens, they need to provide certain types 
of information to the government; some data are automatically generated or changed in the 
KRP, for example when you get married in the Netherlands. As end-users, they can also 
help increase safety by using DigiD carefully and following the advice of Logius. The 
running Alert Online campaign also has a strong focus on Internet safety, for example via 
the website www.veiligInternetten.nl485  
Regulatory Framework 
There is no strong basis for DigiD in legislation. Its regulation is mainly based on private law 
instruments, such as contracts or on rules governing the use and accessibility of data from the 
BRP, which is regulated by the Key Registry Persons Act (Wet Basisregistratie personen).486 
Similar to the approach taken in Chapter 4, we distinguish between regulation of prevention, 
regulation of incident management and regulation of repression (for the full explanation see Section 
4.1.3). 
 
Regulation of prevention 
Ministerial control of Logius and connected organisations 
The Ministry as owner monitors whether the parties connected to DigiD comply with the 
requirements outlined in the Connection Conditions DigiD Single Logon (Aansluitvoorwaarden 
DigiD Eenmalig inloggen). The Ministry’s role of supervisor on the DigiD facilities has not been fully 
developed. Therefore, in practice, administrator Logius also performs monitoring duties (see below 
under Connection Conditions).  
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The ministerial responsibility of the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations extends 
fully over Logius. Each year, ADR audits the technical implementation and management processes 
of the suppliers as well as the management processes of Logius concerning DigiD and DigiD 
Machtigen. The assessment is governed by the Logius framework for general administrative 
processes (Logius normenkader voor generieke beheerprocessen). The framework is based on 
the NOREA framework for IT administration processes.487 Information protection plans for DigiD 
facilities contain the analysis of the security risks and the specification of the protective measures. 
The risk analysis and defined measures are source materials for the judgment of the ADR and the 
assessment of Logius of the implementation of the security measures by the supplier. 
The Ministry can enforce compliance with the agreements and norms governing DigiD in 
the following ways: 1) allowing Logius to cut off a connected party; 2) at the request of Logius,  
addressing a connected party, for example, by way of a formal letter to the board and 3) dissolving 
Logius’ assignment to administrate DigiD facilities. 
 
Relationship between Logius and customers 
This relationship is governed by contractual conditions, such as the General Conditions of Logius, 
the Conditions DigiD and the Connecting Conditions DigiD Single Logon.   
  
Conditions DigiD (CD) 
The Conditions DigiD are applicable in the relationship between Logius and any organisation using 
DigiD to identify citizens (the ‘customer’) and hold in addition to the General Conditions Logius.488 
The General Conditions of Logius define a customer as ‘a public or private organization, or a board 
or a person that deems electronic communication with other governmental bodies and citizens 
and/or companies desirable for the execution of a public task, and that for that purpose can and 
may use one or more of Logius’ services (art. 1.2 GCL).  
Every connected organisation must undergo an annual ‘DigiD assessment’ by an 
independent registered EDP auditor (art. 5(5) CD). Organizations that connect for the first time to 
DigiD must complete the assessment successfully within two months after connection (art. 5(6) 
CD). The assessment is governed by the Norm ICT-beveiligingsassessments DigiD,489 the security 
norm established by the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations (art. 1(7) CD), which is 
based on the ICT-beveiligingsrichtlijnen voor webapplicaties (ICT Security guidelines for web 
applications) of the NCSC.490 Other relevant norms specifically for DigiD and DigiD Machtigen are 
the ‘Logius normenkader voor DigiD’ (Logius Framework for DigiD) and  ‘Programma van Eisen 
(ten dele) voor DigiD’ (Programme of Requirements (partly) for DigiD). For DigiD Balie, the ‘Logius 
                                                   
487 NOREA is the Dutch Order for EDP registered accountants, see <www.norea.nl> accessed on 13 May 2015. 
488 General Conditions Logius: 
<https://www.logius.nl/fileadmin/logius/ns/diensten/algemeen/20120401__Algemene_voorwaarden_Logius_versie
_1_0.pdf> accessed on 13 May 2015. 
489 https://www.logius.nl/fileadmin/logius/ns/diensten/digid/assessments/120221_norm_ict-
beveiligingsassessments_digid.pdf (accessed on 13 May 2015).  
490 Framework ICT protection assessments for the DigiD: <https://www.ncsc.nl/dienstverlening/expertise-
advies/kennisdeling/whitepapers/ict-beveiligingsrichtlijnen-voor-webapplicaties.html> accessed on 13 May 2015. 
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normenkader specifiek voor de uitgifteprocessen en de onderliggende infrastructuur bij de uitgifte 
balies’ is relevant (Logius Framework specifically for issuing processes and the underlying 
infrastructure of the issuing desks). 
The audit report is sent to Logius that assesses the report.491 If the report shows that an 
organization does not (completely) comply with the Norm ICT-beveiligingsassessments DigiD 
Logius can suspend its DigiD services without prior notice (art. 5(9) CC). Logius can enforce the 
compliance with the relevant norms and agreements by discussing the risks of non-compliance 
with the connected party, formally addressing the connected party cutting off the connected party 
in case of an immediate security risk due to vulnerable implementation, or referring to (or dissolving) 
the contract with suppliers of the infrastructure of DigiD. 
 
The Connection Conditions Single Logon (CCSL)492 
These conditions apply to the relationship between Logius and any organisation (customer) using 
DigiD to identify citizens by a single log-on. CCSL is an addition to the Connection Conditions for 
the Single-Logon-use of DigiD whereby the authentication of the users is reused, so that a user 
need not login anew during a session. In the so-called ‘Handreiking DigiD’, Logius prescribes the 
security means and measures that the customer has to take (art. 6(1) CCSL). A customer is 
responsible for the security of its own decentred technical infrastructure (art. 6(2) CCSL). If Logius 
adapts its security requirements, the customer is granted a reasonable term to realise the 
necessary technical changes. If the customer does not conform to Logius’ requirements, Logius 
can suspend or terminate the use of computer programs or services (art. 6(3) CCSL). Logius will 
take technical and organisational measures to protect personal data from loss or any kind of 
unlawful processing. These measures need to be appropriate, considering the state of technology 
and the associated costs, and focus on the prevention of unnecessary collection and processing of 
personal data (art. 7(1) CCSL). 
With regard to the Single Logon Function, customers are mutually dependent on the 
reliability and security of their systems and are obliged to Logius and the other customers to take 
technical and organizational measures that ensure that the identity of the user leaving the service 
corresponds to the identity provided by the Single Logon Function (art. 6(1) CD).  
 
Use Conditions493 
These conditions apply to the relationship between Logius and an end-user. The end-user is bound 
to a few security related obligations, such as confidentiality of the DigiD (art. 2.9 UC). Furthermore, 
the e-mail address and telephone number that the user issues to Logius must belong to an e-mail 
                                                   
491 The statement has to be handed in at Logius between the first of January and the first of May (art. 5(5) 
Conditions DigiD).  
492 Connection Conditions DigiD Single Logon (Aansluitvoorwaarden DigiD Eenmalig Inloggen): 
<https://www.logius.nl/fileadmin/logius/ns/diensten/DigiD/voorwaarden/101122_Aansluitvoorwaarden%20DigiD%
20Eenmalig%20inloggen%20v1.0.pdf> accessed on 13 May 2015. 
493 Conditions DigiD: <https://www.digid.nl/voorwaarden/#c348> accessed on 13 May 2015. For the service 
DigiDMachtigen additional terms and conditions apply: https://www.digid.nl/machtigen/gebruiksvoorwaarden/.  
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account and cell phone that is under the user’s control (art. 2.12 & 2.10 UC). If the user knows of 
abuse, loss, theft or any other mishap to the issued DigiD, he should immediately report this to the 
Helpdesk DigiD. Logius will do its best to block the DigiD as soon as possible (art. 6.4 UC). In case 
of (suspected) abuse or misuse of DigiD Logius may decide to exclude the user from further use of 
DigiD (art. 2.15 UC). 
Apart from binding users to contractual security-obligations, Logius also provides security 
related information to users. Logius gives for example tips on how to make a safe password, how 
to recognize, stop and notify abuse of DigiD, and how DigiD itself tries to ensure its safety.494 
 
Regulation of Incident Management 
Conditions DigiD 
A security incident is an event that is or can be a threat to the reliability, confidentiality or availability 
of DigiD (art. 2.3 CCSL & art. 1.4 General Conditions of Logius, GCL). Logius has the right to 
suspend the delivery of services temporarily and without announcement in case of a security 
incident (art. 5.4 GCL). 
 
Bill on Cyber Security Data Processing and Reporting of Incidents 
It is unclear whether Logius will fall under the Bill on Cyber Security Data Processing and Reporting 
of Incidents. In the CMS-incident described above, Logius informed the NCSC, the information 
security service of municipalities (IBD) and the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations about 
the vulnerability and the solution chosen. 
 
The Logius Calamity Plan 
This plan became public through a Freedom of Information Request. It contains detailed information 
about the escalation of incidents, communication in the event of an incident and performance 
indicators for the resolution of problems.495 Escalation basically relates to “when do you warn your 
boss”. There is a classification of incidents, whereby functionaries with increasingly more authority 
and powers need to be called upon as an incident becomes more serious. The calamity plan 
indicates what to do and when and stipulates the rules about communication. These rules build on 
three starting points: 1. accuracy of communication, 2. honesty and timeliness of communication 
and 3. internal communication before external communication. The performance indicators of the 
calamity plan indicate, for example, how fast an incident needs to be resolved. Naturally, incidents 
with a high priority need to resolved more quickly (e.g. within 8 hours) than lower priority incidents 




                                                   
494 See for example: <https://www.digid.nl/veiligheid/ accessed 13 May 2015.>   
495 Available at: 
<http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:smk9OjsaqmwJ:www.rijksoverheid.nl/bestanden/docu
menten-en-publicaties/wob-verzoeken/2011/11/16/wob-verzoek-over-het-calamiteitenplan-van-logius/te-
publiceren-stukken-wob-verzoek-inzake-calamiteitenplan-logius.pdf+&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=nl> accessed on 
13 May 2015. 
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Regulation of Repression 
As the introductory examples showed, DigiD incidents may come in various forms of unauthorised 
use or other systemic breakdown. The ‘normal’ criminalizations in the field of computer crime can 
be used to prosecute these offenses. The Computer Crime Act (1993) and the Computer Crime 
Act II (2006) have added relevant provisions to the Criminal Code. A Computer Crime Bill III is in 
preparation, which will inter alia criminalise receiving (heling) of data. The legislation implements 
the international obligations to criminalise computer offenses of the Convention on Cybercrime and 
Directive 2013/40/EU.  
The purpose of manipulations in electronic identity systems is often financial gain. 
Therefore, perpetrators may also be prosecuted for financial-economic crimes such as fraud (art. 
326 DCC) or forgery (art. 225 DCC). Many of the criminalizations in this field are sufficiently 
technology-neutral to allow their applications in electronic environments. The punishments that can 
be imposed on perpetrators are also relatively high.  It is questionable whether specific identity-
related offences such as forgery of an identity document (art. 231 DCC) or forgery of an identity 
card (art. 232 DCC) are applicable to DigiD. However, in 2014, a new provision was included in the 
Criminal Code that penalises the unlawful use of someone else’s identifying personal data with the 
purpose of hiding one’s identity or of hiding or abusing someone else’s identity, if this can result in 
any harm; this is punishable with up to five years’ imprisonment (art. 231b DCC).496 This can 
address most unlawful uses of other people’s DigiD; it does not, however, cover situations in which 
people use fake DigiDs.  
5.2.5 United Kingdom 
Digital identity is fundamental to the development of e-government initiatives. As stated jointly by 
CESG, the National Technical Authority on Information Assurance497, and Cabinet Office’s 
Government Digital Service, “within the UK there is no official or statutory attribute or set of 
attributes that are used to uniquely identify individuals across Government. Neither is there a single 
official or statutory issued document whose primary purpose is that of identifying an individual.”498 
Identification credentials seem to be a peculiarly sensitive matter in the UK: identity cards,499 for 
example, were abolished500 in 2011 by the Identity Documents Act 2010 (c. 40) and the personal 
data of every identity card holder were erased from the government’s national identity register. 
Citizens, however, arguably benefit from secure authentication, especially in relation to online 
government services. Conversely, e-IDs sensibly reduce the cost governments must undertake to 
provide their services, while, “benefits to users are a reduced risk of fraud, increased convenience 
and reassurance that they are interacting with a bona fide service.”501  
                                                   
496 Staatsblad 2014, 125.  
497 Formerly ‘Communications-Electronics Security Group’. 
498 CESG, Cabinet Office, ‘Good Practice Guide No. 45 – Identity Proofing and Verification of an Individual’ (Issue 
No 2.3, 2014), p. 3. 
499 Originally introduced by the Identity Cards Act 2006 (c 15), now repealed. 
500 See https://www.gov.uk/identitycards.  
501 Parliamentary Office of Science & Technology (POST), ‘Managing Online Identity’ (Postnote Number 434, 
2013), p. 4. 
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  Currently, a federated approach to identity is emerging: a public service provider engages 
in online transactions with a subject whose identity is verified and authenticated by a third party502, 
the Identity Provider. The subject can use the credentials provided by an Identity Provider with a 
multiplicity of service providers, and has the possibility to choose between different identity 
credentials if more than one Identity Provider verifies his identity. A federated identity system should 
ensure that the technologies used, the processes deployed, and the parties on which they rely are 
secure and trustworthy. This is achieved through a combination of technical and business elements 
and legal and contractual rules. 
Relevant Actors 
The following actors are relevant to the governance of identity infrastructures in the UK:  
 The Government Digital Service in the Cabinet Office runs a federated identity program 
called Identity Assurance Programme (IDAP), in the context of its Digital Transformation 
Programme,503 which aims at implementing the governmental “digital by default” policy. Its 
purpose is to develop a framework for ensuring that the electronic credentials representing 
a person accessing and signing in a number of governmental online services actually 
identify that person with some level of certainty, which will be referred to as Identity Proofing 
and Verification (IPV).  
 The Communications Electronics Security Group (CESG) is the Information Security arm 
of GCHQ (see Chapter 4). It is the National Technical Authority for Information Assurance 
within the UK. It states that it is “the definitive voice on the technical aspects of Information 
Security in Government.”504 CESG has a leading role in providing the relevant stakeholders 
with guidance, standards and best practices.  
 Service providers deliver various e-government services in the UK; in order to use them, 
citizens need to identify themselves through an identity provider.  
 Identity providers are organizations paid by the government to identify the citizens that use 
their services. Once an identity provider has positively identified a citizen, the latter can use 
the former for authentication when accessing a given service provider. The IDAP uses a 
technical intersection (hub) that allows identity providers to confirm the identity of the 
service user to the GOV.UK service provider without the government centrally storing an 
individual’s data, without unnecessary data being exchanged and without either party 
sharing users’ data stored in their servers.505 
 
                                                   
502 The very basis of identity management are the processes of identification (issuing an identity credential to an 
individual or an organisation that claims it) and authentication (verifying that the claimed identity does indeed 
belong to that person or organisation): see Thomas J Smedinghoff, ‘Solving the legal challenges of trustworthy 
online identity’ (2012) 28 Computer Law & Security Review 532. 
503 See https://www.gov.uk/transformation.  
504 https://www.cesg.gov.uk/AboutUs/Pages/aboutusindex.aspx.  
505 See Cabinet Office and Government Digital Service, ‘Identity assurance: delivering trusted transactions’ (2014) 





There seems to be no clear-cut legal basis for the Gov.UK identity verification framework in current 
legislation: its regulation is mainly based on private law instruments and good practice guides 
issued by the CESG.  
 
Regulation of Prevention 
PCAG Identity Assurance Principles 
The Privacy and Consumer Advisory Group (PCAG) was established as an independent working 
group in order to develop a framework for the IDAP to be built upon. The PCAG elaborated, after 
a public consultation process, a set of nine principles to be applied in the context of identity 
assurance. The principles currently stated in their third edition:506  
1. User Control: The IDAP services can be performed only with the consent and approval of 
the service user; no compulsion can be exercised to undermine the user’s free choice, so 
means of identification alternative to IPVs have to be provided.  
2. Transparency: The user has to be fully informed in advance and in a way that is clear and 
understandable to him. The way in which the data is processed and the authentication 
services provided must be transparent to him. Any significant change to the processing 
arrangements that have been previously described to a service user requires its prior 
consent. Moreover, all procedures, including the security ones507, should be made available 
unless their publication represents a risk to users security or privacy. 
3. Multiplicity: Service users are free to use any number of identifiers, to use any identity 
provider and any number of service providers they wish, and to change provider at will. If a 
user registers with more than a service provider, it is forbidden to those providers to 
exchange information between them. 
4. Data Minimisation: The amount of data to be used is the minimum necessary to achieve 
the user’s needs. Identity assurance itself should be used only where there is an 
established need. Once a user stops using the service, his data has to be erased. 
5. Data Quality: Users need to be able to update and modify their data; those operations, 
however, still require a level of information assurance to be provided by them in order to be 
performed. 
6. Service User Access and Portability: Users have to be able to access their data promptly 
and whenever necessary, and to port them from an identity provider to the other without 
being locked in by proprietary formats. 
7. Certification: Identity providers and service providers have to be certified in order to 
operate. 
8. Dispute Resolution: An independent third party needs to be tasked with solving possible 
disputes arising between service users and identity providers. 
                                                   
506 Privacy And Consumer Advisory Group (PCAG), ‘Identity Assurance Principles V3.1’ (2014). 
507 e.g. the encryption standard used by the identity provider. 
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9. Exceptional Circumstances: Any exception to the principles above needs to be sanctioned 
by law, transparent, accountable, and subject to scrutiny. 
 
The following sections briefly outline the specifications and requirements that identity 
providers and service providers must implement when dealing with individuals and organizations 
aiming to use public online services. 
 
Service provider requirements 
Providing online public services attracts significant risk: several categories of potential attackers 
would benefit from unauthorized access to the service or its users’ information. Online public 
services often deal with extremely sensitive and valuable information, and it is fundamental for the 
subjects running them to assess how to provide their services securely. As noted, “(w)hen 
considering the threats to a HMG Online Services, analysts should be aware that anyone or any 
organisation that has the capability and motivation to attack the service are highly likely to do so. 
Threats will seek to make use of lost, stolen, intercepted or hijacked identity information to gain 
unauthorised access to systems, information and services.”508 
The CESG and the Cabinet Office, in this regard, published a Good Practice Guide509 
aiming at setting the Requirements for Secure Delivery of Online Public Services (RSDOPS). 
Rather than listing particular protocols or security measures, the RSDOPS are “a response to the 
challenge of delivering online public services and sets out an approach to deriving, discussing, and 
agreeing security requirements for systems delivering public services electronically [...] The 
purpose of this document is to provide HMG departments and the wider public sector with a means 
to understand what is needed from a security perspective to support delivery of an online public 
service.”510 The Good Practice Guide focuses on end-to-end security, taking into account not only 
its technical aspects, but also the need to rely on secure business processes and stakeholder 
relations;511 it does not substitute pre-existing standards and practices, but aims to inform and 
complement it. 
The RSDOPS guide foresees the adoption of a six-step process to help service providers frame 
their security needs with a sufficient degree of clarity. The assessment’s steps are as follows: 
 Step 1: Identify & Describe the Security Challenge. The first step aims at identifying the security 
issues and concerns arising from the service’s provision, after a descriptive but thorough 
examination of the business case around the model. 
 Step 2: Identify Active Participants, i.e. the ones that will use, deliver, support, manage and 
regulate the service. 
                                                   
508 CESG, Cabinet Office, ‘Good Practice Guide No. 43 Requirements For A Secure Deliver Of Online Public 
Service’ (Issue No 1.1, 2012), p. 23. 
509 CESG, Cabinet Office, Ibid. 
510 Ibid., p. 5. 
511 Ibid., p. 6. 
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 Step 3: Identify Stakeholders Expectations and Engagement. Different stakeholders have 
different security concerns with regards to the same service. 
 Step 4: Identify Information Risks, through threat modeling and risk assessment. The good 
practice guide does not identify a specific methodology, even though some UK bodies are 
mandated to use the HMG Security Policy Framework (SPF) by policy or regulation. The risks 
assessed might be due to personnel, procedures, physical location or technical design, 
implementation and management. 
 Step 5: Match the Information Risks to a Profile. The good practice guide exemplifies a set of 
security components512 forming the RDOPS. A risk level has to be matched to each component, 
in order to form a granular risk profile. 
 Step 6: Develop and Validate the Security Case. The final step builds upon the previous ones, 
framing the decisions and the proposals resulting from the precedent steps. The security case 
could contain, according to the guide, the following elements, and everything else the subject 
drafting the case deems relevant: 
 Overview of the service or transaction; 
 Description of any security challenges identified; 
 Summary of stakeholders, their concerns and expectations; 
 Summary of risk assessment activities and key findings; 
 Security profile recommended and supporting rationale; 
 Analysis of consequences of failure of specific security components. 
 
Identity Proofing and Verification of an Individual 
Identity Providers authenticate an individual’s identification.  In the UK there is no common set of 
attributes to be used for identification purposes. The CESG and Home Office’s Good Practice 
Guide No. 45 on Identity Proofing and Verification of an Individual (GPG45), however, states the 
UK IPV verification requirements and allows interpretation in light of the relative international 
standards.513 
The GPG45 describes the process to be followed for identity proofing purposes. Initially, 
the individual must declare his/her name, date of birth and address, known as Claimed Identity. 
The applicant will be then required to prove that the Claimed Identity exists, providing an Identity 
Evidence Package, either electronically or physically, depending on the particular requirements. 
The evidence provided is then subject to a validation and verification process, that checks whether 
it is genuine and valid and relating to that particular individual. 
The Claimed Identity (rectius, its Activity History) will then be subject of background checks 
to determine whether there are signs of its existence in the real world. Moreover, the Claimed 
Identity will be crosschecked with specific databases to ensure that it is not a known fake or stolen 
                                                   
512 e.g. authentication, information access, network protection, etc. 
513 e.g. ￼GPG 45, RSDOPS, STORK 2.0, 29115:2011, ISO 29003, NIST 800-63. 
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identity (Counter-Fraud Checks). The identity provider has to ensure that all the steps of the 
process are adequately completed. At the end of the process (whose steps do not have to be 
followed in a specific order) the individual will have an Assured Identity to be used as an 
authenticating credential.  
The GPG45 foresees four different levels of identity proofing, which can be related to the 
levels foreseen by other Identity Proofing and Verification (IPV) standards. At Level 1 there is no 
specific requirement for the identity to be proven. The individual has provided an Identifier that can 
be used to confirm his identity and the Identifier has been checked to ensure that it is associated 
with the individual. A Level 2 Identity is a Claimed Identity with evidence that supports its existence 
and activity history. “The steps taken to determine that the identity relates to a real person and that 
the Applicant is owner of that identity might be offered in support of civil proceedings.”514 A Level 3 
Identity is a Level 2 identity that physically identifies the person to whom it refers. “The steps taken 
to determine that the identity relates to a real person and that the Applicant is owner of that identity 
might be offered in support of criminal proceedings.”515 For a Level 4 Identity, the individual is also 
required to provide additional evidence; moreover, additional and specific processes, including the 
use of Biometrics, are foreseen. 
As mentioned, the Claimed Identity provided by the applicants is subject to a verification 
process, whose checks are increasingly thorough according to the level of identification required. 
The Identity Evidence required in order to meet the requisites of the Identity Levels sketched above 
is evaluated according to the strength of its IPV elements.516 In accordance with the Identity Level 
classification, there are five IPV elements. In order to be ranked in a specific category, the Identity 
Evidence provided by the individual must meet all the properties517 required by the GPG45. The 
IPV elements enumerated by the GPG45 are: 
1. IPV Element A – Strength of Identity Evidence; 
2. IPV Element B – Outcome of the Validation of Identity Evidence; 
3. IPV Element C – Outcome of Identity Verification; 
4. IPV Element D – Outcome of Counter-Fraud Checks; 
5. IPV Element E – Activity History of the Claimed Identity. 
The IPV Operations Manual518 provides detailed requirements and guidance on individuals’ 




                                                   
514 CESG, Cabinet Office, Ibid., 2014, p. 9. 
515 Ibid. 
516 Ibid., pp. 10 ss. 
517 e.g. to achieve an IPV Element C – Outcome of Identity Verification score of 3 an individual’s Identity evidence 
would have to meet all the following properties: “(t)he Applicant’s ownership of the Claimed Identity has been 
confirmed by physical comparison using a photograph/image OR Biometric comparison of the Applicant to the 
strongest piece of Identity Evidence provided to support the Claimed Identity AND The Applicant’s ownership of 
the Claimed Identity has been confirmed by a Static OR Dynamic Knowledge Based Verification” – see Ibid., p. 
13. 
518 Cabinet Office and Government Digital Service, ‘IPV Operations Manual v2.3.1 (redacted)’ (2014). 
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Identity Proofing and Verification of an Organization 
Individuals are not the only subjects that may benefit from using online public services: 
organizations often have the same need with regard to identity proofing, often needing to prove 
that a particular individual (the Responsible Officer) is responsible and accountable for the 
organization. 
The CESG’s Good Practice Guide No. 46 – Organisation Identity519 (GPG46) provides a 
proofing process: after the verification of the identity of the individual applicant according to the 
process and standards foreseen in the GPG45, the (claiming) Responsible Officer shall provide an 
indication of the organisation he represents and the registered details of that organisation, if any. 
The checks that are to be performed in order to determine whether the individual applicant is the 
Responsible Officer for that particular organisation, if successful, determine also by inference that 
the applicant is a legal entity. 
The GPG on RSDOPS (GPG43), mentioned above, specifies a number of security controls 
to be enacted to safely deliver an online public service. The GPG46 clarifies that “(a)t Level 0 for 
personal and corporate registration there is no requirement for assurance in a claimed identity. For 
Level 1 personal and corporate registration there is no need to disclose the real world identity of 
the individual or the organisation but registration using an asserted identity may be required to 
access the service, so no proofing of an asserted identity is carried out. If there is no need to know 
an individual’s or an organisation’s identity then it is simply not asked for.” Hence, the requirements 
for Level 0 and Level 1 organisation identity proofing are not stated in GPG46. Level 2 and Level 3 
of identity proofing testimony that the individual has declared that they are a Responsible Officer 
for the Organisation and that “(t)he level of assurance concerning the Applicant’s identity and that 
they are a Responsible Officer for the Organisation, give sufficient confidence for it to be offered520”, 
respectively, in support of civil or criminal proceedings. 
There are three Organisation Proofing and Verification (OPV) Elements used to score 
from 0 to 4 an organisation’s identity assurance level: 
1. OPV Element A - Outcome of IPV of the Applicant’s Identity521: 
0. IPV of the applicant ex GPG45 unsuccessful. 
1. The applicant has a Level 1 identity ex GPG45. 
2. The applicant has a Level 2 identity ex GPG45. 
3. The applicant has a Level 3 identity ex GPG45. 
4. The applicant has a Level 4 identity ex GPG45. 
2. OPV Element B - Outcome of Verification of the Responsible Officer; 
0. Confirmation unsuccessful. 
1. No assurance of the applicant being a Responsible Officer was required. 
2. The applicant address is consistent with the organisation’s one. 
                                                   
519 CESG, Cabinet Office, ‘Good Practice Guide No. 46 – Organisation Identity’ (Issue No 1.0, 2013). 
520 Ibid., p. 7. 
521 Under the GPG45. 
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3. The Personal Details of the applicant match those of a registered Responsible Officer, or 
he has been confirmed by the organisation as their Responsible Officer. 
3. OPV Element C - Outcome of Counter-Fraud Checks. 
0. The organisation is known or suspected not to be a legal one. 
1. No counter-fraud check performed. 
2. No confirmed evidence that the organisation is not a legal one through a reliable and 
independent source.  
3. No confirmed evidence that the organisation is not a legal one through a reliable and 
independent source and through a specified governmental source. 




Both Identity Providers and Service Providers need to use authentication credentials in order to link 
an individual or an organisation to a particular identity. 
The Good Practice Guide No. 44 – Authentication and Credentials for use with HMG Online 
Services (GPG44)522 foresees three levels of authentication for online public services, each of 
which mandates the use of authentication credential of a different strength. A Level 1 authentication 
demonstrates that the person requesting authentication is in possession of the credential for a 
legitimate account. Level 2 “provides sufficient confidence that the Credential is being used by the 
legitimate account holder, or with the explicit consent of the legitimate account holder, and might 
be offered in support of civil proceedings.”523 The authenticating credential must be bound to its 
owner and provide protection against theft. Level 3 authentications provide sufficient assurance 
that the credential is being used by the legitimate account holder or with his explicit consent, and 
might be offered in support of criminal proceedings. The credential must be bound to its owner and 
protect the transaction from attacks. 
In order to qualify for a given Authentication Level, an authentication credential must reach 
the corresponding score in each of its elements. The Authentication Credential elements foreseen 
in the GPG44 are as follows: 
1. AC Element A: Credential Type; 
2. AC Element B: Quality of the Credential; 
3. AC Element C: Management of the Credential; 
4. AC Element D: Monitoring; 
5. AC Element E: Authentication Service Characteristics; 
6. AC Element F: Information Assurance Maturity of the Authentication Provider. 
                                                   
522 CESG, Cabinet Office, ‘Good Practice Guide No. 44 – Authentication and Credentials for use with HMG Online 
Services’ (Issue No 2.0, 2014). 
523 Ibid., p. 4. 
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The guide details the requirements each element must fulfil to have a certain score. In order to 
reach a certain Authentication Level a credential must have a score equal to the level desired in all 
of its elements. 
 
Transaction monitoring 
Transaction Monitoring (TxM) is a particular monitoring technique that helps identity and service 
providers counter and prevent the risk of an electronic attack targeted toward online public services. 
It “comprises a complementary set of business processes which monitor authenticated online 
transactions in real time for signs of abnormal behaviour and provides appropriate alerts 
accordingly.”524 TxM does not stand alone, but is part of a broader procedure of deterrence, 
detection and response. TxM reviews ICT systems for suspicious behaviour and patterns in 
transaction data and aims to detect fraud. It is different from protective monitoring, which oversees 
ICT systems “by monitoring internal network connections and functions and flagging an alert when 
users or applications attempt to perform actions they are not supposed to, without necessarily 
knowing exactly what is causing the problem.”525  
The Good Practice Guide No. 53 – Transaction Monitoring for HMG Online Service 
Providers (GPG53), which sets out the requirements for TxM performance – assumes that “a 
Department's TxM service will be provided by a combination of Industry, central HMG service and 
Departmental service, and will draw on the services of Identity Providers (IdP) and Attribute 
Providers (AtP) in the process.”526 In certain circumstances, the performance of TxM is compulsory. 
From a definitional perspective, TxM is a system that “compares all aspects of a transaction 
event against data and rule sets previously recorded as the normal profile for a particular user. 
Having already established what a normal transaction session should look like in terms of behaviour 
and various technical parameters, any element of the transaction event which falls outside the 
profile then triggers an alert which raises the risk score of the transaction.”527 A TxM system gathers 
data from many different levels, stages and parties of the transaction: such data could include, for 
instance, IP addresses, transactional content, timing, bank account details, identity and credential 
attributes, etc. 
A TxM system can be regarded as fully operational when it is able to achieve the following 
tasks: 
1. Capture of all transaction data; 
2. Detection of abnormal behaviour; 
3. Data storage and records management. 
Overall, the “deterrence, detection and response” procedure in which TxM is integrated needs to 
allow public service providers or whoever executes it to perform the following activities: 
                                                   
524 CESG, Cabinet Office, ‘Good Practice Guide No. 53 – Transaction Monitoring for HMG Online Service 
Providers’ (Issue No 1.0, 2013). 
525 Ibid., p. 7. 
526 Ibid., p. 1. 
527 Ibid., p. 6. 
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1. Transaction Event Monitoring;  
2. Behavioral Monitoring; 
3. Fraud and Error Monitoring; 
4. Intelligence Feed; 
5. Root Cause Analysis. 
It is evident, on one hand, the degree of technical demand that the TxM would require, and on the 
other its potential to be strongly privacy–intrusive; hence, both a technical assessment and a 
privacy impact assessment are strongly suggested before its implementation. 
 
Regulation of Incident Management 
The basis of the Gov.UK Verify programme appears to be constituted mostly by private law 
instruments and good practice guides issued by public bodies; hence, in order to review how 
incidents are managed in the program’s context, it is necessary to examine which incident 
management system each actor (e.g. IDPs, relying parties, etc.) composing the Gov.UK Verify 
program has in place in its own undertaking, which would exceed the scope of this report. 
Adherence to well-established international incident management standards, in particular to the 
ones addressing information security incidents528 is arguably to be expected, given that an 
intentional breach of the confidentiality or of the integrity of the systems connected to the Gov.UK 
Verify could lead to distribution of users’ relevant identifiers, which in turn could be instrumental in 
the commission of identity-related crimes.  
While there seems to be no particular regulation aiming at the management of the incidents 
deriving from an attack targeted towards one of the components of the Gov.UK Verify program, the 
UK has developed a series of initiatives529 that allow individuals to report identity crimes through a 
single dedicated contact point and provide information on the subject. Public and private initiatives 
aiming at providing information and raising awareness, such as informative websites, can play a 
crucial role in ensuring that consumers and businesses are informed on how to adequately address 
the event of an identity-related crime taking place, and on where and how to report it. 
 
Regulation of Repression 
Besides what is implied by the categorization of the Gov.UK Verify system as a critical 
infrastructure,530 the UK’s criminal legislation addresses the aftereffects of identity crimes.531532  
Identity Crimes Legislation 
                                                   
528 e.g. ISO/IEC 27035:2011. 
529 Both of a public and of a private nature; e.g. ActionFraud (http://www.actionfraud.police.uk/), a portal through 
which any incident relating to fraud – identity crimes included – can be reported and that acts as a single point of 
contact in order to facilitate a follow-up. Another example is the activity carried on by Cifas 
(https://www.cifas.org.uk/), a non-profit organisation composed by a number of large companies that is dedicated 
to the prevention of fraud, identity and financial crimes. 
530 See also Chapter 4, on the protection of electricity-related CNIs in the UK. 
531 e.g. identity theft, identity fraud, and all the crimes committed as instrumental to other crimes revolving around 
an individual’s identity or identification. There are several definitions that can be applied to “identity crime” and its 
related terms. 
532 See Neil Robinson et al, ‘Comparative Study on Legislative and Non Legislative Measures to Combat Identity 
Theft and Identity Related Crime: Final Report’ (RAND Europe 2011), p. 568. 
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There is no targeted legislation in the UK that explicitly criminalizes ID theft, ID fraud and other 
related crimes as specific offences, and therefore they are dealt with through the use of more 
general repressive provisions like the ones highlighted below. However, as mentioned, most cases 
of identity-related offences, such as operating a false identity on-line, unlawfully using another 
person’s identity, deploying malware, phishing, and trafficking in personal data acquired illicitly, are 
effectively criminalized by the UK’s legislation. 
Section 2 of the Fraud Act,533 ‘Fraud by false representation,’ criminalizes the activities of 
persons making a false representation, intending to make a gain for himself or another, or to cause 
loss to another or to expose another to a risk of loss. Any representation as to fact or law, be it 
express or implied) is deemed as false representation if it is untrue or misleading, and the person 
making it knows that it is so. Section 6 of the Fraud Act states that a person commits an offence if 
he has in his possession or under his control any article for use in the course of or in connection 
with any fraud – a provision that could be used to sanction the possession of software instrumental 
to the commission of an identity crime that exploits the Gov.UK Verify program. The following 
section, “Making or supplying articles for use in frauds”, classifies as an offence the making, 
adaptation, supply or offer of any article while either knowing that it is designed or adapted for use 
in the course of or in connection with fraud, or intending it to be used to commit (or assist in the 
commission of) fraud. “Article”, as section 8 specifies, includes any program or data held in 
electronic form. As identity crimes are often of an instrumental nature, section 11 sanctions 
obtaining services for oneself or another by a dishonest act, if those services are made available 
on the basis of a payment that has been, is being or will be made, and he obtains them without any 
payment having been made or without payment having been made in full, while knowing that they 
are or might be being made available on the basis of such a payment (or promise thereof), but he 
or she intends for that payment not to be made, or not be made in full. 
Moreover, as has been noted,534 the national legislation transposing the European data 
protection framework into national law, the UK Data Protection Act,535 “could act in this respect as 
a convenient catch-all safety net for incidents with an otherwise unclear legal status”.536 Section 55 
of the aforementioned act, ‘Unlawful obtaining etc. of personal data,’ criminalizes the conduct of 
whoever obtains or discloses personal data or the information contained in personal data, or 
procures their disclosure to another person.  
 
Computer Misuse Act 
The UK Computer Misuse Act 1990537 (CMA) is specifically aimed at tackling the offences derived 
from the misuse of computers and networks; the CMA (as amended by the Police and Justice Act 
2006) frames as punishable offences the unauthorised access to a system, the same access with 
                                                   
533 Fraud Act 2006 (c. 35). 
534 See Robinson 2011, Ibid., p. XIII. 
535 Data Protection Act 1998 (c. 29). 
536 Robinson 2011, Ibid., p. XIII. 
537 Computer Misuse Act 1990 (c. 18). 
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the specific intent to commit or facilitate commission of further offences (e.g. identity theft) and the 
acts that intentionally, or unintentionally but recklessly, impair the operation of computer systems 
or networks. For a discussion on the CMA offences, we refer to the discussion of offences against 
the electricity provisioning CNI. Aside from its function in the repression of cyber attacks targeting 
the eID program as a critical infrastructure, the CMA also “provides for the manner in which identity 
crimes take place.”538 
 5.3 Conclusion  
This chapter examines how the identity infrastructure for citizen-government relations is organized 
in the selected countries. As in the previous chapters, the distributed responsibility and mutual 
dependency between actors is evident as they attempt to ensure the protection of individual privacy 
and citizen-specific data. There are four primary issues relevant to governance of these 
infrastructures: architecture and interoperability, use and citizen engagement, combating fraud and 
the role of legislative measures. 
System architectures differ, with countries such as the UK opting toward more centralization 
(‘hub’) and other countries explicitly choosing for no centralized database. The latter is the case in 
Germany, but is perhaps most evident in Canada, where the distributed responsibility for identity 
among federal, provincial and territorial governments has led to a diversity of e-identity 
infrastructure initiatives that now need to be made interoperable. (A Joint Council of Federal, 
Provincial and Territorial Governments is working on a ‘Pan-Canadian Identity Trust Framework’.)  
Trust in systems is important not only between the actors working to protect the 
infrastructures, but also from the end-users, i.e. the citizens. From a privacy and data protection 
perspective, the German eID infrastructure seems to be exemplary for taking the right approach to 
infrastructure protection. The role of the need-to-know principle in preventing the misuse of 
personal data and gaining transparency, the possibility to limit data transfers within the scope of 
the European Data Protection Directive and the possibility to validate the identity of the interaction 
partner have been especially highlighted.539 However, despite the positive evaluation, the eID 
infrastructure has not been used as widely as initially expected. As of 2014, only about one third of 
all the ID cards had the function activated.540 This is generally attributed to poor marketing, lack of 
perceived value and the low number of service providers that can access the card,541 but could 
also be attributed to the relative novelty of the system, whereby some use issues could eventually 
be resolved over time. In the move toward such systems, the Estonian case example in this chapter, 
which outlines how the state actively engages and informs its citizens, demonstrates the 
importance of transparent communication strategies when implementing such infrastructures. 
                                                   
538 David S Wall., ‘Future Identities: Changing identities in the UK – the next 10 years’ (DR 19: Identity Related 
Crime in the UK, Durham University, 2013), p. 18. 
539 Hornung and Roßnagel 2010, p. 155. 
540 C Hoffmann, ‘Warum die eID-Funktion des neuen Personalausweis (noch) keinen Erfolg hat‘ (2014) 
Government2020.de blog, available at: http://www.government2020.de/blog/?p=1420.  
541 Rosner 2014, p. 184. 
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Once use is secured, not only protecting individual data by identifying weaknesses in the 
system, but also combating fraudulent use becomes an important aspect of governance. This was 
especially relevant in the Dutch case, where much discretion is left to individual actors. In this case, 
customers are free to decide how to use DigiD in their application domain, e.g. they choose the 
security level, whereby security may be balanced against other interests such as ease of use, which 
was apparent in the tax fraud case. Recent research542 claims that the Gov.UK Verify program 
“suffer from serious privacy and security shortcomings, fail to comply with privacy-preserving 
guidelines they are meant to follow, and may actually degrade user privacy.”543 The main area of 
concern regards the hub that links users’ interactions across services, is able to see citizens’ 
personal data and, if compromised, would allow a malicious insider to impersonate a user. As a 
consequence, and considering its forensic capabilities, the hub has the potential to be used for 
mass surveillance purposes.544 Despite the principles set by the PCAG, the CESG guidelines and 
best practices, and the decentralized architecture of the Gov.UK Verify system, the UK’s eID 
framework still raises certain privacy and security concerns. Such problems were not encountered 
during the quick scans of the other studies (even when asked about during the validation 
interviews), but Germany, for example, continues tests to find these types of systemic 
vulnerabilities.  
The interest of security, the interdependence among actors and the discretion attributed to 
some actors require a security-oriented mentality among the actors. Such mentality cannot or 
hardly be enforced legally. Other instruments, such as information provision and EDP audits, 
therefore play an important role. Nonetheless, the high degree of mutual dependence between the 
different actors, in both the vertical chain (Government actor + Private parties/service providers + 
Customer + End User) and the horizontal chain (customers + other customers), provides strong 
legitimization for regulation. Omissions by one party often have implications for other parties, which 
means that there should not only be a clear distribution of responsibilities but also specific 
mechanisms in place to ensure that these responsibilities are taken seriously. Although the 
operational security of most of the systems discussed here must still be shaped, there are other 
initiatives reinforcing cybersecurity in this domain, such as the comprehensive criminalisation of 
identity theft in Canada and broader initiatives that have particular relevance for cybersecurity in 
relation to identity. In the Netherlands, actors currently rely on a web of contracts; in case of 
disputes, actors like the Ministry and Logius rely on civil remedies, which may be slower in 
application than public instruments. Also the Estonian case shows the important role of key 
legislative decisions in paving the way for actors to create a securely functioning identity 
infrastructure for both online and offline transactions. Specifically, giving online exchanges equal 
status and protection is a key element of that case.  
                                                   
542 Luís T.A.N Brandão, Nicolas Christin, and George Danezis, ‘Toward Mending Two Nation-Scale Brokered 





The identity infrastructures reviewed in this quick scan are quite new, with most still being 
developed. They exemplify both the trial-and-error nature of experimentalist governance and the 
social transition identified in Chapter 2 under the section on risk governance. There is indeed an 
expanding arena of actors, shifts between public/private relations and tensions between processes 
of centralization and decentralization. Rather than restricting the capacity of traditional authority as 
is stated in these governance theories, however, these developments (and the concretization of 
approaches in specific technological architectures) highlight areas where traditional governance 
strategies such as regulation fall short, e.g. in creating a security-oriented mentality, but at the same 
time also legitimize the need for more clarity of roles which can be offered through regulatory 




6. Discussion and Conclusion 
 
This report provides a quick scan of the landscape of cybersecurity governance in five countries. 
In order to make a feasible overview, we selected three diverse cases: botnet mitigation, vital 
infrastructure protection, and identity infrastructure in government-citizen relationships. These 
cases were selected because they are diverse (which provides for a richer analysis than only 
examining cases that lie close to the core of cybersecurity), cover the main aspects of cybersecurity 
(confidentiality, availability and integrity), cover different domains in which government classically 
plays an important role (law enforcement, national security, and service delivery) and involve 
different levels of private-actor involvement. The cases thus shed light on the multifaceted nature 
of cybersecurity and reveal various shifts in forms of governance. In this chapter, we first briefly 
summarize the key findings in answer to the research questions and then revisit the primary 
concepts discussed in Chapter 2. In revisiting the primary concepts, we introduce two critical views 
presented in the literature, in order to further nuance the view of cybersecurity governance in policy 
and practice. We then outline six lessons learned/points for further consideration.  
6.1 What is cybersecurity?  
Cybersecurity denotes the process and result of making cyberspace secure, where cyberspace 
refers to the space constituted by information, ICT, networks, and (ICT-based) infrastructures. 
Although cyberspace is based on technological components, it is not identical to physical space, 
i.e., the technological layer itself; it also includes the abstract space of digital, interconnected 
human and organisational activities. The security of this space consists of being free from threats 
to the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of the computers, networks, and information that 
together make up this space. Cyberspace itself, and the human and organisational activities using 
this space ideally should not suffer from malfunctions in the infrastructure or any of its components, 
or from attacks on the infrastructure, its components, or the information processed using the 
infrastructure or its components. In short, cybersecurity can be defined as the proactive and 
reactive processes working toward the ideal of being free from threats to the confidentiality, 
integrity, or availability of the computers, networks, and information that form part of, and together 
constitute, cyberspace—the conceptual space that affords digitised and networked human and 
organisational activities. 
 Given the increasing multitude of players interacting in the cybersecurity landscape, there 
is a need to cooperate and coordinate in order to prevent threats to this infrastructure and its 
component parts, as well as a need to deal with incidents when they occur. Cybersecurity 
governance can thus be defined as the approaches used by multiple stakeholders to identify, frame 
and coordinate proactive and reactive responses to potential threats to the confidentiality, integrity, 
or availability of the computers, networks, and information that together constitute cyberspace (the 
conceptual space that affords digitised and networked human and organisational activities). This 
includes not only short-term and concrete approaches to address known threats, but particularly 
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also the development and implementation of structures and processes to reduce uncertainty and 
to enable to respond to threats from unanticipated events over the longer term. 
6.2 How are the responsibilities for cybersecurity distributed 
among relevant actors?  
The three case studies, taken together, show a progression in understanding of what constitutes 
cybersecurity and how to ensure that the relevant structures are in place. In all countries a number 
of policy documents and strategic action plans have been produced by various federal agencies, 
police authorities and/or key interest groups, highlighting increased attention for the need to protect 
information infrastructures at various levels. An examination of UK and German policy documents, 
for example, shows the increasing specificity of the language used to refer to what constitutes a 
given infrastructure, the nature of possible threats to that infrastructure and the subsequent social 
sectors that will feel the effects of those threats. At the same time, such documents reveal the high 
degree of polycentric governance in each country and in relation to each case, which can lead to 
confusion regarding who is responsible in the case of a major incident (seen, for example, in the 
case of Germany’s vital infrastructures) and makes it somewhat difficult to compare between 
national-level approaches.   
 Interestingly, which national agency (department or ministry) is responsible for the primary 
agenda-setting and coordination efforts varies per country (and, to a certain degree, per case). 
Whereas in the Netherlands, the Ministry of Security and Justice is the leading authority, in other 
countries, such as Estonia, it is the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Communications (although 
the Ministry of Justice also plays a role). Specifically, and perhaps not unsurprisingly, with regard 
to vital infrastructure protection, there is a greater role for departments that handle Foreign Affairs 
and thus also for policing forces and the military (as in Canada and Germany). Increasingly, there 
also seems to be recognition that the nature of the problem is so large that it is insufficient to 
designate one lead agency, whereby there have been mergers between two or more previously 
distinct bodies, as in the UK, or new cooperative arrangements formalized between agencies 
responsible for different sectors. What is less clear is the degree to which each of these agencies 
has an identified coordinator status with a given final decision-making authority and where this 
coordination role is better described as one of providing guidance, promoting best practices and 
engaging in activities to facilitate collaboration with and between other actors.  
The case of botnets discussed in Chapter 3 showed that, in addition to the responsible 
government agency, all of the countries included in this quick scan have at least a national CERT 
in place, with the mandate to oversee the dissemination of threats on national territory. While the 
procedures followed by CERTs are to a large extent harmonised, the practical value of their 
operations in regard to botnets varies. Moreover, because CERTs work within specified circles of 
trust, they share relevant information with one another that may not be disclosed to a larger 
audience, making it nearly impossible to evaluate the impact and the influence of national CERTs 
countering botnets beyond what stated online. Nonetheless, in countries such as the UK, parties 
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are increasingly encouraged to develop their own CERTs, which could potentially lead to less 
information sharing (and thus, partial knowledge of threats), without any demonstrated additional 
benefit.  
Chapter 3 also showed the importance of multi-stakeholder mitigation efforts at the 
international level. Despite national variations in approaches to botnet mitigation, all countries have 
demonstrated participation in international cooperative efforts against botnets. Despite the 
widening arena of actors and concordant shifts in the division of responsibilities, at the moment that 
coordinated action was necessary to take down a botnet in these situations, the C&C function of 
the government and police became evident. Initiatives supported by public authorities were easier 
to identify than sectoral and inter-sectoral efforts, for example the Virtual Situation Room run by the 
Estonian CERT. A large part of the international cooperation activities against botnets revealed a 
connection with EUROPOL (EC3) and the FBI efforts in fighting botnets, demonstrating the 
important role played by both institutions and a significant level of international cooperation.  
Whereas the distribution of authority across sectors and many levels of government could 
potentially be problematic from a governance perspective, especially in countries with a division of 
power between federal and state or provincial domains, Chapter 4 showed that this is perhaps not 
as great a problem as one might initially expect. The example of the energy sector clearly shows 
that critical infrastructure protection at the national level is a key issue that is increasingly seen as 
a joint task of society at large – suggesting more distribution of responsibilities across sectors, 
levels of government and types of individual and corporate actors. This was evident in German 
calls for more coordinated action supported by all players – government, business and industry and 
the general public – as well as in the role afforded to individual citizen vigilance in policy documents 
on the governance of Canadian vital infrastructure.  
One issue that became evident in Chapter 4 (and 5) was the increasing importance of the 
role of private sector parties, especially in countries where liberalization of markets has led to 
unbundling of functions and thereby a more distributed governance network. The economic aspect 
was mentioned as a point of contention in the Canadian case, and in the German case the issue 
of private actors currently only participating in collaborative and cooperative partnerships on a 
voluntary basis raises concerns about the actual effectiveness of such structures in preventing 
serious infrastructure threats. This is an important point to consider because it demonstrates how 
the choice for new measures (and thus who is responsible for them) touches upon the general 
interest and therefore legitimises certain government involvement. This is perhaps one reason that 
economic agencies have a more prominent role in some of the countries examined in this study.  
Chapter 5 revealed a myriad of approaches to identity governance in the internet era. The 
role of private sector parties was also prominent here, largely in settling contracts with government 
for the provision of various services and products necessary to a secure and functioning 
infrastructure for individual identification, authentication and authorization. Estonia and Germany 
further demonstrate how industry can be instrumental in the adoption (as in the case of Estonia) or 
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non-adoption (as in the case of Germany) of policies and practices that ensure the protection of 
identity-related transactions in a digital environment. The Canadian case showed one of the 
drawbacks of having so many different players active in this field: after implementing systems, 
ensuring the interoperability between (geographically) distinct systems while still effectively 
protecting the data they are transmitting poses a new governance challenge. Especially the 
incidents related to identity protection mentioned in the Dutch case highlight the importance of 
having systems in place that allow for quick detection of malfunction and criminal activities, which 
further points to the relevance of not only technical interoperability, but also cooperation between 
key players. 
 Finally, with regard to the distribution of responsibilities, examining how the different 
countries deal with the specific cybersecurity challenges presented by each case type reveals the 
importance of considering other aspects of governance than just the mutual interdependence 
between public and private actors. The cases show that counteracting the security threats posed 
to the various infrastructures is rarely a merely technical solution; rather, communication is a key 
part of governance processes, be it informing the affected parties after the fact or raising public 
awareness as part of preventive strategies. Moreover, they all point to the need for reflexivity and 
iterative learning in governance processes, as discussed in Chapter 2, which is especially critical 
given the dynamic nature of the cybersecurity landscape and the fact that actors cannot always 
foresee and oversee all the possible threats and their consequences.  
6.3 How are the responsibilities for cybersecurity regulated by 
law? 
In examining the legal side of cybersecurity governance, we discussed the regulatory frameworks 
for prevention, incident management and repression of threats to cybersecurity. Although the three 
cases cannot be generalised or even comprehensively summarised, given their specificity and 
complexity, we can sketch a preliminary picture that emerges from the cases.  
Regulation of prevention often takes the form of sectoral laws, possibly combined with lower 
regulations, stipulating requirements for risk assessment and risk management in a certain sector. 
There is some regional harmonization, such as the proposed EU Directive on network and 
information security (NIS), but we encountered few international regulatory frameworks here, 
except some references to international security standards such as the ISO norm for information 
security. Preventive regulation is, unsurprisingly, most prominently seen in the field of critical 
infrastructures, where it particularly makes sense to invest in prevention of high-risk threats; 
besides critical infrastructures, it can also be observed in regulating specific elements of 
cyberspace, such as protection of personal data or of telecommunications, where security 
requirements aim to provide a basic level of protection against generic cybersecurity threats. 
Besides legislation, we see prevention also being approached through information sharing, 
between and among various public and private stakeholders, which sometimes but not always 
seems to be underpinned by some form of regulation, such as contracts or another form of 
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agreement between parties. One important aspect of prevention for which we encountered only a 
few examples (although this may well be due to the quick scan character of the report, which 
necessarily relies more on law in the books than law in action), is enforcement of preventive 
measures. One interesting example of a preventive regulatory framework that includes significant 
measures of oversight is the German Energy Industry Act. It is a question for further research to 
what extent regulatory frameworks also provide for sufficient measures to ensure compliance with 
preventive standards and procedures, including oversight.  
Regulation of incident management seems less developed than regulation of prevention or 
repression. The primary focus of regulators is security breach notification, to ensure that 
cybersecurity threats are timely known at the appropriate level(s) where adequate incident 
response can be coordinated and performed. It is also assumed that mandatory security breach 
notification will have some preventive effect, since organisations will want to prevent the burden 
(and possible reputation damage) of having to report breaches in their cybersecurity. Regulators 
seem to be struggling with security breach notification regulation: many measures are still being 
developed, both at the supranational and at the national levels, and we see a fragmented approach 
with different, and possibly overlapping, measures being proposed or adopted. Most prominent is 
the security breach notification requirement in the EU NIS Directive, but there are also notification 
requirements in personal data and telecommunications regulation. Moreover, it remains to be seen 
to what extent the NIS Directive will be implemented in the same way in different member states; 
the developments in Germany with the IT Security Act, for example, seems suggestive of a sectoral 
and piecemeal approach, possibly leading to different forms of notification requirements or 
procedures.  
The fact that notification requirements apply in different sectors and for different aspects of 
cyberspace (data, communications infrastructure, type of service), which often have different 
authorities as the addressee of notifications, implies that a comprehensive overview of 
cybersecurity threats will not be achieved, unless further efforts are taken to streamline or 
coordinate the different types of notifications. Here we see the complexity of cybersecurity 
governance in action: cyberthreats can be approached from different angles (threats involving the 
technological (communications) infrastructure, the data flowing over this infrastructure, and the 
meaning of these data (the informational content) in different application contexts), and since these 
angles are often associated with different responsible actors, it is difficult to have a comprehensive 
approach to cybersecurity, even for something as relatively straightforward as notifying a breach of 
security. It may also be telling that the primary regulatory effort encountered in the cases is security 
breach notification; other elements of incident response are (even) less clearly or visibly regulated.  
This contrasts with regulation of repression, where we find considerable similarities and a 
consistent effort in regulatory approaches in the different countries. This is particularly the case in 
substantive law, which is harmonised to a considerable degree through the Cybercrime 
Convention. With the recent accession of Canada, all countries we studied have ratified and 
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implemented the Convention, which is a sign of its global importance. The Convention and national 
implementations provide a minimum level of criminalisation of cyberattacks, and since the types of 
attacks are defined in a generic and relatively technology-neutral way (as unlawful access to, 
interception of or interference with networks, computers or data), this provides a good basis to 
prosecute perpetrators of cyber-attacks, regardless of the particular modus operandi or the type of 
computer or data involved.  
The Convention does have limitations, however. One is that it does not mention sanction 
levels; EU Directive 2013/40/EU provides a more forcible model in this respect, as it prescribes 
minimum levels of criminal sanctions, and also includes particular aggravating circumstances (and 
higher sanctions) for use of botnets or attacks against critical infrastructures. A Guidance Note to 
the Cybercrime Convention on sanctions might be helpful in this regard. Another limitation, at least 
from the perspective of cybersecurity, is that repression through criminal law is generally only 
possible for intentional attacks, not for negligence or accidents. Repressive measures against those 
who are sloppy with cybersecurity are also important, but this should be done, for example, by 
enforcing professional standards through tort law, rather than criminal law.545 Moreover, 
substantive criminal law only works if it is enforced, so procedural law is equally important. Here 
we see less harmonisation and more differences between countries, even though the Cybercrime 
Convention also provides minimum standards for investigation powers. The discussions in Canada 
on lawful interception and in the Netherlands on remote access to computers by police show that 
state powers to investigate cyberattacks are a sensitive issue, all the more so in a post-Snowden 
context where the issue of government surveillance leads to wider societal debates. These 
sensitivities are difficult to resolve, and will require fine-tuned, national approaches rather than 
international guidelines. Since cyberinvestigation is – by its nature – easily cross-border 
investigation, this is a particularly challenging area in cybersecurity governance.  
Taking the above into consideration, we can conclude that the regulatory framework of 
cybersecurity has certain international elements, e.g., in cybercrime legislation and technical 
standards, but is largely undertaken at the national (and sometimes sub-national, in federated 
countries) level. Supranational regulation is visible in the EU, but rather limited to certain aspects 
of cybersecurity, such as critical infrastructures and telecommunications regulation. This is not to 
say that regulatory frameworks are necessarily fragmented at the supranational level – e.g., policy 
learning or legal transplants might take place, which we cannot determine on the basis of a quick 
scan – but at least it is clear that a comprehensive global regulatory effort to cybersecurity is not 
visible in the cases we studied. A similar observation can be made at the national level: most 
cybersecurity regulation is relatively specific, covering a particular aspect of cyberspace or of 
security, or cybersecurity in a particular context. Comprehensive regulatory frameworks are rare – 
understandably so, given the complexity of cybersecurity as we highlighted in Chapter 2. However, 
the UK Civil Contingencies Act 2004 provides an interesting example of a more comprehensive 
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approach, constituting the UK’s general framework for local and national emergency planning, 
management and response, excepting only defence issues.  
Finally, it is clear that law is not the only regulatory instrument in cybersecurity, although it 
plays an important role in all areas, as a general framework or as backstop regulation for situations 
that cannot be dealt with by private regulation alone. Legal frameworks are supplemented by, or – 
more often – expanded and detailed in, lower forms of regulation, such as administrative codes or 
(technical) standards, which may be explicitly made mandatory through a law as a minimum level 
of security or implicitly incorporated through a reference to open norms. Thus, cybersecurity 
regulation is often layered regulation, with more general legislative legal norms and more concrete 
lower-level norms. In several cases, soft law can also be observed that is not necessarily part of 
an overarching legislative framework; stakeholders make agreements with each other or develop 
guidelines or principles that serve as reference points for a sector or a certain type of organisation 
or professional. Particularly in the case of identification infrastructures, we encountered relatively 
few general legal frameworks, and more regulation through soft law, in particular also through 
contracts between public and private parties, where Terms & Conditions play an additional role in 
the governance of behaviour (in particular for the contracted private parties and the businesses or 
end-users with whom they engage). Here we can see the role of the state shift from being (only or 
largely) a public-policy maker and coordinator of society to being (also) one stakeholder among 
many with an interest in governance.  
6.4 Putting cybersecurity governance into perspective 
The form of a quickscan report does not allow us to elaborate and embed the findings of the use 
cases in a further theoretical reflection of cybersecurity governance. However, with a view to 
drawing lessons from the use cases, it is useful at this point to take one step back and to briefly 
discuss how the landscape of cybersecurity governance, as visible in the use cases, has come 
about, and how some of the challenges emerging from these could generally be approached by 
the stakeholders in governance.  
Cybersecurity is a term that is used in certain ways, which is captured by the notion of 
securitisation – a discursive practice with a particular rhetorical structure, framing political debates 
in terms of the need for providing (one or another form of) security. The term cybersecurity, being 
a part of the political security discourse, was politicised by policy makers very early on in its 
development, and cybersecurity can be seen as ‘a classic case of securitization’.546 In the US, for 
example, cybersecurity was first presented as a matter that requires the attention of state actors 
because it cannot be solved by market forces.547 As concern increased, policy-makers also 
represented it as a challenge requiring the urgent attention of the national security apparatus. 
Concern about security framed the issue either as a special kind of politics or as above politics: 
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with securitisation, an issue is no longer debated as a political question, but dealt with at an 
accelerated pace and in ways that may come to violate normal legal and social rules.548  
A key element of securitising discourse is creating a sense of urgency: arguing that if action 
is not undertaken then serious incidents will materialize in the near future. This is a specific 
rhetorical strategy to legitimize a proposed governance solution for a given situation, but at the 
same time offers opportunities to assess actual damage in attack situations (rather than only 
modelling the possibilities). Particularly events such as Stuxnet in 2010 or the cyberattacks on 
Estonia in 2007 catapulted cybersecurity from the expert level to the diplomatic and foreign policy 
realm, so that cybersecurity became an issue for diplomats, foreign policy analysts, the intelligence 
community and the military.549 Cyber-risks – especially in their most extreme form (in the sense of 
cyberterrorism etc.) – fit the risk profile of so-called ‘dread risks,’ which are perceived as 
catastrophic, fatal, unknown and basically uncontrollable. That is why they cause disproportionate 
fear despite low probability, which translates into pressure for regulatory action of all sorts and the 
willingness to bear high costs for uncertain benefits.550 A good example of the ‘remarkable 
mobilization of securitizing prose’ is an incident in the late 1990s, when two young hackers, Pryce 
and Bevan, were described in US Congress hearings as, “possibly the single biggest threat to world 
peace since Adolf Hitler.”551 The case against Bevan was dropped, and Pryce was fined the 
equivalent of £1200. Bevan said: “Looking back, I now believe that my case was not about hacking, 
but an exercise in propaganda.”552  
One risk of securitisation discourse is that it can lead to ‘hypersecuritization’, meaning an 
expansion of securitisation beyond what is considered to be a ‘normal’ level of threats and dangers, 
by defining ‘‘a tendency both to exaggerate threats and to resort to excessive countermeasures.”553 
Another characteristic of the securitisation discourse is ‘technification’ – it is dominated by technical 
and expert discourse with a strong emphasis on the hypothetical. These are both known strategies 
for dealing with the complexity and uncertainty that accompanies a risk such as cyberattacks, and 
although they might seem to make the cybersecurity landscape more manageable, it can mask the 
fact that the landscape is, in actuality, not overseen by policy-makers. The knowledge required to 
master the field is daunting and often not available to the broader public and as in most academic 
fields, computer scientists have disagreed on the likelihood of different forms of attacks. Moreover, 
since part of the field is cloaked in military or business secrecy, “much is withheld or simply not 
known, and estimates of damage strategically either wildly exaggerated or understated.”554 
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Technifications thus support hypersecuritisations, whereby they play a crucial role in legitimating 
cyber-securitisations. With the shift from computer security to cybersecurity as described in Chapter 
2, the original technical discourse has become linked to the securitizing discourse “developed in 
the specialized arena of national security”,555 whereby cybersecurity can be seen as a development 
of computer security evolving into network and infrastructure security combined with a process of 
securitisation. 
Closely related to, yet conceptually distinct from, the process of securitisation is a process 
of criminalisation – or perhaps, rather, of ‘crimification’ – that is visible in policy in the past decades. 
This is the phenomenon of using criminal law as a key instrument to address societal problems, 
rather than as a last resort (which criminal law traditionally has been) that is only used if other 
approaches (less invasive of fundamental rights and liberties) turn out insufficient. In the ‘crime 
society’, issues are often examined through the lens of criminal law: should we not criminalise new 
forms of behaviour that are causing problems, and should we not give the police more investigation 
powers?556 As a result, many activities are criminalised in the early stages before harm is actually 
done, as is visible in, e.g., criminalisation of preparation and facilitation of (cyber)terrorism, and of 
misuse of devices (art. 6 Cybercrime Convention), i.e., the creation, trade, or possession of 
passwords, software or hardware if this occurs with intent to commit a cybercrime. From a 
governance perspective, the process of crimification is not necessarily wrong, but it raises 
questions of subsidiarity (is a new measure really necessary, given existing possibilities or 
alternative approaches, including non-criminal law or soft law?) and the cumulative effect of 
disparately adopted measures (e.g., the combination of measures may have side-effects not 
foreseen when measures are decided upon). Moreover, it raises questions of the organisation of 
legal protection, given that most checks and balances in criminal law are focused on the criminal 
trial, which does not protect citizens from the many risk-based and pre-emptive interventions (which 
do not lead to a trial in court) that are becoming an intrinsic part of cybercrime, and hence also of 
cybersecurity governance.557   
Being aware of these issues helps position the discourse and policy-making efforts in the 
field of cybersecurity. In critical literature on cybersecurity governance, efforts are made to 
distinguish approaches based on inflated threat scenarios from realistic approaches to 
cybersecurity. Two concepts from this literature that can possibly help avoid tendencies toward 
hypersecuritisation, and thus are relevant to present here as ways that can help achieve a balanced 
and realistic approach to cybersecurity governance, are the “cybersecurity ladder” and “balanced 
risk approach”.  
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6.4.1 The cybersecurity ladder 
One effort to provide a nuanced view on cybersecurity governance is the development of the 
cybersecurity ladder. The idea behind this ladder is based on the likelihood of a cyberattack and 
the damage it might involve. Cyberincidents are continually causing minor and only occasionally 
major inconveniences (e.g., loss of intellectual property or other proprietary data, maintenance and 
repair, lost revenue and increased security costs).558 In the entire history of computer networks, 
there are only a few examples of cyberattacks that resulted in actual physical violence against 
persons,559 and only few had a substantial effect on property so far, although with the rise of the 
Internet of Things this may change in the future. Cyberattacks have not yet caused serious long-
term disruptions – they are mainly risks that can be dealt with by individual entities using standard 
information security measures and their overall costs remain low in comparison to other risk 




Types of cyber conflict, as identified by Dunn Cavelty (2012), p. 116.  
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Thinking about and planning for worst-case scenarios is of course a legitimate task of the 
national security apparatus, however, based on probable risk and damage incurred, certain types 
of cyberattacks that are sometimes included in the definition of cybersecurity, such as cyberwarfare 
or cyberterrorism, should not receive too much attention at the expense of more plausible 
cyberproblems. Using too many resources for high-impact, low-probability events – therefore 
having fewer resources left for the low to middle impact and high probability events – does not 
make sense, neither politically, strategically, nor from a cost-benefit perspective. The focus should 
be on types of attacks that are more likely and even common, such as cybercrime, cyberespionage 
and attacks on critical infrastructures.  
6.4.2 A balanced risk approach to cybersecurity 
In keeping with the idea of risk governance mentioned in Chapter 2, another way of conceptualizing 
cybersecurity is through risk analysis. As mentioned above, in the last couple of years the definition 
of cybersecurity, particularly in NCSs, has been expanding to also include cyberterrorism and 
cyberwarfare. Moreover, after the attacks in the US on September 11, 2001, attacks affecting 
critical infrastructures have been labelled terrorist attacks and critical infrastructures have emerged 
as an increasing priority in counter-terrorism activities.561 Although this report is not advocating 
widening the definition of cybersecurity to include cyberwarfare or cyberterrorism (which would 
include critical infrastructures), at least not as high priority cybersecurity goals, a risk analysis 
approach, also advocated as a counterterrorism policy,562 to decision-making in regard to 
cybersecurity is proposed.  
The risk analysis approach to decision-making states that allowing emotion to overwhelm 
sensible analysis is understandable and common among average citizens, however, it is 
inappropriate, irresponsible and even dangerous for the officials trying to keep them safe.563 Taking 
the risk analysis approach means that four issues are applied to the threats presented by 
cybersecurity as it is defined: (1) the cost per saved life; (2) acceptable risk; (3) cost-benefit 
analysis; and (4) risk communication. Graver cybersecurity threats, e.g. terrorism, evoke 
extraordinary fear and anxiety in people. Since there the public places pressure upon decision-
makers to act (and sometimes overreact), decision-makers are often also overly fearful about 
negative reaction to any relaxations of security measures that fail to be cost-effective and are 
otherwise seen as appropriate response with regard to possible consequences.564 There are, thus, 
serious psychological and political aspects of risk perception and electoral and lobbyist pressure. 
In spite of this, it is has been found that regulators and administrators are generally unwilling to 
spend more than a certain amount (changing with time) to save a human life; if the investment 
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would exceed this ceiling, they would prefer to spend funds on measures that save lives at a lower 
cost.565 This is the cost per saved life part of the risk analysis approach.  
Another way to approach the issue is by looking at what individuals consider to be 
acceptable risk, i.e. compare annual fatality rates caused by cybersecurity attacks with those 
caused by other hazards. The central issue here is whether the likelihood of being killed by the 
threat is unacceptably high or is low enough to be acceptable: how safe is safe enough? To take 
an extreme example from the CATO paper: every year a few thousand people in the US die in falls 
from buildings that are more than one story high. Those lives could be saved by closing off all 
buildings at the ground floor – to reject such a policy would be to say tall buildings are worth that 
cost in lives. Indeed, as a society, we regularly and inescapably adopt policies where human lives 
are part of the price.566 However, if this approach only looks at fatality rates then it would hardly be 
useful for cybersecurity threat analysis, since not many cyberattacks in fact result in death or 
serious physical injury. The ‘injury’ of cyberattacks is usually of a different kind – it is in distributed 
financial loss, loss of political or trade secrets, loss of privacy (or identity), annoyance and loss of 
capacity to conduct our lives in all aspects as we are used to.567 The consequence in the 
‘acceptable risk’ part of the risk analysis should, thus, be defined differently – threats that fall in the 
unacceptable range should be determined and these should then generally command the most 
attention and resources (for reaction and prevention).  
The cost-benefit analysis, as the third part of the risk analysis approach to cybersecurity, 
brings the issues of acceptable risk and the value of a saved life together. The conventional 
approach compares the costs of the security measure with its benefit in the lives saved and 
damages averted. The benefit of a security measure is a multiplicative composite of three 
considerations: a) the probability of a successful attack absent the security measure; b) the losses 
sustained in a successful attack; and c) the degree to which the security measure reduces the risk 
by lowering the probability and/or the consequences of a successful attack.568 If the benefit of the 
risk-reduction measure is greater than its cost, then the measure is deemed cost-effective. With 
certain cybersecurity threats or types of attack, usually those perceived as most dreadful (such as 
cyberwarfare and cyberterrorism), there is a lack of past experience. As such, the likelihood of such 
events in the future is very difficult to discern. This is another reason why these types of attacks 
should not be the primary focus of cybersecurity as a concept and cybersecurity governance 
measures in practice.  
The last part of the risk analysis approach is risk communication. This means that regulators 
who seek to expand limited funds in a manner that best enhances security should be risk neutral – 
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in as far as this is possible. This implies that they should deal with the objective likelihood that the 
hazard will occur and rely on that in their decision-making (rather than on worst-case or overly 
pessimistic scenarios).569 Here, again, the great psychological, social, cultural and institutional 
factors connected to dread risks arise – regulators are incentivised to communicate risk in line with 
the public’s (exaggerated) expectations and react in an exaggerated manner to them as well. More 
realistic communication to the public (and then action taken in accordance with it) does not 
necessarily mean that the official will not be re-elected for not acting in line with the public’s (initial) 
expectations.570  
According to these four steps in a risk analysis approach to cybersecurity policy and action, 
cybersecurity threats that are likely to occur and to incur non-acceptable damages (as defined at a 
certain time and place571) should be given priority, as that is the most responsible thing to do. 
Moreover, the occurrence of a new attack, despite measures taken based on such a risk analysis, 
should not be a priori considered as a failure of the approach. As James Fallows pointed out, 
political incentives here work only one way: “a politician who supports more extravagant 
counterterrorism measures can never be proven ‘wrong’, because an absence of attacks shows 
that the ‘measures have worked,’ whereas a new attack shows that we ‘must go further still.’”572 
Admittedly, risk and cost-benefit analysis should not be the sole criteria for public decision-making 
regarding cybersecurity or other matters. Nevertheless, they provide important insights into how 
security measures may (or may not) perform, the effect of such measures on risk reduction and 
their cost-effectiveness. Ignoring these insights may lead to raising unnecessary fears, wasting 
scarce resources and ignoring important other problems.573  
Countries should thus take a realistic approach to risk assessment, risk management and 
risk communication. While there is a need for proactive solutions that ensure stability over the 
longer term, at the same time it is important to avoid over-comprehensive approaches (i.e. securing 
everything Internet) that lack focus and concrete goals. Attention should be paid to high-impact, 
low-probability events (such as cyberterrorism), but strategically and from a cost-benefit 
perspective, the main focus ought to be on higher-probability events that have medium or higher 
impact, such as cybercrime, cyberespionage and attacks on critical infrastructures.574  
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6.5 Lessons Learned  
Based on our findings in the use cases and the approaches discussed in the literature, the following 
points can be made as lessons learned from our analysis, and thus also as issues that are important 
for further consideration since they are rather starting points for further reflection and policy 
development.  
1. Do not expect to resolve issues merely by establishing more laws. States currently tend to 
attempt to resolve cybersecurity problems by increasing ‘criminalisation’ – i.e. arranging 
tightening the reins through criminal law – but this is not necessarily the best or only solution. 
The countries studied here also illustrate alternative routes to regulating the field. 
2. The multi-stakeholder, private-public partnership approach is considered to be a crucial 
characteristic for governing cyberspace. All countries recognize this and this approach is 
evident in all the cases, albeit in slightly different forms. While there are considerable 
advantages to such an approach, the disadvantages highlighted here (such as coordination 
problems) should not be overlooked. 
3. In light of point 2, in such arrangements, who is coordinating between stakeholders (including 
who takes the lead and who has ultimate responsibility) should be clear and formally delineated.  
4. Policy makers can increase oversight efforts, which will indicate where there are potential gaps 
in both systems and the processes that govern them. Especially in differentiated forms of 
collaboration and cooperation, oversight is crucial. 
5. In multi-stakeholder collaborations, especially where certain actions are based on voluntary 
efforts, trust is a key success factor. Trust cannot be demanded or regulated, but fostered 
through good communication, information exchange and making clear agreements regarding 
division of tasks and actions to be taken.  
6. Cybersecurity is not necessarily separate from national security or civil protection, but an 
exceptional case that requires specific attention for the aforementioned points. Countries 
should carefully consider whether and how they regulate cybersecurity in relation to national 
security and civil protection: both an integrated governance regime and separate regimes can 
be employed, but either way, public policy should address the pitfalls in an integrated approach 
(e.g., too complex or too vague approaches, insufficient attention for the specifics of 
cybersecurity) or those in a separated approach (e.g., lack of coordination, policy competition, 
redundancy).  
                                                   
Available online: http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/science-and-technology/digital-security-risk-management-for-
economic-and-social-prosperity_9789264245471-en.    
 
 155 
6.6 Conclusion  
In modern societies, non-governmental actors play an increasing role in influencing policy 
outcomes, whereby the role of the centralized government (and, as such, its relationship to society) 
continues to change. Most especially, changing dynamics in public-private relationships and 
influences at the systemic (international) level put the effectiveness and legitimacy of classical 
policy strategies and instruments up for discussion. The cases discussed in this report provide yet 
another example of policy challenges for which the solution is often thought to require polycentric 
governance structures, rather than hierarchical ones. Indeed, developments in the field are 
dynamic and rapid, often occurring in absence of a central authority to steer or coordinate the 
process. On the one hand, in such situations, polycentric constellations can open a space for the 
experimentation and iterative learning processes that are deemed necessary to governance in 
process and possibly lead to more effective policy action in areas that span multiple sectoral 
domains. On the other hand, when the exact nature of the coordination structure is unclear, actors 
become concerned about the respective roles of the different parties (and who will take the lead) 
in cases of incidents and repression. This can even lead to opposing – rather than coordinated – 
actions (and in some cases, non-action) owing to individual interests, reflecting the steep learning 
curve that actors currently face in their efforts to coordinate collective action. 
 Some uncertainty is evident in the cases examined here, which reflect a great degree of 
decentralization to sectors that take a risk analysis or problem-oriented approach to dealing with 
cybersecurity. Decentralization is not necessarily a positive or negative development in and of itself. 
It seems logical, given the numerous, intertwined, social and technical factors that influence 
cybersecurity in various layers of society (e.g. data, infrastructure, personal behaviour, etc), that 
societies would move to governance arrangements that allow for cooperation between public and 
private parties, often (but not always) underpinned by some form of regulation. Use of contracts is 
one way of legitimizing cooperation, but may not always provide the desirable level of legitimacy 
from a public governance perspective. Moreover, many arrangements currently remain ‘voluntary’ 
or ‘encouraged’ for some actors and – especially because of the multiple layers that must be taken 
into account – there is an ever-present risk of fragmentation, which could impede effective policy 
action (gaps in coverage, inefficiency, policy competition, etc.), if the overarching picture is missing. 
More discussion is needed on how far society wants to proceed in engaging the private sector in 
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 Appendix 1. List of Abbreviations Used 
ACM  Authority for Consumers and Markets (NL) 
BKA   Federal Criminal Police Office (DE) 
BSI   Federal Office for Information and Security (DE) 
C&C  Command and Control 
CC III  Computercriminaliteit III (NL) 
CCIRC  Canadian Cyber Incident Response Centre  
CERT  Computer Emergency Response Team 
CIIP   Critical Information Infrastructure Protection 
CiSP   Cyber-security Information Sharing Partnership (UK) 
CMA  Computer Misuse Act (UK) 
CSIRT  Computer Security Incident Response Team 
CSTB  Computer Science and Telecommunications Board 
CVCA   Country Verifying Certificate Authority (DE) 
DDoS  Distributed Denial of Service 
DoS  Denial of Service 
EC3  European Cyber Crime Centre   
ENISA  European Union Agency for Network and Information Security 
EU  European Union 
FBI  Federal Bureau of Investigation (US) 
FIRST   Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams 
GCPC   German Criminal Procedure Code  
IAA  Identification, authentication and authorization 
ICS  Industrial Control System 
ICT  Information and Communication Technology 
ISA   Information System Authority (EE) 
ISAC  Information Sharing and Analysis Center 
ISP  Internet Service Provider 
ITU   International Telecommunication Union 
J-CAT   Joint European Cybercrime Action Task Force 
MEAC   Ministry of Economic Affairs and Communications (EE) 
NATO  North Atlantic Treaty Organization  
NCA   National Crime Agency (NCA) 
NCCU   National Cyber Crime Unit (UK) 
NCS  National Cybersecurity Strategy 
NCSC   National Cyber Security Centre (NL) 
NCSS 2  National Cyber Security Strategy 2 (NL) 
NCTV   National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism (NL) 
NERC   North American Electric Reliability Corporation (C) 
NFI   National Forensics Institute (NL) 
NGO  Non-governmental Organization 
NHTCU  National High Tech Crime Unit (NL) 
NIS  Network and Information Security 
NRR   National Risk Register for Civil Emergencies (UK) 
P2P  Pollution Prevention Progress 
PPP   Public-Private Partnership 
SCADA  Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition 
TERENA  Trans-European Research and Education Networking Association 
TI   Trusted Introducer for European CERTs 
TOR  The Onion Router 
VSR  Virtual Situation Room (EE)  




Appendix 2. List of Interviewed Experts 
 
Canada 
Martin Rudner, Ph.D., Distinguished Research Professor, Emeritus, Carleton University Ottawa 
 
Estonia 
Urmo Sutermäe - Head of the Division of Protection of Critical Infrastructures, Risk Management 
Division of the Estonian Information Systems Authority 
 
Marek Vasar – Head of the Division of Security and Coordinator of Information Security of State 
Agencies through IT Baseline Security System ISK, Risk Management Division of the Estonian 
Information Systems Authority  
 
Janek Rozov - Head of the Department of Information Society Services Development, Ministry of 
Economic Affairs and Communications 
 
Germany 
Gerrit Hornung – Chair of Public Law, IT Law and Legal Informatics, Institute of IT-Security and 
Security Law (Uni Passau)  
 
United Kingdom 
Ian Brown – Professor of Information Security and Privacy, Oxford Internet Institute 
 
George Danezis – Reader in Security and Privacy Engineering, Information Security Group, 
Computer Science Department, University College London 
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